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1. Introduction
Since 1890, judges and scholars have focused on the conceptual
phrase "new tort" when confronting the problem of expanding or
creating novel, noncontractual civil causes of action, or when ad-
dressing the probable ramifications of changing existing tort doc-
trine. "New tort" describes the process of identification. classifica-
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S. Economics, University of
Pennsylvania (Wharton School), 1973; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1977.
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tion, and analysis of emerging legal interests that are purportedly
ripe for judicial recognition. Use of the "new tort" concept as an
approach to sorting out and classifying tort liability principles is
rooted in Warren and Brandeis's Harvard Law Review article, The
Right To Privacy.' In that seminal work, the authors articulated an
overarching rationale for judicial recognition of a new cause of ac-
tion for tortious disruption of privacy based upon the technological
advances in the latter part of the nineteenth centuiy that enabled
one person to make photographic images of another and to make use
of those images for profit.
2
This approach to judicial creativity in the field of torts had two
antecedents: (1) the evolution of the action of "trespass on the case"
in early English common law;' and, (2) the "prima facie' tort" doc-
trine first enunciated in nineteenth century English and American
case law.4
In 1939, Dean William Prosser incorporated the provocative
phrase "new tort" into the title of an article published in the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law Review.5 The article, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering.- A New Tort, advanced the argument that prior
court decisions had functionally recognized a new cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and urged other courts to
formally acknowledge the creation of this unique form of tort liabil-
ity in future cases."
From 1939 onward, courts and legal commentators increasingly
employed the phrase "new tort" to signal their examination of the
need and desirability of creating new tort law. While analyzing the
ramifications of new tort doctrine, judicial opinions and scholarly ar-
ticles explored an assortment of policy considerations favoring or dis-
favoring expansion of existing tort law. Without reaching agreement
about the relative importance of policy considerations that should
trigger changes in tort doctrine, jurists and scholars who used the
phrase "new tort" engaged in a spirited and stimulating dialogue
about the nature of modern tort law. This article traces .the history
of judicial and scholarly use of the phrase "new tort," and considers
the problems and prospects that have arisen from reference to the
I. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Id. at 195-97, 213-20.
3. See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
5. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874 (1939).
6. See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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phrase as a shorthand expression of judicial creativity in the realm of
tort law.
This study is organized into three principal parts. First, this ar-
ticle examines the common law antecedents that provide general
background analysis about the origins of the "new tort" conception
in American law: the centuries old writ of "trespass on the case," the
development during the nineteenth century of the "prima facie" tort
doctrine, and the notion, widely recognized in the late nineteenth
century, that "torts without particular names"-7 were constantly be-
ing developed. Second, the article explains how, from 1940 through
1988, courts and commentators have utilized the phrase "new tort"
to resolve novel tort problems. Finally, the study synthesizes, criti-
ques, and appraises the multiplicity of policy considerations stern-
ming from "new tort" cases by focusing on the major themes in ease
law and scholarship.
11. The Intellectual Origins of the "New Torts" Concept in Ameri-
can Law
A. Trespass on ihe Case: The Release Valve ol EarlY English
Common Law
During late thirteenth century England, the emergence of the
action of trespass changed the common law." Having achieved politi-
cal hegemony and prestige in the first part of the century, the central
courts began to systematize and formalize the law that they applied."
As a result, what had been formless, relatively flexible quare actions,
reflecting a wide range of trespass actions for direct personal and
property damage, hardened into the special writ of trespass.'" The
writ of trespass, however, did not provide redress for injuries inflicted
by indirect force and covered only limited categories of injuries that
derived from earlier precedents."l
In response to the formalism and conservatism of the Chancery
and the King's court, King Edward I effected passage of the Statute
of Westminster 11 in the year 1285." In the statute, particularly
chapter 24, Edward attempted to provide remedies for otherwise
7. See infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
8. Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE LJ 1142, 1149
(1937).
9. Id.
10. Examples of these early actions are provided in T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956).
II. Dix, supra note 8, at 1150.
12. Id. at 1146 n.18.
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remediless plaintiffs. 3 Specifically, chapter 24 stated:
And whenever henceforth, it shall happen in the Chancery
that in one case a writ is found and in a like case falling under
the same law and requiring a like remedy [no writ is found],
then the clerks of the Chancery shall agree in making the writ,
or they may adjourn the plaintiffs until the next parliament, and
let them write the cases in which they cannot agree and refer
them to the next parliament, and let the writ be made with the
consent of the wise men of the law; and from henceforth, let it
not happen that the court any longer fail complainants seeking
justice. 4
American and English legal scholars of the late nineteenth cen-
tury and early twentieth century, including Blackstone, Holmes,
Maitland, and Ames, postulated that the emergence of the action of
trespass on the case was derived directly from chapter ;24 of the
Statute of Westminster 11.15 Although this legislative enactment was
undoubtedly part of the general legal environment of the late thir-
teenth and early fourteenth centuries, more recent scholarship has
suggested that the special action of trespass on the case gradually
evolved from the old action of trespass.1 6 Such writs were said to be
actions "upon the case" because, although analogous to existing
forms of action, they depended on recitation of unique and compel-
ling facts. Thus, according to the more modern view, the action of
trespass on the case was judicially crafted over several centuries as a
special form of the common law action of general trespass, adapted
to the particular facts of cases in which the usual form of the writ of
trespass could not apply.17
The significance of the medieval action on the case is threefold.
First, the device was judicially created and implemented. Although
legislative enactments served to inform judicial decision in particular
cases, Parliament's direction was not binding. Second, full develop-
ment of action on the case during the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries reflected an evolution in the thinking of common law judges.
Thus, while traditional forms of action were desirable, the courts
were called upon to respond to changes in society that led to "indi-
13. Id. at 1147.
14. Id. (citing Statute of Westminster I, 13 EDw. I, ch. 24 (1285)).
15. Id. at 1142 nn.I & 2 (citing O.W. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW 274-75 (1881); F.
MAITLAND, EQUITY AND FORMS OF ACTION 345-46 (1909); J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL
HISTORY 442 (1913)).
16. Dix, supra note 8, at 1176.
17. Id. See also T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 10, at 372-73.
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rect" forms of injury. Third, no specific criteria existed to determine
whether a fact pattern should give rise to a new action on the case.
Considerations of custom and legislative policy received judicial at-
tention; however, these factors were vague and elastic.
B. The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: A Nineteenth Century
Innovation
Despite the emergence of the special action of trespass on the
case, English tort law maintained strict standards. A plaintiff had no
remedy unless his case fit within some specific and established rule
of liability regardless of whether the action involved a writ of tres-
pass for direct injuries, or a precedent for trespass on the case for
indirect injuries. During the latter part of the nineteenth century,
however, the rigorous early rules began to soften, and the prima fa-
cie tort doctrine emerged.' 8
The prima facie tort doctrine drew upon civil law traditions by
basing liability on principle rather than on precedent. 19 Lord
Bowen's dictum in the 1889 case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGre-
gor, Go & Co.20 expresses the classic statement of the prima facie
tort doctrine: "Now intentionally to do that which is calculated in
the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact,
damage another in that person's property or trade, is actionable if
done without just cause or excuse. "21
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was the chief judicial proponent
of the prima facie tort doctrine in the United States. In scholarly
commentary 22 and in his opinions written while serving as a justice
both on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 23 and on the
United States Supreme Court, " Holmes admired the "frank presen-
tation of fundamental issues which the doctrine encouraged. ' 25 Fol-
lowing the lead of Justice Holmes, several states accepted the doc-
18. Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1952) (citing W.
PROSSER, TORTS § 22 (1941)).
19. Id. (citing Friedmann, Modern Trends in the Law of Torts, I MOD. L, REV. 39
(1937); Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22 (1933); Winfield, The Foundation
of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1927)).
20. 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd [1892] A.C. 25.
21. Id. at 613.
22. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
23. See Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901); Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (dissenting opinion); Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167
Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
24. See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) ("prima facie the intentional
infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law,
whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape").
25. See Note, supra note 18, at 504.
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trine or were influenced by its principles in the first half of the
twentieth century.2 6 For example, some American jurisdictions in-
voked the doctrine in actions for inducement of breach of contract,
in actions growing out of labor disputes, and in cases involving unfair
competition.27 One commentator, writing in 1959, defended the
prima facie tort doctrine by asserting that it had
proved useful in assisting the development of needed reforms in
the law of tort, particularly in receiving and resolving the myr-
iad of claims which have arisen from new relationships formed,
and continuously reformed, in the business world. It serves a
high purpose in providing within its compass a residuary action
for timely recognition of novel claims . . . .More importantly,
it suggests a mode of reasoning in accordance with "the best
light" we have, whereby the competing interests, both private
and public, in any case are found and considered and honestly
assessed as the relevant decisional factors.2"
The prima facie tort doctrine, however, has not evolved into a
comprehensive theory of liability in the United States.29 Section 870
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[o]ne who inten-
tionally causes injury to another is subject to liability . . . if his con-
duct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances
. .. [even if] the actor's conduct does not come within the tradi-
tional category of tort liability." 30 Nevertheless, few American
26. id.
27. Id. at 504-05 (footnote omitted).
28. Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54
Nw. U.L. REV. 563, 573-74 (1959) (emphasis provided) (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 574.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979). In a comment to this section, the
drafters urge application of this principle to fact patterns that do not neatly fit pre-existing
categories:
Nature of Section. This Section is intended to supply a generalization for
tortious conduct involving harm intentionally inflicted. Generalizations have long
existed for negligence liability, involving conduct producing unreasonable risk of
harm to others (see Sections 282, 291-294), and for strict liability, involving the
carrying on of an activity that is abnormally dangerous (see Sections 519-520).
As for conduct intentionally causing harm, however, it has traditionally been
assumed that the several established intentional torts developed separately and
independently and not in accordance with any unifying principle. This Section
purports to supply that unifying principle and to explain the basis for the devel-
opment of a more recently created intentional tort. More than that, it is intended
to serve as a guide for determining when liability should be imposed for harm
that was intentionally inflicted, even though the conduct does not come within
the requirements of one of the well-established named intentional torts.
The principle set forth in this Section has been recognized in various forms,
often incomplete in their expression. It is sometimes called an innominate form
of the action of trespass on the case; and in New York particularly, it has been
given the appellation of a "prima facie tort" and efforts have been made to set
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courts have relied upon the suggested rule.3 '
C. Torts Without Particular Names: New Tort Scholarship and
Judicial Review, 1890-1939 - From Brandeis and Warren to
Prosser
"New tort" scholarship in the form of intellectual discussion of
changing tort principles giving rise to the recognition of a novel doc-
trine 2 began in earnest in 1890 with the Harvard Law Review's
publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, The Right to Pri-
vacy.33 While not explicitly mentioning the term "new tort," the ar-
forth its requirements with more rigidity. This Section does not attempt to estab-
lish precise and inflexible requirements. Instead, it lays down general guidelines
and uses words expressing standards that vary with the circumstances to which
they are applied. It is stating a general principle rather than setting forth spe-
cific rules.
Id., comment a.
31. But see Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (court
held that strict liability as defined by section 870 should be adopted and applied to claims
based on radioactive damage). See also Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391
(1975); Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.
REV. 465 (1957); Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L.
REV. 196 (1946); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 7
(1951); Note, The Prima Facie Doctrine in New York - Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 530 (1968).
32. "New tort" scholarship combines an interesting mixture of practical and theoretical
articles. In addition to the articles cited elsewhere in this study, see, e.g., Bopp, Bostrom,
McKinney, The 'Rights' and 'Wrongs' of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurispruden-
tial Analysis of Birth-Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461 (1989); Destro, The Emerging
'Right' to a Good Life, WORLD 73 (Spring 1989); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Abso-
lute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV, 359 (1951); Max, A New Tort in Alabama: Wrongful Employ-
ment Termination in Violation of Public Policy" 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 39 (1988); Merritt,
Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Soci-
ety, 42 VAND. L. REV, 1 (1989); Oddi, The Tort of Interference With the Right to Die: The
Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986); Schuck, The New Ideology of
Tort Law, 92 PUB. INTEREST 93 (1988); Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort
Law" 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989); Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of In-
strumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988); Young, Reconceptualizing Account-
ability in the Early Nineteenth Century: How the Tort of Negligence Appeared, 21 CONN. L.
REV. 197 (1989); Comment, Ruminations on a New Tort: Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Refining
Company, 4 LA. L. REV. 309 (1942); Comment, 'Nowhere to Go and Chose to Stay': Using
the Tort of False Imprisonment to Redress Involuntary Confinement of the Elderly in Nurs-
ing Homes and Hospitals, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1989); Note, The Use of Criminal Stat-
utes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1948); Note, A Proposed New
Tort Cause of Action in Missouri for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Commercial Contracts, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 433 (1987); Note, Wrongful Life: Ex-
ploring the Development of a New Tort, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 635 (1985-86).
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I. In an article written several decades after the
Warren and Brandeis piece, one commentator described The Right to Privacy analysis as ad-
vocating a "new tort." See Kalvern, Privacy and Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966). See also later judicial descriptions of the
1890 Warren and Brandeis article as laying the foundation for development of a "new tort":
McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745
F.2d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1984); Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968 (D.R.I.
1988).
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ticle described a common law tort right to be left alone that had not
expressly been recognized by English or American courts. The arti-
cle advanced several observations about judicial creativity and the
evolution of tort law that were central to the subsequent develop-
ment of the "new tort" conception in scholarly literature and judicial
opinions over the next one hundred years. The article began with a
proposition that elegantly summarized the driving force of change in
the law of torts: "[T]hat the individual shall have full protection in
person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but
it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the
exact nature and extent of such protection."" Specifically, the au-
thors contended that "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail
the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal
youth, grows to meet the demands of society."35
Warren and Brandeis then traced the expansion of the ideas of
"life," "liberty," and "property," which in turn gave rise to new
remedies and new tort causes of action.3 6 The authors attributed this
expansion of the law to the inevitable advance of civilization."
Another premise of the Warren and Brandeis article regarding
the "new tort" concept in American law was the argument that judi-
cial innovation in the realm of tort law should be motivated in part
by the need to remedy negative consequences of the march of civili-
zation. The authors advocated recognition of a specific tort cause of
action to protect invasions of privacy that occurred through new in-
ventions and business methods. a8
The Right to Privacy article postulated linkages between judi-
cial creativity and common law development in the separate areas of
contract, property, and tort law. Referring to examples of judicial
innovation in implying trust or contract terms, the article describes
such actions as "nothing more nor less than a judicial declaration
that public morality, private justice, and general convenience de-
mand recognition of such a rule."' 39 Warren and Brandeis argued
that novel contract and new property 0 innovations were consistent
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193 (emphasis provided).
35. Id. (emphasis provided).
36. The authors noted that "the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life -
the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges;
and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form of possession - intangible, as well
as tangible." Id. Warren and Brandeis also summarized specific new tort causes of action
recognized in past centuries. Id. at 193-95.
37. Id. at 195.
38. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
39. Id. at 210.
40. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LI 733 (1964).
NEW TORTS
with recognition of a broad foundation4' of tort law to protect the
"right to be left alone. '"42
Finally, the Warren and Brandeis article made an important
distinction that anticipated judicial pre-occupation with "new tort"
cases in decades to come.'" The article distinguished between the in-
troduction of a new principle and merely applying an existing princi-
ple to new cases." According to the authors, only the former is re-
ally "judicial legislation."45
Initially, courts declined to recognize a "new tort" involving pri-
vacy rights."' But, beginning with the Georgia Supreme Court deci-
sion in the 1905 case, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,47 state courts gradually recognized the tort.48 By 1960, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions acknowledged some form of the right of
privacy.49
Another significant piece of "new tort" scholarship is the 1921
article by Professor Jeremiah Smith, Torts Without Particular
Names.50 Smith synthesized and amplified, various jurisprudential
principles concerning the gradual naming of wrongs by the courts in
juxtaposition with the "unclassified residuum" of wrongs."
41. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 210-11.
42. Id. at 195 (quoting COOLEY ON TORTS (2d ed.), at 29).
43. See, e.g., infra notes 594-602, 757-69 and accompanying text.
44. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 213 n.I.
45. Id. Warren and Brandeis quoted J. AUSTIN. THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 224
(1832) and his assertion:
I cannot understand how any person who has considered the subject can
suppose that society could possibly have gone on if judges had not legislated, or
that there is any danger whatever in allowing them that power which they have
in fact exercised, to make up for the negligence or the incapacity of the avowed
legislator. That part of the law of every country which was made by judges has
been far better than that part which consists of statutes enacted by the
legislature.
Id. at 213 n.j.
46. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902) (New York Court of Appeals dismissed a suit for invasion of privacy brought by a
young woman whose picture was placed on 25,000 posters advertising defendant's flour).
47. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
48. See, e.g., Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926) (posing as plain-
tiff's common law wife); State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924)
(use of name as candidate by political party): Schwartz v. Erdington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660
(1913) (name signed to petitions); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.E. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907)
(birth certificate naming plaintiff as father).
49. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
50. Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1921). Smith is,
perhaps, best known for an earlier article, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV.
103, 223, 303 (1911-12). That article, written in several installments, introduced the concept
of "substantial factor" to causation analysis and influenced later attempts to determine proxi-
mate cause. See GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS 18 (R. Berring ed. 1984).
51. Smith, supra note 50, at 92.
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The Smith article raised six points that are relevant to the
emergance 'of the "new tort" concept. First, Smith traced the history
of the classification of torts, which progressed from procedural no-
menclature in the early common law to later names based on sub-
stantive taxonomies.52 Second, Smith pointed out the inconsistencies
in the way that existing torts had been named." For example, under
the general heading of defamation, Smith illustrated the ambiguities
created by two alternative names for injuries arising from use of lan-
guage: "injurious falsehood," named according to the nature of the
harm done, and "malicious language," denominated by the method
or manner in which the harm is done.,4 Third, Smith analyzed the
ambiguities inherent in naming torts.5 Fourth, Professor Smith con-
tended that use of a distinct name for every possible concrete case of
tort would be both impractical and useless.5 Analogizing the nam-
ing of existing tort causes of action to the complete codification of
tort law, Smith pointed out the undesirability of attempting to
pinpoint an exact name and category for every conceivable tort.5
Fifth, Professor Smith discussed the newly recognized tort of "viola-
tion of, or interference with, the right of privacy,"58 stemming from
the Warrenand Brandeis article, published over three decades ear-
lier. Smith observed that "[f]rom time to time, courts will recognize
the existence of new groups, made up of hitherto unnamed torts...
and names will be .invented (suggested) to describe each of these new
groups."59 Echoing Warren and Brandeis's argument for recognition
of the new tort of privacy, Smith noted that new tort causes of action
arise because of changes in lifestyles and business practices resulting
52. Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted).
The various definitions proposed have met with much criticism. As might
have been expected, it has been found that the various kinds of torts which have
received specific names do not include all the wrongs which courts are accus-
tomed to recognize as coming under the general head of torts. Hence the admis-
sion that, besides wrongs with particular names, there are "wrongs without
names" ("innominate grievances") which are subjects of action, and for which
damages are recoverable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
53. "Some so-called specific torts are named according to the nature of the right af-
fected or the harm done, while others are named by the same writer according to the method
or manner by which the harm is done." Id. at 94 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 105-07.
55. Id. at 109. Smith mentioned "private nuisance" as an example of a tort that is "too
broad, too general." Id. at 110.
56. Smith, supra note 50, at 110.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Id. at 112.
NEW TORTS
from technological advancements.6" Smith postulated, however, that
improved technology might also lessen the likelihood of judicial de-
velopment of new tort doctrine for some types of conduct." For ex-
ample, Smith noted "the danger of certain uses of property hitherto
regarded as extrahazardous . . ., so far as to remove some cases
from the list of instances where the law imposes absolute liability,
and instead leav[ing] the actor liable only for failure to use care." 62
The sixth important contribution of Smith's Torts Without Particu-
lar Names to nascent "new tort" analysis in the twentieth century
was his observation that tort nomenclature often undergoes revision
as the law surrounding each "new tort" develops.63
In 1922, one year after Smith's study, Professor Albertsworth
addressed the Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts in
the California Law Review. " By injecting a number of analytical
observations derived from legal realist jurisprudence, Albertsworth
laid important intellectual groundwork for later recognition of new
tort causes of action.
The first point of synthesis was Professor Albertsworth's histori-
cal explanation of judicial recognition of new interests in tort law.
Beginning with Roman law, he wrote about several stages of devel-
opment in tort law. First, the Strict Law 5 provided an elaborate sys-
tem of remedies. The availability of a remedy defined the extent of
one's rights.66 The next stage of development in the law, Equity and
Natural Law, tried to give legal recognition to certain moral duties
by applying remedies to them The period of so-called Maturity of
Law reversed the Strict Law and "recognized that corresponding to
every duty there was a correlative right which would be protected by
the law." 67
A second contribution of the Albertsworth article to the emerg-
ing new tort concept evolved from reflections on the writings of the
sociological school of jurists.8 Albertsworth first provided back-
60. Id.
61. Smith, supra note 50, at 112.
62. Id. at 113-14.
63. Id. at 114 (footnote omitted). By way of example of this revision in nomenclature,
Smith noted that the tort "slander of title" had gradually evolved to become "disparagement
of title." Id.
64. Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF. L. REV.
461 (1922).
65. Strict law succeeded the former stage of primitive law. Id. at 462.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 462 (footnotes omitted).
68. Sociological jurisprudence is "[t]he general name for those approaches to the study
of law, in general, which have more regard to the working of law in society than to its form or
content." D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1153 (1980). Indeed, "[s]ociological
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1990
ground theory on the meaning of this school of legal thought and
then applied these observations to the field of torts. He noted the
influence of the scholars of the 1920s, such as Rudolf Jhering and
Roscoe Pound, in bringing inductive processes into the administra-
tion of justice.6"
To Albertsworth, the problem with this approach was deciding
what interests, both individual and social, the law should recognize.
70
According to Albertsworth, the traditional "natural rights" concept
"must not be thought of as static, not subject to change with new
and different conditions.'
Professor Albertsworth analyzed four specific new tort catego-
ries in which he believed the law was gradually giving more effect to
interests not previously recognized. 72 Albertsworth argued that:
Some courts [in the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury] are recognizing that the injury is the primary and para-
mount consideration, not the character of the defendant who in-
flicts it, nor the nature of the act itself. If causation and injury
can be established, and the defendant acted wrongfully, the law
will give a remedy. Such is the case, particularly in permitting
recovery for pre-natal injuries; giving the wife tort actions
against the husband; allowing recovery for mental suffering;
and permitting tort actions against municipal corporations in
the face of ancient doctrines which exempted them from
liability.7"
jurists look on legal institutions, doctrines, and precepts functionally; the form of legal precepts
is the means only. They have very divergent philosophical views." Id.
Montesquieu is generally considered the forerunner of this school, and initial steps were
taken by Jhering. in the U.S., the forerunner was Mr. Justice Holmes, succeeded by Mr.
Justice Cardozo and, among academics, Roscoe Pound, followed in Australia by Stone and
Paton.
A divergent branch of sociological jurisprudence is realism, the approach of jurists princi-
pally in the U.S. who regard what the courts will, in fact, do in particular cases as being the
law. Notable figures adopting this standpoint have been Gray, Mr. Justice Holmes, Frank, and
Llewellyn. Id.
69. Albertsworth observed:
Logically, the process of making the law effective as a means of realizing
justice requires a reversal of the historical method of remedy, duty, right, and
interest. [In the 1920s], thanks to the insistence of Rudolf Jhering and the socio-
logical school of jurists [including Roscoe Pound], the legal system approaches
the problem of the administration of justice by an inductive, instead of a deduc-
tive, process.
Albertsworth, supra note 64, at 462-63.
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis provided) (footnote omitted). "On the contrary, they are subject to
fluctuations, due to changed environmental conditions and to more adequate and effective
means of enforcement by the judicial machinery." Id.
72. Id. at 463.
73. Id.
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Albertsworth urged that this approach be utilized in future tort
adjudication. Although he recognized the need for caution in judicial
innovations, Albertsworth concluded his 1922 article by asserting
that "if the viewpoint of the court be that the law should recognize a
continually widening circle of interests, the law will, better than in
the past, serve as a means to an end and to the furtherance of
civilization. 74
Drawing upon tort cases and a body of tort scholarship devel-
oped during the past decades, Dean William Prosser wrote a water-
shed article, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort,
published in 1939.75 He acknowledged at the outset the truth of Jer-
emiah Smith's contention that there was no necessity in law for sep-
arate named torts. Nevertheless, Prosser boldly asserted that it was
time to recognize that the courts had created a "new tort. ' 76 Echo-
ing Professor Albertsworth's analysis of seventeen years earlier,
7 7
Prosser argued that, outside of assault cases, the law has been reluc-
tant to accept "the interest in peace of mind as entitled to indepen-
dent legal protection. '78 Yet, Prosser predicted that the law was in
the process of growth, and that the future of intentional infliction of
mental suffering as a "new tort" was subject to change.79
Prosser's 1939 article did not explicitly explain what he meant
by reference to "new tort." By implication, Prosser viewed a "new
tort" as a recently recognized or nascent independent tort. The best
evidence of this view is in Prosser's discussion of the judiciary's past
allowance of mental damages when an independent tort could be
identified."0 Prosser asserted that intentional infliction of mental in-
74. Id. at 491.
75. Prosser, supra note 5.
76. Id. at 1 (citing Smith, supra note 50).
77. See supra notes 64-74 ind accompanying text.
78. Prosser, supra note 5, at 874 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 880. Prosser observed that:
[lf some independent tort could be made out, no matter how technical it
might be, there was a cause of action; and with this cause of action as a peg
upon which to hang the mental damages, recovery was freely permitted. Virtu-
ally from the beginning mental suffering has been a recognized element of dam-
ages in assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and seduc-
tion . . . .As long ago as 1906, Street remarked upon this phenomenon. He
called such damages "parasitic," and ventured a prediction that has proved to be
prophetic:
The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor be-
longs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution, A factor which is
today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an
independent basis of liability.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis provided) (quoting I. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 470 (1906)).
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jury is "in process of becoming a cause of action in itself."" He
observed, however, that the traditional judicial tendency to allow re-
lief by fitting the case into some existing cause of action strained the
analysis, thereby disguising the real basis of recovery under some
other name.82 In Prosser's view, the courts were using "technical"
categorizations83 to protect "real" interests. Therefore, according to
Prosser's analysis, recognition of a "new tort" was preferable to the
use of a technical old tort or existing contract or property
conceptions.
Dean Prosser's treatise, The Law of Torts,84 elaborated on his
analysis of "new torts" in his 1939 article. Prosser observed that new
torts were constantly being recognized, and that the progress of the
common law depended upon the many cases of first impression in
which the courts "struck out boldly to create a new cause of action,
where none had been recognized before.''85
Prosser framed his "new tort" concept by reference to opposite
extremes of tort theory. Sir John Salmon's view, on one extreme,
envisioned tort law as "a set of pigeon-holes, each bearing a name,
• ..to which the act'or omission of the defendant must be fitted."86
The opposite view was that the entire law of torts could be reduced
to the broad principle that any harm inflicted upon another is a
wrong, and calls for redress, unless the action can be justified."'
Prosser seems to have intended his "new tort" concept to bridge the
theoretical gap. In other words, Prosser probably thought of the
phrase "new torts" as a dynamic way of describing an evolutionary
process whereby courts named, and gave substance to, specific tort
causes of action that were previously hidden in broad and general
principles that contemplated private, noncontractual recovery for
wrongful acts.
While courts and commentators were no doubt catalyzed to em-
ploy "new tort" phraseology by Prosser's use of the term in his 1939
article, the words have meant different things to different writers and
have varied in different contexts. The phrase "new tort" appears to
be a signal, or marker, for addressing the ramifications and implica-
81. Id. (emphasis provided).
82. Id. (footnote omitted).
83. Prosser, supra note 5, at 886. Examples of technical categories include: assaults,
batteries, imprisonments, trespasses, implied contracts, invasions of privacy or doubtful prop-
erty rights. Id. at 886-87.
84. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (lst ed. 1941).
85. Id. at 3 (citing Smith, supra note 50).
86. Id. (citing J. SALMOND. LAW OF TORTS § 2 (7th ed. 1928)).
87. Id. at 4.
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tions of judicial creativity in responding to cases that seek to change
existing tort doctrine. As such, the "new tort" concept has become a
tool of jurisprudential analysis: "a form of law . ..seen as a com-
plex of means and goals.""8
During the fifty year period between the Warren and Brandeis
article and the Prosser article, only a handful of judicial decisions
expressly mentioned the phrase "new tort." For the most part, when
the phrase was used, courts discussed the concept of a "new tort" as
bearing on the effect of some prior legislative change in tort law
from pre-existing common law. Thus, in the 1909 decision of Florida
East Coast Railway Co. v. Lassiter,89 the Florida Supreme Court
considered the defendant railroad's argument that the recently en-
acted worker's compensation statute was an unconstitutional "new
tort" or "new rule of liability of the master to his servant." 9 In the
1933 case Jackson v. Anthony,9' the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court decided a conflict of laws question involving the choice of
which state's wrongful death statutes should apply. That court re-
ferred to the "new tort" created by the Rhode Island Legislature in
its wrongful death statute, which permitted liability where common
law had not.92 In the 1935 case City of Indianapolis v. Willis,93 the
Indiana Supreme Court narrowly construed the availability of a
cause of action under Indiana's wrongful death statute, noting "that
the action for wrongful death is a 'brand new tort.' It is a new and
independent cause of action and can only be maintained when a de-
cedent left a widow or next of kin surviving him." 94
One of the first judicial opinions to comprehensively construe
and apply the phrase "new tort" in the context of common law
causes of action was the 1939 decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.95 In Sum-
mit, the court confronted the issue of imposing strict liability on a
radio broadcasting company for an extemporaneous defamatory re-
mark interjected by the comedian Al Jolson regarding the Summit
Hotel.96 The court focused on the unique technology of radio broad-
casting, interfaced with the existing common law rule that a newspa-
88. See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 71 (1982).
89. 58 Fla. 234, 50 So. 428 (1909).
90. Id. at 235, 50 So. at 429.
91. 282 Mass. 540, 185 N.E. 389 (1933).
92. Id. at 544, 185 N.E. at 391.
93. 208 Ind. 607, 194 N.E. 343 (1935).
94. Id. at 611, 194 N.E. at 346.
95. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939),
96. Jolsen stated that the Summit Hotel was "a rotten hotel." Id. at 183, 8 A.2d at 303.
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per publisher is absolutely liable for defamation. The court observed
that "[t]he real difficulty arises from attempting to adapt to the new
tort of radio defamation, rules of liability applicable to other fields of
kindred, but not identical, types of wrong."197 After noting the state
of development and experimentation in the relatively new broadcast-
ing industry, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that tort
law was flexible enough to provide for the recognition of a "distinct
form of action." '98 Underlying this conclusion was the presupposition
that the law is flexible enough to recognize liability for new wrongs
as progress presents changing demands on the legal system.99 The
court therefore rejected an absolute liability approach. The justices
relied on "government regulation [to] afford . . . a potential check,"
coupled with a negligence approach when the radio station manage-
ment failed to exercise due care to avoid the utterance of defamatory
material.' o
111. Opening the Floodgates: Modern Proliferation of "New Tort"
Contexts
A. Judicial Creativity Explored, 1940-1969
During the thirty year period commencing in 1940, courts in-
creasingly referred to the "new tort" phrase in the process of grap-
pling with novel factual and legal problems in tort law. Decisions
during this period fall roughly within two categories: (1) statutory
construction cases, and (2) novel questions of common law causes of
action.
I. Statutory Construction Cases.-Numerous cases using the
phrase "new tort" focused on whether a particular statute gave rise
to a private civil action that exceeded the bounds of pre-existing
common law torts. 1 Those courts addressing statutory construction
97. Id. at 191, 8 A.2d at 309.
98. Id. at 198, 8 A.2d at 310.
99. Id. at 201, 8 A.2d at 310.
100. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 202, 8 A.2d 302,
311,(1939).
101. Examples of this type of case include: Pennsylvania Council For Ins. On Lives v.
City of Phila., 351 Pa. 214, 40 A.2d 461 (1945) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
state statute authorizing the Public Service Commission to ascertain compensation for prop-
erty damages stemming from abolition of railroad grade crossings "[did] not create liability
for a new tort", Id. at 219, 20 A.2d at 463); Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.
Calif. 1948) (a federal court construed a United States civil rights statute as not triggering
liability against private parties in the absence of state action because courts should "hesitat[e]
to create a new tort liability . . . in the absence of direct congressional authorization, Id. at
507); Vater v. County of Glenn, 309 P.2d 844 (Cal. App. 1957), vacated, 49 Cal. 2d 815, 323
NEW TORTS
cases, however, engaged in little analysis of the reasons why a new
cause of action, predicated on an act of the legislature, should or
should not be recognized."0 2
A few cases, however, defy a pro forma approach. In the 1966
case of Moungey v. Brandt,' for example, United States District
Judge James E. Doyle engaged in lengthy policy analysis. Judge
Doyle found that a complaint based on alleged violations of a federal
air safety regulation was sufficient to state a cause of action within
the federal question jurisdiction of the court, but was, nevertheless,
insufficient to state a cause of action for civil relief.104 He noted that
neither the federal statutes nor the administrative regulations ex-
pressly created a private damage remedy for violations of the stat-
utes or regulations.106 Therefore, if statutes or regulations created
any damage remedy for private parties, the remedy could only be by
implication.' While acknowledging precedent' 017 and scholarly au-
thority 08 for implication of a new tort cause of action, the court
observed that traditional doctrines may require modification in a fed-
eral system because the implication of a civil remedy by a federal
regulatory statute may bring to the federal courts litigation which
P.2d 85 (1985) (California Court of Appeal rebuffed the plaintiffs' wrongful death action
against a governmental irrigation district based on the contention that a statute created "new
tortious liability" because, according to the court, the statute does not create liability against
an irrigation district itself acting in a governmental capacity, but only as against the officers,
employees, and agents of the district).
102. Cf. Schiffman Bros. v. Texas Co., 196 F.2d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1952) (The Sher-
man Act created a new tort damage right); Banana Distrib. v. United Fruit Co.; 158 F. Supp.
160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (Sherman Act created "new tort"); Bechik Products v. Federal Silk
Mills, 135 F. Supp. 570, 578 (D. Md. 1955) ("a new tort is created by Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act").
103. 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
104. Id. at 450. The complaint alleged that:
[T]he action arises under the Federal Aviation Act ...49 US.C. Sections
1301-end; that the defendants ...were doing business as a business and pleas-
ure aircraft company, using the registered airplane in question in this business;
that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was a passenger foi hire in said
airplane; that plaintiff was injured as a direct and proximate result of the negli-
gence of the defendants; and that this negligence consisted in ...violations of
five requirements imposed by the Civil Air Regulations of a Federal Aviation
Agency.
250 F. Supp. at 448-49.
105. Id. at 450.
106. Id. at 450-51.
107. Id. at 451, citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). "Increasingly the
tendency in the federal courts has been to infer private rights of action from federal statutes
unless to do so would defeat manifest congressional purpose." Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 653, 662
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Moungley v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966) (citing RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 286-88 (1934)); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liabil-
ity, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1933); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New
Torts, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 456 (1948)).
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might better remain in the state courts. "' Specifically, the court
noted that many factors affect the division of judicial functions be-
tween federal and state courts. The court suggested that. withholding
a federal remedy is proper if no national interest compels that litiga-
tion be brought in federal district court if a state forum will accom-
modate the action, and if the state and federal courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction. 0
Similarly, the various opinions of the Idaho Supreme Court jus-
tices in Mead v. Freeman"' reflect in-depth policy and legal analysis
on the question of "new tort" liability. The Mead court held that, in
the absence of a specific dram shop statute, the common law rule
that the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person is not a proximate
cause of damage to a third person was not changed by state criminal
legislation controlling the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons or by
the state wrongful death statute." 2 Accordingly, the court held that
those statutes do not give rise to a cause of action against a liquor
vendor by a third party.'
13
In his partial dissent, Justice Prather argued that the Idaho Su-
109. Moungley, 250 F. Supp. at 451.
110. Id. (citing Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 285, 292-94 (1963)). The court concluded that:
No persuasive reason suggests itself why the efficacy of the [Federal Avia-
tion] Program need be fortified by the creation, by implication, of a civil remedy
in the federal court . . . . By 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1506, Congress expressed its inten-
tion that remedies existing "at common law or by statute" not be abridged or
altered. No inadequacies in the state remedy have been called to our attention
and we are aware of none.
Id.
I11. 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969), overruled by Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,
619 P.2d 135 (1980).
112. Id, at 395, 462 P.2d at 60.
113. Id. The majority also rejected the plaintiff's alternative contention that the court
'should, in the absence of statute, declare a change in the common law." Id. at 395, 462 P.2d
at 60. In reaching this decision not to change the common law, the majority opinion waxed
philosophical on the subjects of liquor, society, and change:
We are aware, as the commentators tell us, that the strength of the com-
mon law lies in its capacity to adapt itself to ever changing circumstances. Al-
though traditionally hesitant to change, it should not fail to do so when a hoary
doctrine loses its raison d'etre. We are aware that a minority of courts have
acted as requested by appellants here. We are convinced that such courts are
basically unable to disenthrall themselves of the lurking suspicion that liquor in
and of itself is evil. This, in spite of the fact that the legislature here, as in
almost every other state, has determined as public policy that liquor is part and
parcel of our social scene. Abused it may be; evils it may produce; accidents,
injury and death it may cause; marriages and homes it may rupture; unemploy-
ment, insolvency and degradation may result from its overuse - but legitimate
the selling and consuming of it is declared. Indeed both state and federal govern-
ments indulge in the taxation and/or wholesaling of it, from which flow great
sums of money into governmental treasuries.
id.
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preme Court had no trouble in the past declaring that a violation of
a statute was negligence per se, even in the absence of such a legisla-
tive declaration.114 Justice Prather insisted that the violation of the
state criminal statute should also be negligence per se "in view of the
express legislative declaration that it was enacted for the safety of
the people of the State of Idaho.""1 5
2. Novel Questions of Common Law Causes of Ac-
tion.-During the thirty year period between 1940 and 1969, the ju-
diciary began to grapple with arguments that sought to significantly
expand traditional tort causes of action. A few pioneering courts be-
gan to address novel liability theories: (a) invasion of privacy, (b)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, (c) negligent infliction of
emotional distress, (d) wrongful birth/wrongful life, and (e) miscel-
laneous new torts. In their opinions, these courts restated, synthe-
sized, and clarified existing judicial and scholarly authority, while
drawing upon current notions of policy and norms of civil behavior
when authority was deficient.
(a) Invasion of privacy cases.-ln the 1952 case of Eick v. Perk
Dog Food Co.," 6 the Illinois intermediate appellate court issued a
remarkable opinion recognizing a plaintiff's right of privacy from the
unauthorized use of her photograph in an advertisement promoting
the sale of dog food. Although Eick broke no new ground, it is note-
worthy because the court synthesized existing authorities on the tort
of privacy and restated the importance of judicial creativity in re-
dressing new wrongs.
Four aspects of the opinion are significant. First, in passing on
the question of whether Illinois would recognize a tort cause of ac-
tion for invasion of privacy, the court cited judicial precedent in
twenty states that "explicitly recognized the right either in direct
holdings or well-considered dicta.""' 7 Second, the Eick court made
reference to the large body of legal scholarship emanating from the
Warren and Brandeis 1890 Harvard Law Review article, which sup-
ported the recognition of the privacy right." 8 Third, the court analo-
gized its reasoning to that of several "traditional court cases where
damages to reputation, physical integrity or pecuniary interests were
114. Id. at 403, 462 P.2d at 68 (Prather, J., dissenting in part).
115. Id.
116. 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
117. Id. at 295, 106 N.E.2d at 743. The court also noted that three other states had
recognized the right of privacy by statutory enactment. Id.
118. Id. at 295-96, 106 N.E.2d at 743.
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so slight that mental suffering [implicated in privacy cases] must
have been the real basis of recovery.""' 9 The court relied on prece-
dents that allowed recovery for mental suffering in assault, battery,
trespass, defamation, and false imprisonment.120 Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, the Eick court energetically endorsed judicial
creation of new causes of action, especially in compelling cases. 2
The court pointed out that the common law must remain dynamic
and must not stagnate as of a certain point in time.1 22 Changing
times require changes in the law, and judicial failure to change the
law might result in injustice. 2
To illustrate its point, the court observed that courts in both the
United States and in England have repeatedly "extended relief in
new cases where there was no substantial precedent to support the
action." '24 The Eick court cited a number of examples of this judi-
cial innovation: imposition of third party liability on sellers of defec-
tive goods for negligent manufacturing; 25 articulation of the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine; 2  recognition of liability for malicious
interference with contractual relations;' 27 enforcement of various
real estate covenants in the sale.of land; 28 and recognition of the
contractual third party beneficiary doctrine.' 29
Fegerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 30 another impor-
tant case from this time period, used "new tort" terminology in dis-
cussing the emerging tort of invasion of privacy. In Fegerstrom, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that purchasers of land had a cause of
119. Id. at 300, 106 N.E.2d at 746.
120. Id. 300-01, 106 N.E.2d at 746 (citations omitted). The court summarized its ana-
logical analysis by stating:
All in all, it is fair to say that the courts have already given extensive pro-
tection to feelings and emotions. They have shown a notable adaptability of tech-
nique in redressing the more serious invasions of this important interest of per-
sonality. No longer is it even approximately true that the law does not pretend to
redress mental pain and anguish "when the unlawful act complained of causes
that alone." If a consistent pattern cannot yet be clearly discerned in the cases,
this but indicates that the law on this subject is in a process or growth.
Id. at 301, 106 N.E.2d at 746 (quoting Magruder, Mental Disturbance in Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1067 (1936)).
121. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 303, 106 N.E.2d 742, 747 (1952).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 304, 106 N.E.2d at 747.
125. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
126. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 II1. App. 293, 304, 106 N.E.2d 742, 747 (1952)
(citing Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873)).
127. Id. (citing Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216 (Q.B. 1853)).
128. Id. at 304, 106 N.E.2d at 748 (citing Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774 (1848)).
129. Id.
130. 50 Haw. 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968).
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action for invasion of privacy when the defendant took pictures of
their house at various stages of construction and used plaintiffs'
names, along with the photograph, in sales brochures, advertisements
and television commercials. In an opinion closely resembling that of
the Illinois intermediate appellate court in Eick, the Hawaii Su-
preme Court relied in part on persuasive judicial and scholarly pre-
cedent that recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
13'
Moreover, the Fegerstrom court used an example of the historical
evolution of tort law from the rigid common law writ system to even-
tual recognition of the law of fraud. 132 The Hawaii Supreme Court
also pointed out its recognition of the relatively new tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, even though that cause of ac-
tion offered as little common law precedent as did the right to
privacy. 33
Finally, the Fegerstrom court considered and rejected a number
of policy objections to recognition of a new tort of invasion of pri-
vacy in Hawaii. Specifically, the court reasoned that even if recog-
nizing the tort would result in a proliferation of litigation, that fact
was not enough to defeat recognition of the tort unless "the litigation
largely will be spurious and harassing."' 34 The Hawaii Supreme
Court also rejected the defendant's argument that difficulty in distin-
guishing between public and private figures in future invasion of pri-
vacy litigation should weigh against recognizing the new tort. The
court wryly noted that "[t]he difficulty in discovering the line divid-
ing conduct satisfying that required under the reasonable man stan-
dard and conduct failing to do so has not prevented development of a
cause of action for negligence. 1 36 The court also noted that the rec-
ognition of a right to privacy does not restrict freedom of speech or
of the press.'
3 1
(b) Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.-Five in-
131. Id. at 376, 441 P.2d at 143.
132. "Although the law of trespass was reasonably well established in the common law
by the thirteenth century, no private action was available for fraud. The absence of a prece-
dent did not prevent the common law from recognizing that tort." Id. n.4 (citing F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 534-35 (1899)).
133. Id. at 376, 441 P.2d at 143.
134. Id. at 377, 441 P.2d at 143. Referring to Kalvern, supra note 33, at 338-39, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that "[o]nly in the unusual case where parties actually in-
jured are unlikely to sue and where those likely to sue are not those whose interests are of
primary concern can the possibility of abuse be given substantial weight in determining
whether to recognize a new cause of action." Id. at 377 n.5, 441 P.2d at 144 n.5.
135. Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Haw. 374, 377 n.6, 441 P.2d
141, 144 n.6 (1968).
136. Id. at 377, 441 P.2d at 144.
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teresting cases, decided during the 1940 to 1969 time period, applied
''new tort" terminology to intentional infliction of emotional distress
complaints. 7 In a 1948 case, Bartow v. Smith,' a the Ohio Supreme
Court turned aside a cause of action for emotional distress exper-
ienced by a pregnant woman when the defendant called her a "god-
damned son of a bitch" and a "dirty crook" on a public street.'39
The case is significant for the dissenting opinion of Justice Hart, who
attacked the majority's rationale that recovery was unavailable be-
cause the plaintiff's claim could not "be placed in the mold of any
category of tort actions known to the law." 4 ' Justice Hart also cata-
logued other reasons for denying recovery for the physical conse-
quences of fright, shock, or mental distress without a physical impact
or injury,"' including the lack of judicial precedent, the "evanescent
and intangible" quality of mental suffering, the flood of litigation
that would accompany recognition of the claim, and the administra-
tive difficulties the judiciary would face in handling the cases."' 2
In response to these policy objections, Justice Hart observed
that courts had abandoned the requirement that every tort must fit
within an existing type or category of tort action." ' Justice Hart
argued that "it is the responsibility of the law to grant a remedy for
a substantial wrong even though a new term must be invented to
describe it.""'
In support of his assertion, Hart referred to the writings of Sir
Frederick Pollock, who had argued that the law can no longer be
satisfied with "a mere enumeration of actionable injuries.""' 5 More-
over, Hart's dissent cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's dicta on
prima facie torts in Aikens v. State of Wisconsin, 4' and relied on
the research of William Prosser on the emerging "new tort" of inten-
137. For other less noteworthy cases, see Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.
1961); Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); Pinkerton Nat'l
Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963); and Vargas v.
Ruggierio, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 17 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962).
138. 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948), overruled by Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6
Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
139. Id. at 302, 78 N.E.2d at 736.
140. Id. at 312, 78 N.E.2d at 740 (Hart, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Hart, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 312-13, 78 N.E.2d at 740.
143. Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 313, 78 N.E.2d 735, 740 (1948), overruled by
Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) (Hart, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 313, 78 N.E.2d at 741.
145. Id. at 314, 78 N.E.2d at 741 (citing POLLOCK ON TORTS 16 (14th ed.)).
146. 195 U.S. 194 (1904), cited in Bartow, 149 Ohio St. at 315, 78 N.E.2d at 741. See
supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
NEW TORTS
tional infliction of emotional distress.' 7
The 1953 decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Harned v. E-
Z Finance Co.'"8 concluded that recovery for mental suffering inten-
tionally caused by defendant's debt collection efforts could not be
allowed without proof of physical injury. The court held that any
recognition of a new tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress must come from the legislature.' 9 The Harned court found
that the legislative branch 'would be able to weigh the public policy
considerations both for and against recognition of the proposed cause
of action. 5 ° The court asserted that considerations in favor of recog-
nition were obvious;15' the considerations militating against institu-
tionalizing the new tort were similar to those outlined in the Bar-
tow"'52 dissent.
A 1958 opinion by the Florida Supreme Court, Slocum v. Food
Fair Stores of Florida,"" reflected similar judicial hesitancy to en-
dorse a new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Slocum, a woman shopper contended that she experienced mental
suffering, a heart attack, and aggravation of a pre-existing heart dis-
ease after receiving a comment from one of defendant's
employees.14
In a creative approach, the Slocum court listed judicial and
scholarly authorities who supported the recognition of a new tort.'155
The court found that allowing claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or insult, was preferable to "the strained reason-
ing so often apparent when liability for such injury is predicated
upon one or another of several traditional tort theories."' 56 Relying
on the Restatement of the Law of Torts," 7 the Florida Supreme
Court emphasized that the requisite showing of intent required that
an act be done by the defendant "for the purpose of causing the
147. See W. PROSSER, supra note 84, at 58. "It has gradually become recognized that
there is no magic inherent in the name given to a tort, or in any arbitrary classification." See
also Prosser, supra note 5.
148. 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
149. Id. at 648, 254 S.W.2d at 87.
150. Id. at 648, 254 S.W.2d at 86.
151. Id.
152. 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735, (1948), overruled by Yeager v. Local Union 20,
6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) (Hart, J., dissenting). These arguments against
recognition of the new tort were, in large measure, derived from Prosser, supra note 5.
153. 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
154. Id. Specifically, the store employee told the plaintiff: "If you want to know the
price, you'll have to find out the best way you can ...you stink to me." Id. at 396-97.
155. Id. at 397.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.)).
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distress or with knowledge that severe emotional distress is sub-
stantially certain to be produced by [such] conduct."158 Then, in jux-
taposition to the narrow Restatement Section 46 rule, the Slocum
court compared the broader provision of Section 48 that "granted
relief for offense reasonably suffered by a patron from insult by a
servant or employee of a carrier, hotel, theatre and . ..telegraph
office."' 5 9 The court went on to note that the broader liability rule
recognized by the Restatement of Torts derived from the existence
"of a special relationship, arising either from contract or from the
inherent nature of a non-competitive public utility."' 60
The Slocum court noted the inadvisability of extending the
rules of the Restatement to cover business invitees generally.' The
court's final decision rested on the narrowest of grounds: "whether or
not these rules are ultimately adopted in this jurisdiction, the facts of
the present case cannot be brought within their reasonable
intendm ent.
'16 2
Breaking new ground in its jurisdiction, the Illin6is Supreme
Court in Knierim v. lzzo 63 held that a widow stated a cause of ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress in alleging that the
defendant intentionally caused "great mental anguish and nervous
exhaustion" by threatening and then killing her husband." 4 Citing
Prosser's 1939 Michigan Law Review article, the court characterized
the plaintiff's case as a request for judicial recognition of a "new
tort."'6 5 The Knierim court referred to arguments of some courts
and commentators in support of judicial reluctance to redress purely
mental disturbance without an underlying traditional tort cause of
action. 16 The pivotal part of Knierim, however, was the court's ac-
ceptance of the new cause of action. The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed with the jurists and critics who argued that the justifications
advanced by other courts for denying actions for intentional infliction
of emotional distress had really rested upon "a predetermined con-
clusion dictated by history and the fear of extending liability."'
167
Rooting its conclusion in the historical and policy analysis of the
158. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1958) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 comment (a) (emphasis provided)).




163. 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
164. Id. at 83, 174 N.E.2d at 163.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 83-84, 174 N.E.2d at 163-64.
167. Id. at 87, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
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1890 Warren and Brandeis Harvard Law Review article, the court
noted that the common law had made vast progress and that reme-
dies were no longer limited to cases of physical interference with life
and property.""
As an important collateral issue, the Knierim court ruled that
punitive damages could not be recovered in cases of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. The court held that the remedy of com-
pensatory damages was already "punitive" because "the outrageous
quality of the defendant's conduct," which would normally justify
punitive damages, forms the basis of the entire action.' 69
The Texas Supreme Court, in the 1967 case of Fisher v. Car-
rousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 7' returned to the "new tort" schema it
had first utilized in Harned.'7' In a decisional technique reminiscent
of the Florida Supreme Court's approach in Slocum,'72 the Texas
Supreme Court based its holding on narrow grounds and thus
avoided deciding whether or not the outrage cause of action should
be recognized in Texas. In Fisher, a defendant-employee snatched a
luncheon plate from the plaintiff's hands while the employee shouted
that blacks were not served in the club. Focusing on the facts, the
Fisher court concluded that it did not have to recognize a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to allow
the plaintiff to recover.' 7 3 Concluding that the basis for the jury ver-
dict was the traditional tort of battery, the Texas Supreme Court
noted that actual physical injury was not required in battery cases
because that action is based on an unpermitted and intentional inva-
sion of the plaintiff's person, including objects held by an individual
and not on any resulting physical harm.'"
(c) Negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.-Citing
"new tort" scholarship, both the California intermediate appellate
court and the California Supreme Court decided in the early 1960s
to allow a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
168. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 87, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165 (1961) (citing Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1). The court also acknowledged "the intense intellectual and emotional
life which has come with the advance of civilization [making] ...it clear that only a part of
the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lies in physical things." Id.
169. Id. at 88, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
170. 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967),
171. Id. at 630. See Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953). See
also supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
172. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958). See supra notes
153-62 and accompanying text.
173. Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 630.
174. Id. (emphasis provided).
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t'ress for purely mental distress without a physical impact. In Amaya
v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co.,' 75 the plaintiff witnessed an ice
truck hitting her son while she was seven months pregnant. In addi-
tion to an action against the ice company for the injuries the child
received, Mrs. Amaya sued the company for her own "emotional
shock and great mental disturbance" as a result of being forced to
observe her infant child being injured by the negligence of the truck
driver. 176
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the emo-
tional distress complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 177 Af-
ter a detailed discussion of historical and social policies, the interme-
diate appellate court reversed 78
Granting the defendants' -petition for hearing, the Supreme
Court of California reinstated the dismissal order of the trial
court.1 79 The court conceded that California law does not require "a
contemporaneous physical impact" for bystander recovery of emo-
tional distress damages.' The supreme court, however, examined
numerous tort cases from other jurisdictions and from California
lower courts that had held defendants were not liable to third parties
who were outside the range of physical peril.' The court was im-
pressed by the proposition that "there are many situations involving
175. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962), vacated, 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 738, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968).
176. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
177. Id. at 133.
178. Id. at 141. Cognizant that it would be breaking new ground in California, the
Amaya court initially examined the historical evolution of tort law. The court discussed the
feudal English conception that "the actor bore responsibility for the damage he caused without
regard to whether he owed a 'duty' to the injured person." Id. at 133. Next, the court analyzed
the new economic and social circumstances of the Industrial Revolution and the new rule that
emerged: "[in place of strict liability ...an action for negligence would lie only if the de-
fendant breached a duty which he owed to plaintiff." Id. The court then updated the duty rule,
in the milieu of American jurisprudence, by discussing the "unforeseeable plaintiff" doctrine
articulated in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Id. at
134. Convinced that Ms. Amaya's emotional distress was foreseeable by the negligent defend-
ants, the court went on to note that equitable recovery for substantial wrongs often "becomes
blocked out in many cases by legalistic abstractions," including physical impact requirements,
zone of impact rules, physical manifestation mandates, personal fear of safety requirements,
and fear of a flood of fraudulent claims. Id. at 135. Noting that "at the base of these conten-
tions there may be no more than an underlying reluctance to permit recovery in a new area of
injury," the court subsequently engaged in a detailed analysis of the logic and limits of these
"legalistic abstractions," rebutting the force of each barrier to recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Id.
179. Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968).
180. Id. at 299, 379 P.2d at 515, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
181.. Id. at 302-07, 379 P.2d at 517-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 37-40.
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foreseeable risks [in which] there is no duty."18 '
The Amaya majority substantiated its decision to reject the
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by weighing the
administrative factors that would make it difficult for courts to sort
out legitimate claims for emotional distress from fraudulent
claims, 83 and by considering socio-economic and moral factors that
favored encouraging technological innovation and reserving liability
for negligent acts characterized by moral blame.'84 The California
Supreme Court justified this wide-ranging review by observing that
"[w]hen . ..a wholly new type of liability is envisioned, our re-
sponsibility extends far beyond the particular plaintiff before us, and
touches society at large."' 85
In a lengthy dissent joined by two other jurists, Justice Peters
sought to illustrate the real issue in the case as being more limited
than the majority's statement of the case. According to Peters, "the
real question .. .[was] whether or not a mother may recover dam-
ages for physical injuries resulting from emotional shock caused by
fear for her infant child who is negligently run down by [an] ...
automobile" in her presence. 8 Justice Peters observed that "[t]he
law grows, develops, expands or is limited by a case by case consid-
eration of particular facts, and not by deciding broad general princi-
ples not involved in the case under consideration.' 87
In urging a rule imposing liability in such circumstances, the
Amaya dissent utilized a number of arguments in favor of changing
the status quo and recognizing a new form of liability. First, the
dissent asserted that drawing the line between liability and nonliabil-
ity, while difficult, is a primary function of appellate courts.' 88 Sec-
ond, Justice Peters downplayed the great weight of authority that
denied negligent liability for a bystander's emotional shock when the
bystander was outside of the zone of physical danger.'8 9 In his opin-
ion, the bulk of precedent was "due to the sheer inertia caused by
182. Id. at 308, 379 P.2d at 521, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (quoting Richards v. Stanley, 43
Cal. 2d 60, 66, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (1953)).
183. Id. at 310-13, 379 P.2d at 523-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42-44.
184. Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313-15, 379 P.2d 513,
524-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44-45 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
185. Id. at 313, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (emphasis provided).
186. Id. at 316, 379 P.2d at 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Peters, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 317, 379 P.2d at 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
188. Id.
189. Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 317-18, 379 P.2d 513,
526-27, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 46-47 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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the doctrine of stare decisis, and the apparent reluctance of appellate
courts to disturb the status quo."190 Third, the Amaya dissent in-
voked two broad remedial statutory maxims derived from the Cali-
fornia Civil Code, which Justice Peters viewed as supporting a new
tort liability in the case at bar. The maxims provided that "for every
wrong there is a remedy,"'' and that "everyone is responsible, not
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occa-
sioned to another by his want of ordinary [care] or skill in the man-
agement of his property or person."' 92 Fourth, the dissent traced the
historical erosion of the rule that shock is not a recoverable item of
damage. This discussion followed the progression from judicial al-
lowance of recovery for shock accompanied by physical impact, to
allowance of recovery when the plaintiff was in the "zone of dan-
ger," and finally to the allowance of recovery by a member of the
family even though the plaintiff was not in the "zone of danger."'
1 93
Justice Peters concluded that "[tlhese gradual modifications of the
original rule are of great [evolutionary] significance [in the] develop-
ment of the law,"' 1 ' supporting a further expansion of the rule. Fi-
nally, Peters incorporated by reference the opinion of the intermedi-
ate appellate court, which would have found liability
notwithstanding the absence of the mother from the "zone of
danger."' 95
(d) Wrongful birth/wrongful life cases.-A significant decision
applying "new tort" language during the 1940 to 1969 time period
was Zepeda v. Zepeda.19 Zepeda involved a suit for the recovery of
damages by an infant son against his father under the theory that
because the son was born an illegitimate child he would suffer dam-
ages from the illegitimacy.' 97 The Illinois Appellate Court, in af-
firming an order by the trial court dismissing the suit for failure to
state a cause of action, was confronted with a novel claim lacking
190. Id. at 317, 379 P.2d at 526, 29 Cal. Rtpr. at 46.
191. Id. at 317, 379 P.2d at 527, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 3523
(West 1962)).
192. Id. at 317-18, 379 P.2d at 527, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE §
1714 (West 1962)).
193. Id. at 318-19, 379 P.2d at 528, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48 (Peters, J., dissenting).
194. Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 319, 379 P.2d 513, 528,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 48 (1963) (Peters, J., dissenting) overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
195. Id. at 319-32, 379 P.2d at 528-33, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 48-56 (Peters, J., dissenting).
196. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
197. Id. at 245, 190 N.E.2d at 851. The son sought damages "for the deprivation of his
right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his
paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard." Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
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statutory or case precedent on point in any jurisdiction.19
After holding that the plaintiff's constitutional and contract al-
legations against his father could not be entertained on appeal,' 99 the
court framed the sole question for review as "whether the complaint
states a cause of action in tort. ' 20 0 The court recognized the evolving
trend in tort law to permit actions for prenatal injuries"' and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress,20 2 as well as recent legislation
removing the stigma of illegitimacy and legislation providing a right
to adequate support.203 Nevertheless, the court declined to recognize
the new tort of "wrongful life" in Illinois. The Zepeda court con-
cluded that as a matter of judicial restraint it would not create a
new cause of action because the legal implications of such a tort
would be too vast and the social impact would be too staggering.20
Faced with a similar problem in Williams v. State,0 5 the New
York State trial court reached a different result. The Williams court
held that an infant born out of wedlock to a mentally deficient
mother, who was sexually assaulted as a result of the state's negli-
gence while confined as a patient in a state mental institution, had a
cause of action against the state.206 In reaching its conclusion, the
198. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
199. Id. Plaintiff had raised allegations in the trial court under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution amend. XIV, § 1; the due process
clause of the Illinois Constitution; and under Article 11, § 19 of the state constitution, which
provided that "[e]very person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation." The appellate court con-
cluded that these constitutional questions could not be considered on appeal because the Illi-
nois Supreme Court had denied a direct appeal in the case and transferred it for disposition to
the appellate court. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 852. The plaintiff's contract theory, raised in his
complaint, that he was a "third party beneficiary of the agreement made by his father and
mother to marry each other" was rejected on appeal because "his complaint sounds in tort."
Id. at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
200. Id. at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
201. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I11. App. 2d 240, 248-53, 190 N.E.2d 849, 852-55 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964)).
202. Id. at 253, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
203. Id. at 256-57, 190 N.E.2d at 856-57.
204. Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
205. 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
206. Id. at 834, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
The infant's cause ... [was] predicated on the State's alleged neglectful
care and supervision over the mother, Lorene Williams, while a patient ...at
[the] Manhattan State Hospital . . . . It [was] averred (par. 11) that the de-
fendant's failure "to provide adequate, sufficient, and proper care and supervi-
sion over her while she was in the custody of the State" and "failing to protect
and safeguard her health and physical body from attack and harm from others
• ..resulted in the infant Christine Williams being conceived, being born and
being born out of wedlock to a mentally deficient mother."
Paragraph 15 of the claim ... further pleads that said infant was ...
deprived of property rights; deprived of a normal childhood and home life; de-
prived of proper parental care, support and rearing; caused to bear the stigma of
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court held that novelty and lack of precedent should not be a deter-
rent to recognition of a new cause of action." 7 The court cited
Zepeda v. Zepeda0 8 as the "closest approach" to the case at bar,2"9
but opined that "[t]angential reasoning should not be utilized as a
sledge hammer or chisel to destroy a fundamental right which cries
out for justice. Our courts in New York have not been swayed as
easily."21
The judge in Williams acknowledged that he had read and con-
sidered several law review commentaries on the Zepeda case and
had wrestled with the "knotty problem" posed by denying a cause of
action in tort to one whose life resulted from its commission, but who
was not alive when the tort was committed.2"' Nevertheless, the
court took a different approach. The court observed that "the dam-
ages sustained by the mother for the assault and pregnancy are obvi-
ously distinguishable and separate from those of the infant. If only
the mother can receive damages, it is not sufficient to assuage or
satisfy the child."2"2 The court refused to ignore the dilemma."
(e) Miscellaneous cases.-ln addition to the specific categories
of cases previously discussed,21 courts also utilized "new tort" ter-
illegitimacy and has otherwise been greatly injured all to her damage in the sum
of $100,000.
Id. at 825, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
207. Id. at 826, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
208. 41 I1. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
209. Williams, 46 Misc. 2d at 827, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
210. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 830, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (1965). The "tan-
gential reasoning" set forth in Zepeda and rejected in Williams focused on the domino effect
that could result from recognition of a cause of action for wrongful life. Id. (quoting Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 260, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964)).
211. Id. at 831-32, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
212. Id. at 832, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 960. The trial judge in Williams analogized recogni-
tion of a cause of action for wrongful birth to recognition of actions for prenatal injury result-
ing in physical harm to the baby. Id. at 829-31, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 958-60. The judge in Wil-
liams then quoted a 1951 New York Court of Appeals decision that had recognized a cause of
action for prenatal physical injuries:
The sum of the argument against plaintiff here is that there is no New York
decision in which such a claim has been enforced. [But] . . . if that were a valid
objection, the common law would now be what it was in the Plantagenet period.
And we can borrow from our British friends another mot: "When these ghosts of
the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper
course for the judges is to pass through them undeterred." Lord Atkin [once said
that] . . . [w]e act in the finest common-law tradition when we adapt and alter
decisional law to produce common-sense justice.
Id. at 833-34, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 962-63 (quoting Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102
N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951) (citations omitted)).
213. Id. at 834, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
214. See supra notes 101-213 and accompanying text.
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minology when disposing of a hodge-podge of additional tort theories
during the period from 1940 to 1969. During these years, courts de-
cided that allegations that interference with contractual relations
"done as part of a conspiracy" did not amount to a new tort, because
conspiracy itself did not create a civil cause of action.2 15 Courts also
recognized a counterclaim alleging fraudulent procurement of a
blank paper that defendant believed would be used for a letter and
not a contract;216 held that a grandparent's conspiracy to abduct the
mother's child for the benefit of the father was an actionable
wrong;"' but refused to recognize the new tort of "misappropriation
of the business and product of another.
218
B. Judicial Creativity Embraced, 1970-1979
During the seventies, courts regularly used "new tort" terminol-
ogy when creating new causes of action, eroding doctrinal barriers to
recovery, interpreting statutory rights, and assessing novel proce-
dural issues. While the number of "new tort" cases exceeded the
1940 to 1969 total, the number of discrete problem areas also in-
creased.219 In addition, the judiciary was called upon to construe a
more diverse group of statutory tort causes of action. Here, too, the
number and type of "new tort" application problems expanded.
1. Statutory Construction Cases.-Three federal court deci-
sions reviewed arguments that the Age Discrimination in Employ-
215. A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., I Misc. 2d 788, 793, 148 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107
(N.Y. 1955).
216. Gantell v. Friedmann, 197 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (N.Y. 1959). The court observed
that "[d]efendant's right to maintain this counterclaim does not hinge upon a label. New torts
are created every day. What is important is that there must be the infliction of intentional
harm, resulting in damage, without legal excuses or justification." Id. (citation omitted).
217. Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). The court
cited a law review article, Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV.
463, 488 n.62 (1962), which stated the following proposition:
The case seems to be without precedent, but this does not mean what is
obviously an invasion of a mother's legal right is not a legal wrong. The concept
that there are no causes of action except those that have been recognized by
precedent, assumed at some point in the common law, was not accepted gener-
ally at early common law, nor is it accepted today.
221 Cal. App. 2d at 435, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 482. See also 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TORTS, § 5, 1173.
218. International Plastics Dev., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 433 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (Mo.
1968).
219. New tort categories that emerged during the 1970s included: product liability
cases; abolition of immunities matters; loss of consortium disputes; wrongful discharge cases;
minority shareholder actions; and insurance torts. These new categories, in addition to the
"new tort" categories that emerged from 1940 to 1969 (invasion of privacy, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful birth/wrong-
ful life), brought the total number of "new tort" categories to ten.
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ment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 20 created a "new tort" and, thereby,
conferred broad remedial power upon the courts to redress statutory
violations. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.22 was an
age discrimination suit involving an employee who involuntarily re-
tired at age sixty and contended that he did not receive promotions
and salary increases because of his age. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's determina-
tion that a jury could properly award damages for pain and suffer-
ing, or psychic distress. The appellate court disagreed with the lower
court's expansive "new tort" interpretation of the ADEA because it
believed that the statutory plan of enforcement was limited to doub-
ling the amount of lost earnings as a maximum penalty.22
The district court judge in Dorsey v. Consolidated Broadcasting
Corp. 23 followed the reasoning set forth in Rogers. Discerning a for-
mer radio disk jockey's ADEA claim for damages to reputation to be
analogous to the pain and suffering claim that the Third Circuit had
proscribed in Rogers, the Dorsey court denied the portion of the
plaintiff's complaint that sought compensation for loss of reputation.
In deciding the issue, the district court noted that "[a]lthough the
Act provides that a court may award 'without limitation' relief, in-
cluding unpaid minimum wages or other compensation, such unpar-
ticularized statutory language has not been found sufficient to ex-
pand . ..the types of relief available under the Act." '224 One year
after Dorsey was decided, a judge on the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin similarly ruled in
Schlicke v. Allen Bradley Co.225 that "[h]ad Congress intended to
create a new tort resulting from discrimination on the basis of age
and to provide as part of the remedy therefor recovery of damages
for injury to reputation, it would have done so in terms which were
not ambiguous. '"2
Two other federal courts referred to the phrase "new tort" in
construing rights under various United States statutes. In United
States v. Moore,227 the government sought contribution from a wo-
220. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1985).
221. 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
222. Id. at 839-40. The jury had awarded the decedent's survivors $150,000 for pain and
suffering as well as $30,000 in compensatory damages. The district court judge doubled the
compensatory damages figure because the defendant's conduct had been "willful" under the
statute. Id. at 836.
223. 432 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
224. Id. at 543.
225. 448 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
226. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
227. 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972).
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man for the value of medical care rendered to her husband and chil-
dren due to her negligence in causing an automobile accident that
resulted in her family's injuries. The United States based its cause of
action on the Medical Care Recovery Act.2"' The Moore majority
found that the statute conferred an independent right of recovery on
the United States, unimpaired by the ambiguous state family immu-
nity laws that would otherwise apply. 29
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,2"' the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed catalytic converter emission
control regulations that had been promulgated by the EPA under the
Clean Air Act.2"' The issue in Amoco was to what extent a gasoline
refiner could be held liable for the conduct of retail dealers who sell
the refiner's products when the retailer's conduct violates EPA regu-
lations.23 2 The majority held that "[i]n the absence of any indication
of a specific intent on the part of Congress to create a 'new tort,' the
traditional common law rules of vicarious liability must apply."233
Accordingly, the majority viewed the EPA regulation234 as arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
2 35
In an extensive dissenting opinion, Judge Skelly Wright offered
a rationale for judicial recognition of what he viewed to be a new
administrative law tort. Judge Wright asserted that the
EPA's regulations are designed to deter what amounts to a
"new tort" - call it negligent contamination or negligent im-
pairment of an emission control device. It is a new form of in-
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1973) (cited in 469 F.2d at 789-90). The statute provides in
pertinent part:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to
furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment to a person who
is injured or suffers a disease ...under circumstances creating a tort liability
upon some third person ...to pay damages therefore, the United States shall
have a right to recover from said third person the reasonable value of the care
and treatment so furnished . . . and shall, as to this right be subrogated to any
right or claim that the injured or diseased person ...has against such third
person ....
42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1973).
229. Moore, 469 F.2d at 790. Since the wife was domiciled in Maine, Maine's family
immunity laws governed notwithstanding th6 fact that the accident had occurred in Pennsylva-
nia. The district court had held that no liability exists on the part of the wife because Maine
law "does not permit actions for negligent tort by one spouse against the other, or by a minor
child against a parent." Id. at 789-90. The appellate court interpreted Maine's intrafamily
immunity law less restrictively. Id. at 794.
230. 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(B) (1970).
232. Amoco, 543 F.2d at 273.
233. Id. at 275.
234. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2)(iv) (1975).
235. 5 US.C: § 706(2) (1970).
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jury which has resulted from advancing technology coupled with
increasing public demand for clean air. Contrary to the major-
ity's repeated intimations, there is no "settled law" governing
responsibility for this particular narrowly-defined class of inju-
ries. Nothing in the Constitution, the Clean Air Act, or the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act dictates that the liability rules here
must conform precisely to the vicarious liability rules that con-
tinue to apply to other, more familiar, types of injuries.2"'
Several state appellate courts during the 1970s found it useful
to use "new tort" language when interpreting the breadth and mean-
ing of statutory provisions. The most important and novel interpreta-
tion is the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion in Burnette v. Wahl."2 7
Burnette involved consolidated actions by five minor children,
through their guardians, against their natural mothers for emotional
and psychological injuries caused by the mothers' failure to perform
basic parental duties. Four alternative tort theories of recovery were
asserted by the plaintiffs' counsel: (1) the new tort theory of parental
desertion;"' (2) the common law tort of alienation of affections;
2 3 9
(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 4 ° and (4) the grava-
men of the action: an implied cause of action for civil damages based
on alleged violations of criminal and regulaiory statutes that set
forth a variety of procedures to ensure that children receive proper
nurturing, support, and physical care.24 The majority declined to
create a "new tort" based on its "own appraisal of the policy consid-
erations involved,"2 2 noting that the state legislature had historically
created new causes of action when it believed that public policy de-
manded them. 43 The Burnette court was concerned that tort actions
like the one before it could interfere with the future care of children
and with family relationships.
44
In a thoughtful dissent, Justice Linde focused on the majority's
flawed policy analysis, which led to what he believed was the errone-
ous conclusion that a new statutorily implied tort for mental and
emotional injuries for breach of parental obligations did not exist.2 45
236. Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 543 F.2d 270, 281-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., dissenting).
237. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
238. Id. at 708, 588 P.2d at 1107.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 709, 588 P.2d at 1108.
242. Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 711, 588 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1978).
243. Id. at 712, 588 P.2d at 1109.
244. Id. at 714, 588 P.2d at I110.
245. Id. at 730, 588 P.2d at 1119 (Linde, J., dissenting).
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Three aspects of the dissent are noteworthy. First, Linde observed
that while clarification of public policy regarding the civil conse-
quences of penal legislation would be helpful, it was unrealistic to
expect the legislature to alter its past practice.2"6 Second, Judge
Linde disputed the majority's contention that when a court interprets
a statute to imply a civil cause of action, the court has actively pro-
nounced common law." 7 According to Linde, there is an obvious dif-
ference between a new common law theory of recovery in tort and a
civil claim based on a statute. An implied statutory claim can be
implied only when a statute exists to support the implication.2"8 The
third notable aspect of Justice Linde's dissent is his division of crimi-
nal or regulatory laws into three types:
(1) laws that are redefinitions of common law crimes
against private persons or property;24 9
(2) laws that are standards of socially responsible conduct
for the protection of persons endangered by the conduct;25 ° and
(3) laws that are governmental sanctions, penal or other-
wise .. .enacted to add governmental enforcement to the rec-
ognized obligations of a relationship existing apart from the
legislation.2"'
2. Novel Questions of Common Law Causes of Action
(a) Invasion of privacy case law.-In the early 1970s, the New
York Court of Appeals decided the only case that utilized "new
tort" parlance to explore issues of tortious invasion of privacy. That
case, however, was of great social and historical interest.
246. Id. at 726-27, 588 P.2d at 1117.
247. Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 727, 588 P.2d 1105, 1117 (1978).
248. Id. at 727, 588 P.2d at 1117.
249. Id. at 728, 588 P.2d at 1118.
250. Id.
251. Id. Applying the Oregon penal statutes to the instant case, Justice Linde remarked:
It can hardly be questioned that a statute like [ORS] 163.535, which makes
it a crime to desert and abandon a child intentionally, is of the third kind. It and
the related sections did not enact a novel prohibition against parental neglect for
the convenience of the general public or the protection of taxpayers. They en-
acted a legislative definition and public enforcement of certain minimal obliga-
tions of an existing relationship. Jurisprudentially it might be said the parents
have a duty not to abandon and desert their young children because ORS
163.535 makes it a crime to do so, but a legislator would surely think ORS
163.535 should make it a crime to abandon and desert a child because the par-
ent's existing duty - the duty to the child, not to the state - deserved govern-
mental reinforcement. It is the parent's duty thus recognized under Oregon law
that plaintiffs invoke in these cases.
id.
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In Nader v. General Motors Corporation,2 52 Ralph Nader-the
well-known consumer activist-sued GM for invasion of privacy, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with eco-
nomic advantage. The issue on appeal was limited to the legal suffi-
ciency of the invasion of privacy claims under District of Columbia
law. 2
53
While the Nader court unanimously affirmed the lower court's
denial of GM's motion to dismiss the privacy causes of action, 25 1 the
court was concerned about the sufficiency of the allegations in Na-
der's complaint. 255 The court stated that "[i]n order to sustain a
cause of action for invasion of privacy . . . the plaintiff must show
that the appellant's conduct was truly 'intrusive' and that it was
designed to illicit information which would not be available through
normal inquiry or observation."2 56 In justifying this approach, the
majority placed heavy reliance on the fact that the court was dealing
with a "new and developing area of the law."
'257
PrediCting what the substantive tort law of the District of Co-
lumbia would be, the Nader majority indicated that Nader's allega-
tion that GM had orchestrated intensive investigation of the plain-
tiff's background by asking questions of other persons and
undermining Nader's character were not germane to his invasion of
privacy claim. Likewise, the majority concluded that Mr. Nader's
allegations that the defendant accosted him with women who made
illicit proposals, and also arranged for the making of threatening and
harassing phone calls, did not involve an intrusive invasion of
privacy.2 58
252. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
253. Id. at 564, 255 N.E.2d at 767, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 650. The lower courts had upheld
the invasion of privacy claims as opposed to GM's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action. Id. at 571, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 655. The pertinent choice of law
policies dictated that District of Columbia privacy law govern the New York dispute because
"[tlhe District is the jurisdiction in which most of the acts are alleged to have occurred, and it
was there, too, that the plaintiff lived and suffered the impact of those acts." Id. at 565, 255
N.E.2d at 767-68, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
254. Id. at 564, 255 N.E.2d at 767, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 567, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 653. Another classification of the
common law tort of invasion of privacy is "unreasonable publicity." Id. at 572, 225 N.E.2d at
772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (Breitel, J., concurring).
257. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 568, 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1970).
258. Id. at 569, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654. However, because the com-
plaint contained allegations concerning other activities by the appellant or its agents which did
satisfy the requirements for a privacy cause of action under District of Columbia law, the
Nader majority allowed the pleading to stand. Id. at 571, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at
656. The majority added, however, that:
[Tihe allegations concerning the interviewing of third persons, the accosting
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The concurring opinion by Judge Breitel and two other mem-
bers of the court agreed with the majority's order upholding the suf-
ficiency of the privacy causes of action, but disagreed with the ma-
jority's analysis of the particular allegations in the complaint.259 The
concurrence made a number of important jurisprudential points
about tort classifications and policy implications of the developing
"new tort" of invasion of privacy.
First, the concurring judges attacked the majority's linkage of
several allegations in the complaint to the more restrictive tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress rather than to the common-
law right of privacy.2 60 Second, the concurrence questioned the ma-
jority's strict and exclusive subdivision of the invasion of privacy tort
into "unreasonable intrusions" and "unreasonable publicity."26 ' Ac-
cording to Judge Brietel's analysis, although many scholars per-
formed this analytical bifurcation, the courts should not subse-
quently limit the concept of a right of privacy to those narrow
classifications.262 Third, the concurring judges objected to the con-
text of the majority's decision. Since New York had not recognized a
common law right of privacy, the concurrence believed that the ma-
jority was treading in murky water by trying to apply the law of the
District of Columbia.2"3 MoreQver, this gratuitous undertaking was
further criticized by the concurrence in light of the "still inchoate
...development" of the "new tort" of invasion of privacy in the
District of Columbia.
264
(b) Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.-Sixteen
cases utilizing "new tort" terminology in the analysis of actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage were decided by
American courts* during the seventies. Seven of these cases are
notable.265
by girls and the annoying and threatening telephone calls, though insufficient to
support a cause of action for invasion of privacy, are pertinent to the plaintifls
third cause of action - in which these allegations are reiterated - charging the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
259. Id. at 571-76, 255 N.E.2d at 771-74, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656-60. Judge Burke and
Judge Jasen joined in Judge Breitel's concurring opinion.
260. Id. at 572, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
261. Id. at 572, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
262. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572, 255 N.E.2d 765, 772, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647, 657 (1970).
263. Id. at 573, 255 N.E.2d at 773, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
264. Id.
265. For the less noteworthy cases, see Hamner v. Bradley, 289 Ala. 624, 270 So. 2d 81
(1972); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. App. 1979); Public Fin.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with a bizarre case
of first impression in Papieves v. Lawrence.26 In reversing the trial
court's dismissal of the case, the supreme court held that "recovery
may be had for serious mental or emotional distress directly caused
by the intentional and wanton acts of mishandling a [close relative's]
body .... .. 67
At issue in Papieves was the disappearance of the plaintiffs'
fourteen year old son. The parents later discovered that on the date
of his disappearance, their son had been struck and killed by a motor
vehicle operated by the defendant, who was a minor at the time of
the incident. Without attempting to obtain medical assistance and
without notifying either the police or the boy's parents, the defend-
ant removed the body from the scene of the mishap, took it to his
home, and hid it in his garage. Subsequently, the defendant buried
the body. Over two months later, the boy's partially decomposed
body was retrieved and his remains were returned to his parents.
2 68
The parents sued the defendant for intentional infliction of-emotional
distress.
The court observed that this case was unusual, but it was will-
ing to recognize a well-developed novel claim.2 6 9 After discussing
other authorities that had recognized claims for mental suffering
caused by wanton or intentional mishandling of corpses, 71 the court
continued its analysis by referring to Prosser's 1939 Michigan Law
Review article and section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.2 75 Rejecting the defendant's argument that a physical impact
was required before plaintiffs could recover, the Papieves court rea-
soned that "[i]nvocation of the impact rule is no more meaningful in
this instance than it would have been in the areas of libel or invasion
of privacy where recovery is permitted for mental or emotional dis-
tress without regard to the presence of 'impact'. 2 72 Finally, the
court rejected the argument that the appropriate form of relief was a
wrongful death action, holding that "it is not . . . an argument
Corp. v. Davis, 66 111. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976): Kaletha v. Bortz Elevator Co., 178 Ind.
App. 654, 383 N.E.2d 1071 (1978); Wambsgans v. Price, 274 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 1979); Jones
v. Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977); Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505
P.2d 68 (1972); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
266. 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970).
267. Id. at 379, 263 A.2d at 121.
268. Id. at 375, 263 A.2d at 119.
269. Id. at 376-77, 263 A.2d at 120.
270. Id. at 377-78, 263 A.2d at 120-21.
271. Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 378, 263 A.2d 118, 121 (1970) (citing Prosser,
supra note 5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
272. Id. at 380, 263 A.2d at 121-22.
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against one cause of action to say that a second action might also
have been brought.
273
In cases decided less than a year apart, the California Court of
Appeals considered the issue of whether an action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress could be barred by a communication
made pursuant to judicial proceedings. In Lerette v. Dean Witter Or-
ganization, Inc.,274 the court answered the question in the affirma-
tive. Lerette involved an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress brought by a bank president and was based on a letter sent
by Dean Witter's lawyer to the bank president accusing him of in-
tentionally misrepresenting the financial condition of a customer of
Dean Witter. The letter indicated that because the customer had de-
faulted on a credit obligation, which had been extended in reliance
on the bank president's representations of the customer's credit wor-
thiness, Dean Witter planned to sue the president unless a settlement
was reached. z75 Referring to a California statutory provision that
conferred an absolute privilege on a person to make germane com-
munications before or during a judicial proceeding, 276 the court con-
cluded that to allow an action for outrage to proceed "would exalt a
judicially derived [new tort] cause of action ...above clear legisla-
tive intention and operate as a severe deterrent to communications
otherwise protected. 277
In Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder,12 78 the California Court of
Appeals distinguished Lerette, holding that a complaint stated a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
that communications antecedent to judicial proceedings did not insu-
late defendant's attorneys from liability in that case. The court con-
cluded that actions of attorneys in threatening criminal prosecution
to obtain an advantage in a civil debt collection case were not privi-
leged because the communication violated rules of professional con-
duct. 79 Accordingly, the court concluded that the action for outrage
could proceed unimpeded.280
The dissent in Kinnamon vigorously argued against the dangers
of too liberal an interpretation of the "new tort" of intentional inflic-
273. Id. at 380, 263 A.2d at 122.
274. 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976).
275. Id. at 575, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
276. Id. at 579, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
277. Id.
278. 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977).
279. Id. at 897, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24 (citing CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7-104 (1977)).
280. Id.
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tion of emotional distress. In support of dismissing the complaint, the
dissent argued that allowing the cause to proceed "would stretch the
ever expanding circle of judicially created liability to absurd limits
and tend to further clog our courts which are already heavily con-
gested and overburdened with cases of substance."2 81 In the dissent's
view, the plaintiff's remedy was to file a complaint for disciplinary
action against the defendant attorney.282
In Harris v. Jones,283 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted
that as of 1977, the date of its decision, thirty-seven American juris-
dictions recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress as a valid cause of action. 284 The court enumerated four ele-
ments that must combine to impose liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress:
(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrong-
ful conduct and the emotional distress;
(4) The emotional distress must be severe.
285
Concerned about potential problems that might stem from recogniz-
ing this "new tort," the Maryland court concluded that adherence to
the four enumerated elements would help courts distinguish the true
claim from the false claim and distinguish frivolous claims from seri-
ous ones. 2
6
The Vermont Supreme Court, in Sheltra v. Smith,"8 ' reversed
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and recognized the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Reiterating the
customary arguments for and against the new tort, the court decided
to risk proliferous litigation in order to provide relief for serious
claims. Accordingly, the court allowed a complaint which alleged
that the defendant-father "willfully, maliciously, and outrageously
render[ed] it impossible for any personal contact or other communi-
cation to take place between the Plaintiff and her daughter, ' 288 to
proceed to trial.
281. Id. at 904, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
284. Id. at 564, 380 A.2d at 613.
285. Id. at 565, 380 A.2d at 614 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d
145 (1974)).
286. Id. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614.
287. 392 A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978).
288. Id. at 433.
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In another family dispute, Vance v. Vance,289 the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals gave an explanation of the law regarding
the emotional distress tort first recognized by the state in Harris v.
Jones.9 Noting that the trial court judge might have been misled
by the name "Intentional infliction of emotional distress," the court
advised that "the tort need not be Intentional." 29' The court thus
concluded that a defendant is responsible for the injury even if it is
inflicted by extreme and outrageous recklessness. 2 ,
Another decision that discusses the tort of outrage as a "new
tort" is the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Brewer v. Erwin.
2 93
Brewer provides important insights into the meaning and contours of
judicial recognition of a new cause of action in tort. The case in-
volved a suit for damages and injunctive relief brought by a tenant
against her landlords, based on allegations of wrongful eviction.
While reviewing the tenant's claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, Justice Linde also reviewed extant precedent on the
cause of action in Oregon and traced exactly what was meant by a
court's decision to "recognize" a new tort. 94 The Brewer opinion
adds three important insights to judicial use of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in recognizing "new torts."
First, the opinion clarifies the significance of judicial reference
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the course of an opinion.
Specifically, while acknowledging that past court decisions quote
from the Restatement, the opinion instructs that selective quotation
does not connote that the judiciary has actually adopted the Restate-
ment as though it was a legislative enactment.291 5 Second, the opinion
points out the ambiguity of the Restatement regarding the "system-
atic statement of existing law and source of doctrinal innovation." '96
289. 41 Md. App. 130, 396 A.2d 296 (1979).
290. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying
text.
291. Vance, 41 Md. App. at 139, 396 A.2d at 302 (original emphasis; citations omitted).
292. Id.
293. 287 Or. 435, 600 P.2d 398 (1979).
294. Id. at 455-58, 600 P.2d at 410-12.
295. Id. at 455 n.12, 600 P.2d at 410 n.12. With insightful analysis, Justice Linde pro-
vided additional commentary on this point:
In the nature of common law, such quotations in opinions are no more than
shorthand expressions of the court's view that the analysis summarized in the
Restatement corresponds to Oregon law applicable to the facts of the case before
the court. They do not enact the exact phrasing of the Restatement rule, com-
plete with comments, illustrations, and caveats. Such quotations should not be
relied on in briefs as if they committed this court or lower courts to track every
detail of the Restatement analysis in other cases.
Id.
296. Id.
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The Brewer court analogized section 46 of the Restatement to the
bold normative provisions incorporated into the strict product liabil-
ity provisions of section 402(a).291 Third, the opinion criticized the
Restatement definition of the still emerging tort of outrage. The
Brewer court recorded its "dissatisfaction with the battery of epi-
thets" used in the Restatement comments to characterize the tort, 98
and noted its preference for a broad definition that must always be
tested on a case by case basis.2"9
(c) Negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.-Four judi-
cial opinions examined various aspects of the tort of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress with reference to the phrase "new tort."
Three cases are of particular interest.
Two cases were decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
Niederman v. Brodsky"°' and Sinn v. Burd 01 Both cases include
strong dissenting opinions that object to the majority's creation of
new tort law. Niederman was an action by a Philadelphia pedestrian
against a motorist for negligent and reckless infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action because of lack of physical impact. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. The court held that a plain-
tiff has a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when he suffers from severe heart problems caused by witnessing his
child being struck by the defendant's automobile.3"2
Resting its decision on considerations of humanitarianism and
notions of justice, the Niederman court considered and rejected three
basic arguments that, in the past, would have disallowed the plain-
tiff's suit.3"3 First, the majority rejected the notion that it would be
impossible for medical science to prove the linkage between the de-
fendant's negligent act and the plaintiff's symptoms. The court
pointed to the significant advances that medical science has achieved
in recent years in diagnostic techniques,3"4 the logical incongruity of
297. Id.
298. Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or. 435, 456 n.13, 600 P.2d 398, 411 n.13 (citing Rockhill v.
Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971)).
299. Id. (citing Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. at 60, 485 P.2d at 31).
300. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
301. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
302. Niederman, 436 Pa. at 404, 261 A.2d at 85.
303. Id. at 404-13, 261 A.2d at 85-90. The court was also influenced by the statistics of'
other jurisdictions, noting that "[a] total of thirty-one jurisdictions [as of 1970 have] consid-
ered the impact rule. Of these 22, and perhaps 23 . . . have rejected the requirement of im-
pact." Id. at 404 n.I, 261 A.2d at 85 n.l.
304. Id. at 405-06, 261 A.2d at 86.
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allowing recovery for emotional distress upon a showing of "the
slightest impact,"3 5 and the desirability of affording the plaintiff an
opportunity to substantiate his claim.3"6
Second, the Niederman court reviewed the fear that the allow-
ance of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims without the
requirement of physical impact would lead to fictitious injuries and
fraudulent claims. In refusing to accept this assertion, the court indi-
cated that the opportunity for fallacious claims was as great in situa-




Third, citing Prosser's 1939 New Tort article for authority, the
majority rejected the proposition that allowing recovery in the ab-
sence of impact would create an unmanageable avalanche of new
cases. The court indicated that if the judiciary's caseload did in-
crease, it would be the responsibility of the state's judicial system to
handle the load.308
In Sinn v. Burd,3 °9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
recovery of damages for negligently caused mental distress is not
precluded merely because the plaintiff was outside the "zone of dan-
ger. ' '31 0 Reciting its earlier decision in Niederman, the court noted
that it had "joined the ranks of forward-looking jurisdictions" in
abandoning the impact rule in cases of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.31 Using the Niederman case as precedent for chang-
ing tort law, the Sinn majority stated that "experience has taught us
that the zone of danger requirement can be unnecessarily restrictive
and prevent recovery in instances where there is no sound policy ba-
sis supporting such a result. ' 312 Moreover, the court observed that
"[t]he wisdom and ...justice of cutting off a bystander's potential
recovery on a per se basis simply because the person was situated
beyond the zone of danger has been soundly criticized. ' 31 3 After
considering numerous policy arguments bearing on the advisability
of creating a new rule of tort law for bystander recovery, the. major-
ity changed pre-existing law to allow recovery. for instances in which
emotional distress of the bystander was a reasonably foreseeable
305. Id. at 406-07, 261 A.2d at 86.
306. Id. at 408, 261 A.2d at 87 (citing Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 561, 214 A.2d 12,
15-16 (1965)).
307. Niederman v. Brodksy, 436 Pa. 401, 409-10, 261 A.2d 84, 88 (1970).
308. Id. at 412-13, 261 A.2d at 89.
309. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
310. Id.
311, Id. at 153, 404 A.2d at 676.
312, Id. at 155, 404 A.2d at 677.
313, Id. at 158 n.8, 404 A.2d at 678 n.8.
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injury."5 4
The impact rule was rejected in a 1973 Florida intermediate
appellate court case. In Stewart v. Gilliam,315 the panel, in a divided
decision, held that a plaintiff who suffered a heart attack in reaction
to fright caused by the noise from an automobile collision with her
house could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, de-
spite a lack of physical impact. The majority made two compelling
arguments in support of its conclusion that Florida should join the
other jurisdictions that had abandoned the impact rule. The initial
argument was that the law "must keep pace with changes in our
society, for the doctrine of stare decisis is not an iron mold which
can never be changed." ' 6 The second argument discarded the notion
that any change in the impact rule should come from the legislature.
Observing that courts should not be remiss in their duty to overturn
unsound precedent in the area of tort law, the majority indicated
that it would be abdicating its own function in a peculiarly nonstatu-
tory area if it refused to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court
rule.
3 1 7
In contrast to the majority's bold assertions, the Stewart dissent
saw the case in a different light. According to the dissent, the case
presented the familiar problem of striking a balance between the
separation of governmental powers and doing justice in specific
cases.318 Alert to the possibility of second-order consequences of ju-
dicial policymaking, 19 the dissent contended that abandonment of
the impact rule in cases involving negligent infliction of emotional
distress involves more than an extension of, or deviation from, judi-
cial precedent. Abandonment of the impact rule "involves a detailed
314. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 158-63, 404 A.2d 672, 678-81 (1979).
315. 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
316. Id. at 471 (citing Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)). The opinion
included an extensive quote from O.W. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881):
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappear, but
the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some
ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with
the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons
which have been found for it, and centers on a new career. The old form receives
a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which
it has received.
271 So. 2d at 471.
317. 271 So. 2d at 477.
318. Id. at 478 (Reed, CA., dissenting).
319. See generally, Blomquist, Solar Energy Development, State Constitutional Inter-
pretation and Mount Laurel 11: Second Order Consequences of Innovative Policymaking by
the New Jersey Supreme Court, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 573 (1985).
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law-making process which has the potential for far-reaching
"1320consequences.
(d) Wrongful birth/wrongful life cases.-Judicial decisions that
addressed claims for preconception torts proliferated during the sev-
enties. Most courts were hesitant to expand this type of tort liability
and, therefore, denied "new tort" claims.32' Opinions by two state
supreme courts-Illinois and New York-provide insight to the pol-
icy considerations involved in the judicial creation of these controver-
sial new causes of action.
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 2 the Illinois Supreme
Court ignored the conservative trend in this area of the law and held
that an infant could sue a hospital and physician for injuries sus-
tained as a result of the negligent transfusion of RH-negative blood
into the mother who had RH-positive blood. In reaching this result,
the court was not deterred by the fact that the transfusion had oc-
curred several years before the infant was conceived. In a panoply of
opinions, the state supreme court justices expressed the different pol-
icy rationales that each believed should guide the holding in the
case.
In the Renslow plurality decision, endorsed by three justices,
the court discussed numerous law review articles that had criticized
the rule of law that permitted a child to bring a cause of action for
prenatal injuries only in cases in which the child was viable at the
time of the injury.323 Moreover, the court acknowledged a number of
320. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The dissent
continued:
This [creative task] is not for the courts, but the legislature. When the judi-
ciary becomes involved in the process of law making, representative government
is abandoned and so is the protection of the checks and balance system estab-
lished by our state constitution. To illustrate the latter, if the legislature exceeds
its police power by the adoption of unreasonable legislation, a citizen may turn
to his court system for protection. Where may he go, however, for such protec-
tion in the case of equally arbitrary judge-made law?
Id.
321. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (court
refused to create a new tort of wrongful life for a physician's failure to properly perform an
abortion on plaintiff's mother); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (minor
child, born out of wedlock, did not state cause of action against her father for the new tort of
wrongful birth or wrongful life). But see Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496
(1979), arid in part, rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (in case involving actions
by parents against physicians on behalf of infants for "wrongful life" and in their own right for
pecuniary expenses for the care of an infant born with neurofibromatosis, former claims disal-
lowed but latter claims, absent recovery for emotional distress, allowed).
322. 67 II1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
323. Id. at 352-60, 367 N.E.2d at 1252-56 (citing White, The Right of Recovery for
Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 383, 401 (1952); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging
Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 140, 141 n.5 (1976); Comment, Negligence and the
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Illinois lower court decisions that recognized a surviving infant's
right of action for injuries sustained in utero during the previable
stage of its development.32 In support of the appellate court's rejec-
tion of the defendants' contention that no duty was owed to the
plaintiff because of the unforeseeability of her injuries, 25 the court
noted that medical science understood the nuances of blood typing at
the time of the plaintiff's injury so that her injuries were foresee-
able. az6 In addition, the court downplayed the problems that defend-
ants might have in defending against stale claims.
327
Justice Dooley's concurring opinion in Renslow was more ex-
pansive than the plurality opinion in justifying judicial creation of a
new cause of action for a wrong committed prior to a child's exis-
tence. The concurrence sought to legitimatize acts of judicial legal
creativity. Justice Dooley urged that "[c]ourts must take an active
part in the development of the common law, although this may mean
creativeness."3a28 Justice Dooley linked creativeness in the law to flex-
ibility by urging the court to "remember that the' body of law is not
a repository of stagnant problems of society but a vital, moving force
which deals with the current problems of society. '3 2
9
Justice Ryan's dissent in the. Renslow case decried the great
change the court was making in traditional principles of tort law.
According to Ryan, " 'liability must stop somewhere short of the
freakish and the fantastic'. a33 0 The result in Renslow, he argued,
signaled the demise of the primary tort liability concepts: duty and
foreseeability.3 aa In Ryan's view, the court's decision reflected a
blind concern for loss-spreading which disregarded the competing
policy of limiting the liability to which the public can be subjected
and focused solely upon the needs of injured plaintiffs.
3 1
In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals issued an intriguing
opinion on the subject of "wrongful birth" in a consolidated action
Unborn Child: A Time for Change, 18 S, DAK. L. REv. 204, 213-14 (1973); Note, The Impact
of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 563
(1962)).
324. 67 Ill. 2d at 352, 367 N.E.2d at 1252.
325. Id. at 353, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
326. Id. at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
327. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 355, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255
(1977).
328. Id. at 361, 367 N.E.2d at 1257 (Dooley, J., concurring).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1953)).
331. Id. at 373, 367 N.E.2d at 1262.
332. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 111. 2d 348, 374, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1263
(1977).
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involving companion cases. On the one hand, the majority of the
court in Becker v. Schwartz3 3 held that "wrongful life" complaints
filed on behalf of infants did not state cognizable causes of action
when the complaints were based upon medical negligence for failure
to accurately inform certain patients of pregnancy risks, thereby re-
suiting in the birth of abnormal infants.334 On the other hand, the
same allegations led the court to recognize a direct cause of action
by the patients for economic damages suffered as a consequence of
the births, in the form of expenses for extraordinary care and treat-
ment of the children.
3 3 5
Three dimensions of the majority opinion in Becker are signifi-
cant. First, the court acknowledged the gravity of the policy consid-
erations at issue in the case. The court stated that "the weighing of
the validity of a cause of action seeking compensation for the wrong-
ful causation of life itself casts an almost Orwellian shadow, pre-
mised as it is upon concepts of genetic predictability once foreign to
the evolutionary process."3 ' Second, the Becker. majority offered an
engaging taxonomical analysis of "factually divergent wrongs" sub-
sumed beneath the broad category of "wrongful life" causes of ac-
tion. 337 The court trifurcated the typical kinds of "wrongful life"
cases into the following distinct categories:
(1) "wrongful conception" cases wherein one or both par-
ents have undergone an unsuccessful surgical birth control pro-
cedure and then seek damages for the birth of an unplanned
child; 38
(2) "wrongful diagnosis" cases involving suits for damages
incurred upon the birth of a child and based upon an erroneous
diagnosis of an existing pregnancy, which results in the depriva-
tion of the mother's choice to terminate the pregnancy within
333. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
334. Id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
335. Id. at 412-13, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
336. Id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The court continued:
It borders on the absurdly obvious to observe that resolution of this question
transcends the mechanical application of legal principles. Any such resolution,
whatever it may be, must invariably be colored by notions of public policy, the
validity of which remains, as always, a matter upon which reasonable men may
disagree.
Id.
337. Id. In undertaking this taxonomy, the court relied upon extensive scholarly litera-
ture. See id. at 409 n.4, 386 N.E.2d at 810 n.4, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898 n.4 (citing articles).
338. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
898-99 (1978). In such cases, "damages have not been sought on behalf of the child - a
healthy and normal infant - but by the parents for expenses attributable to the birth, includ-
ing the pecuniary expense of rearing the child." Id.
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the permissible time period; 3"' and
(3) "wrongful birth" disputes wherein an illegitimate, but
otherwise healthy child, seeks recovery in his or her own behalf
for the injury suffered as a consequence of his or her birth as a
stigmatized child.3 4
The Becker majority discerned that the claims before it encom-
passed yet another category of "wrongful life" cases: cases that are
premised upon the birth of a fully intended but abnormal child for
whom extraordinary care and treatment is required.3 11 With regard
to this fourth category of cases, the court observed that
"[i]rrespective of the label coined, plaintiffs' complaints sound essen-
tially in negligence or medical malpractice." ' 2
Using the foregoing as a foundation, the Becker court distin-
guished between claims by the handicapped infants for "wrongful
life" and the validity of the parents' actions for damages resulting as
a consequence of the birth of their children. 3  As to the former set
of claims, the court found that the infants did not suffer any legally
cognizable injury because what they sought was beyond the compe-,
tence of the judiciary.344 But, as to the latter set of claims, the court
of appeals reached a different conclusion. Utilizing traditional tort
language, the court held that "but for the defendants' breach of their
duty to advise plaintiffs," the parents would not have had to incur
339. Id. at 409, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (citations omitted).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. "As in any cause of action founded upon negligence, a successful plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a duty, the breach of which may be considered the proximate
cause of the damages suffered by the injured party." Id. (citations omitted).
343. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410-11, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812-13, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01 (1978).
344. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The court mused that:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born
with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philoso-
phers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to resolve
the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value which the
law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence. Not only is
there to be found no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for
judicial recognition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the
implications of any such proposition are staggering. Would claims be honored,
assuming the breach of an identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And
by what standard or by whom would perfection be defined?
Id.
Moreover, the court perceived a'second flaw in this kind of action: "[a] cause of action
brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of
damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired
state and nonexistence." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the law is not equipped to
make such a comparison. Id.
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the extraordinary costs of raising handicapped children.34 Moreover,
in the majority's view, the calculation of damages necessary to make
the parents whole requires nothing extraordinary.346 However, for
policy reasons, the court disallowed parental recovery of emotional
damages in such cases."4 7
Judge Wachtler, in a partial dissent, expressed disagreement
with the majority's recognition of the parents' rights to press claims
for genetic defects against physicians. Wachtler argued that the ma-
jority had "created a kind of medical paternity suit":
It is a tort without precedent, and at variance with existing
precedents both old and new . . . . The limits of this new liabil-
ity cannot be predicated [sic]. But if it is to be limited at all it
would appear that it can only be confined by drawing arbitrary
and artificial boundaries which a majority of the court consider
popular or desirable. This alone should be sufficient to indicate
that these cases pose a problem which can only be properly re-
solved by a legislative body, and not by courts of law. 48
(e) Product liability cases.-Spurred by the American Law In-
stitute's adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) Of
Torts a few years earlier, eight cases decided during the 1970s used
"new tort" prose to categorize and explain doctrinal changes involv-
ing product liability cases.
In Cronin v. JBE Olson Corp.,34 the California Supreme Court
made reference to its seminal decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.35 and to the embodiment of the strict liability ap-
proach in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) Torts.351 The
Cronin court continued to follow an innovative approach to develop-
ing product liability law. A unanimous court held that an injured
plaintiff seeking recovery on the theory of strict liability in tort need
not prove, as required by the Restatement, that the product "defect"
made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;
all that was required in California was that the plaintiff establish a
defective condition of the product.352
345. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 422, 386 N.E.2d 807, 819, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
907 (1978) (Watchler, J., dissenting in part).
349. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
350. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
351. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 128-29, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
352. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
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In Atkins v. American Motors Corp.,353 the Alabama Supreme
Court adopted the language and principles of section 402A. In a pre-
amble to the creation of strict products liability in Alabama, the
court traced the erosion of privity defenses in implied warranty cases
and the eventual judicial recognition of the "new tort action" of
strict liability.354
The California Supreme Court, in Daly v. General Motors
Corp.,315 applied the principles of comparative negligence that it had
adopted in an earlier case356 to actions founded on strict products
liability. Thus, the court held that while evidence of a plaintiff-dece-
dent's intoxication and failure to wear a seat belt could be weighed
in the balance to equitably allocate the loss among all parties legally
responsible in proportion to their fault, 357 assumption of the risk was
inappropriately used by the court below to bar all recovery by the
plaintiff.358 In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion referred
to the historical background of its approach and noted that "the doc-
trinal encumbrances of contract and warranty, and the traditional
elements of negligence, were stripped from the remedy, and a new
tort emerged which extended liability for defective product design
and manufacture beyond negligence but short of absolute
liability."35 9
Interestingly, two separate opinions in Daly took issue with the
majority's semantical imprecision in synthesizing the "new tort" of
strict products liability with comparative negligence principles. Jus-
tice Jefferson criticized the majority's inability to label the new prin-
ciples it had invoked. Jefferson took issue with the majority's indeci-
sion as to whether the newly recognized doctrine should be known as
comparative fault, equitable apportionment of loss, or equitable allo-
cation of loss. 3 0 Jefferson believed that the majority's inability to
give the new doctrine an appropriate label is some indication of the
shaky ground upon which the majority decided to tread. 61
In a similar vein, Justice Mosk criticized the majority's failure
to cabin the new tort principles' that it had enunciated in Daly into
353. 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976).
354. Id. at 137-44.
355. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rtpr. 380 (1978).
356. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
357. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 745-46, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 733, 575 P.2d at 1166, 144 Cal. Rtpr. at 384.
360. Id. at 751, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Jefferson, J., concurring in




The conclusion is inescapable that the majority, in avoiding
approval of comparative negligence in name as a defense to
products liability, are thereby originating a new defense that can
only be described as comparative products liability. We may
now anticipate similar defenses in the vast number of other tort
actions. Can comparative libel, comparative slander of title,
comparative wrongful litigation, comparative nuisance, compar-
ative fraud, be far behind? 62
(f) Abolition of immunity cases.-ln a variety of cases reported
during the seventies, courts embraced various modes of judicial crea-
tivity to expand tort liability by rendering decisions that abolished or
eroded traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity and intrafamily
immunity.
In some sovereign immunity cases, courts interpreted relatively
new tort claims statutes, enacted following World War I1, to give
rise to expanded liability against government defendants. 63 In other,
more momentous cases, courts wrote opinions that judicially abro-
gated the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Educa-
tion3"4 is a good example. In Ayala, a student lost an arm while
operating machinery in a shop class. In his subsequent suit, the stu-
dent alleged that the school district employees were negligent in fail-
ing to supervise the class, in supplying the machine for use without a
proper safety device, and in failing to warn students of the dangerous
condition of the machine. The trial court dismissed the action, based
on the doctrine of governmental immunity. The supreme court re-
versed the lower court holding, stating that it was joining the in-
creasing number of jurisdictions that have judicially abandoned the
sovereign immunity doctrine-a doctrine that the court character-
ized as "long since devoid of a valid justification. ' 365 The court re-
362. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 761, 575 P.2d 1162, 1184, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 402 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting). "By whatever name, negligence, heretofore just
one subtopic in the elaborate spectrum of torts which require six volumes and appendices of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to cover now seems destined to envelope the entire tort
field." Id. See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 448 146
Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
363. See Silverlight v. Huggins, 347 F. Supp. 895, 896 (D.V.l 1972), rev'd in part, 488
F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1973); Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1972); Board of Comm'rs of Delaware County v. Briggs, 167 Ind. App. 96, 337 N.E.2d 852
(1975). Cf Palmer v. State, 173 Ind. App. 208, 363 N.E.2d 1245 (1977).
364. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
365. Id. at 587, 305 A.2d at 878.
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ferred to the traditional notion encompassing sovereign immu-
nity-that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury
than that the public should suffer an inconvenience'" 3 6-as an
anachronistic social philosophy in modern America. a"7 The court, cit-
ing Prosser's New Tort article, expressly rejected fear of excessive
litigation as a justification for the immunity doctrine." 6 On similar
grounds, the justices found unpersuasive the policy arguments that
governmental functions would be impeded as a result of liability for
tortious conduct. 369 In closing, the Ayala court rejected the argu-
ment that it should defer to legislative action, noting that immunity
rules were created by the judiciary and "what [the judiciary] put
together, it can dismantle."37
Numerous courts during the seventies made reference to the
words "new tort" in cases involving previous abrogation of immunity
and asserted the proposition that mere removal of a previous proce-
dural bar to suit should not be construed to create new causes of
action. Thus, in Holodook v. Spencer,37' the New York intermediate
appellate court held that a prior New York case that had abolished
the defense of intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful torts did not
create new torts.372 Similarly, the federal district court in In Re
Bomb Disastera3 7  held that by enacting the Federal Tort Claims
Act, Congress did not intend to waive governmental immunity to tort
claims based on a theory of strict liability, thereby exposing the pub-
lic treasury to every new tort theory . 7 4 In a related federal case in-
366. Id. at 593, 305 A.2d at 881 (quoting Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 673,
100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788)).
367. The court supported this contention by quoting from a scholarly article, Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41, 48 (1949): "There is widespread acceptance
of a philosophy that those who enjoy the fruits of the enterprise must also accept its risks and
attendant responsibilities." Id. at 594, 305 A.2d at 882 (original emphasis omitted).
368. Id. at 595, 305 A.2d at 882 (citing Prosser, supra note 5, at 874).
369. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 595-96, 305 A.2d 877,
882-83 (1973).
370. Id. at 600, 305 A.2d at 885 (quoting Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486,
503, 208 A.2d 193, 202 (1965) (emphasis in original)). The court addressed arguments in
favor of stare decisis and then went on to note the distinction between precedent and policy:
"Precedent speaks for the past; policy for the present and the future. The goal which [a court
should] seek is a blend which takes into account in due proportion the wisdom of the past and
the needs of the present." Id. at 603-04, 305 A.2d at 887 (citing Schaefer, Precedent and
Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 3, 24 (1966)).
371. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
372. Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871. Accordingly, since no cause of
action existed for parental nonsupervision of a child, a defendant was not entitled to maintain
actions against the parents for indemnification. Id. See also Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d
664 (Iowa 1979); Grogan v. Comm'w, 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1979); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis
Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
373. 438 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
374. Id. at 780. Therefore, the United States could not be held liable for damages aris-
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terpreting the Federal Torts Claim Act, the district court in Hoesl v.
United States 75 held that, since a government employee's lawsuit
was essentially a claim for defamation,31 6 the plaintiff's attempt to
characterize the action as medical malpractice or "some new tort" of
"negligent imposition of economic loss" would fail. a77
(g) Loss of consortium cases.-During the seventies, courts em-
ployed "new tort" terminology when reviewing cases involving claims
for loss of consortium. Four cases address this issue.
In Garza v. Kantor,3 7 8 children sought recovery for the loss of
consortium with their father. In affirming the trial court's dismissal
of the claims, the California intermediate appellate court referred to
persuasive authority in fourteen other jurisdictions that distinguished
a child's interest in compensation from a spouse's interest in compen-
sation. The court reasoned that such claims would be speculative and
could result in the overlap of recovery by the injured parent and by
the children.3 7 1 Concluding that neither state nor federal constitu-
tional equal protection mandates compel recognition of the "new
tort," the appellate court reiterated the differences in relationships
between spouses and between parent and child s.3 0 The court further
distinguished between the statutory right of surviving children to sue
for the wrongful death of a parent, and the novel common law asser-
tion of a child's entitlement to loss of parental consortium. 8'
In the 1976 decision, Bessette v. St. Peter's Hospital,382 the
ing out of explosion of bomb laden box cars on a theory of strict products liability.
375. 451 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 629 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1980).
376. Plaintiff's complaint sought damages arising from an alleged negligently-made re-
port by a government psychiatrist stating that the government employee was unfit for his job
because of a psychiatric disorder. Id. at 1171.
377. Id. at 1175. Since "Congress did not intend to make the United States liable for
. . . conduct which fits 'the traditional and commonly understood legal definition' of defama-
tion . . . this legislative intent cannot be frustrated by calling plaintiff's cause of action some-
thing other than defamation," id, at 1175 (citations omitted), when the allegation in the com-
plaint sounded in defamation by a government physician.
378. 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976).
379. Id. at 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
380. Id. at 1028, 127 Cal. Rtpr. at 166. The equal protection arguments were advanced
under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I and CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 7. The court's distinction
between spousal relations and parent-child relations was stated as follows:
These relationships are not the same. The one rests in contract. (Civ. Code,
§ 5100.) The other does not. The one endures for the length of the marriage; the
other, generally speaking, is a continuing close familial relationship only during
the minority of the child at most. Love, affection, companionship and services
between adults differ in kind and not simply in degree from the same matters
when they exist within the relationship of parent and child.
Id. at 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (footnote omitted).
381. Id. at 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
382. 51 A.D.2d 286, 381 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1976).
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New York appellate court distinguished a wife's cognizable loss of
consortium action against a hospital and surgeons for malpractice
resulting in the amputation of her husband's right leg, from her sep-
arate claim for emotional distress arising from the incident. Reason-
ing that these claims were distinct, the court acknowledged that past
precedent involving negligent infliction of emotional distress had
amounted to "an expansion rather than a creation of a new tort con-
cept," 383 but determined nevertheless that the medical defendants
owed no duty to the wife.
Plain v. Plain" 4 entailed a novel claim by a husband against his
wife for her negligence in causing an automobile accident that led
her to suffer severe permanent injuries. The husband contended that,
as a result of his wife's negligence, he had suffered and would con-
tinue to suffer from the loss of consortium with her. The husband
argued that current case law entitled him to loss of consortium dam-
ages." 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court observed that earlier case
law "did not purport to create a new cause of action, or a new tort.
It merely did away with the defense to pre-existing torts. Plaintiff
must first show that his interest in consortium is legally protected as
against his wife, which he has failed to do.""8 6
(h) Wrongful discharge cases.-Courts in three cases reported
in the 1970s utilized "new torts" language to analyze novel actions
by employees against their former employers for "wrongful dis-
charge" or "wrongful termination" of employment.
In Nees v. Hocks,3 s7 the Oregon Supreme Court held that
"there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an em-
ployee for such a socially undesirable motive that the employer must
respond in damages for any injury done."3 "8 Accordingly, the court
concluded that sufficient evidence was presented in the trial below
for the jury to conclude that an employer who discharged the plain-
tiff for serving on jury duty should be responsible for paying the
383. Id. at 287, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
384. 307 Minn. 399, 240 N.W.2d 330 (1976).
385. Id. at 400, 240 N.W.2d at 331.
386. Id. at 402, 240 N.W. 2d at 332 (emphasis added). But see Pascal v. Charley's
Trucking Serv. Inc., 436 F. Supp. 455 (D.V.I. 1977) (federal district court interpreting Virgin
Island's law held that a wife's complaint for loss of her husband's consortium stated a valid
cause of action, id. at 456, but certified to the court of appeals the question of the wife's ability
to seek loss of consortium because it was a "controlling question of law to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion." Id. at 458).
387. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
388. Id. at 218, 536 P.2d at 515.
NEW TORTS
plaintiff compensatory damages."8
In reaching their holding, the justices in Nees first considered
the plaintiff's argument that her employer's actions constituted a
"prima facie tort" under the theory that intentional infliction of
"temporal damages" without justification is a cause of action.
390
Recognizing the problems that arose in jurisdictions that had
adopted the "prima facie tort" concept, and also recognizing the dif-
ficulties of chiselling a very broad principle of liability into a specific
tort,' 391 the Oregon Supreme Court pronounced a workable jurispru-
dential alternative. The court referred to a wide spectrum of persua-
sive authority holding that an employee is entitled to compensation
when an employer's reason or motive for discharging the employee
interferes with an important interest of the community. 392 Since
state constitutional and statutory provisions establish jury duty as an
important public service, the court concluded that the defendant em-
ployer was liable for wrongful discharge damages.3 93
The Alabama Supreme Court refused to create a new cause of
action for dismissal of an "at will" hospital employee in Hinrichs v.
Tranquilaire Hospital.39 4 The employee was discharged for his al-
leged refusal to falsify medical records. The court held that public
policy considerations alone should not justify the creation of a new
tort. The court believed that such creations are best left to the legis-
lature.395 Moreover, the per curiam opinion indicated that "[s]uch a
new rule . . . would abrogate the inherent right of contract between
employer and employee" ' 6 under Alabama law.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Jones sought to under-
mine the majority's characterization of public policy grounds for rec-
ognition of new torts as being "too nebulous. 397 Jones argued that
the law is fully capable of setting a sufficiently definitive standard in
its application of a public policy concept.3 98 He believed that such
causes of action should be "limit[ed] ...to those acts cognizable as
389. Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
390. Id. at 213, 536 P.2d at 513.
391. Id. at 215, 536 P.2d at 514.
392. Nees v. Hock, 272 Or. 210, 215-16, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (1975).
393. Id. at 218-19, 536 P.2d at 516. The court reversed in part, however, on the issue of
the jury's award of punitive damages because of concern that the defendant may not have
known that his actions were inherently wrongful. Id. at 220-21, 536 P.2d at 516-17.
394. 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
395. Id. at 1131.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1132 (Jones, J., dissenting).
398. Id. The dissent also pointed out that "the law is not unaccustomed to dealing with
the 'public policy' concept," as exemplified by precedent voiding otherwise legally binding con-
tracts on public policy grounds. Id. at 1133.
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a crime or to conduct so morally reprehensible as to be commonly
recognized as offensive to the public good."399
(i) Minority shareholder cases.-During the seventies, a num-
ber of tort actions were adjudicated involving minority shareholder
actions against majority shareholders of business corporations. Due
in large measure to a seminal law review article entitled Going Pri-
vate - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?,'" published in 1974,
courts increasingly referred to "new torts" parlance in deciding these
cases.
Two cases reflect detailed analysis of equitable considerations
underlying minority shareholder actions. In Berkowitz v. Power/
Mate Corp., ° a New Jersey trial court enjoined a proposed merger
that would "freeze-out" the minority shareholder interests. Referring
to the Borden Old Tort/New Tort article and other authorities, the
court characterized the proposed merger and "freeze-out" mergers
in general as "serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perver-
sion of the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevi-
tably is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile
to American corporate mores and the securities markets than he al-
ready is." 4 2
Likewise, in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,4 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at some
length the equitable considerations in a "going private" transaction.
Noting that its "finding of fraud inherent in the freezing out of a
splinter interest in the context of a 'going private' transaction that
lacks corporate purpose is not without scholarly or judicial sup-
port,"4 4 the Green court found such allegations cognizable under se-
curities laws.4 0
(j) Insurance tort cases.-ln three cases decided during the
1970s, courts explored the wisdom of recognizing "new tort" causes
of action against insurance companies for the alleged breach of duty
399. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala. 1977).
400. See Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
987 (1974).
401. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
402. Id. at 43, 342 A.2d at 570 (quoting Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corpo-
rate Responsibility, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 278 (Nov. 20, 1974)).
403. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
404. Id. at 1290 (citing, inter alia, Borden, supra note 400). But see id. at 1299, 1306,
1308 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Borden, supra note 400 as support for dissenter's
argument).
405. Id. at 1291.
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to protect policy holders and their beneficiaries.
Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance Co.4"' involved a suit
by a beneficiary of a life insurance policy against the life insurance
company. The complaint alleged mental distress stemming from the
insurer's economic coercion in refusing to make payments on 'the pol-
icy. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited the Illinois Supreme
Court's recognition of the "new tort" of intentional infliction of se-
vere emotional distress40 7 and reversed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint. Linking the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff
with the kind of business practiced by the defendant, the Seventh
Circuit went on to note that the "insurance business affects a great
many people, is subject to substantial governmental regulation and is
stamped with a public interest."'408
In a 1977 case, Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co.,4 9 the
Oregon Supreme Court mentioned a "new tort" named "tortious
breach of an insurer's duty of 'good faith and fair dealing' when
dealing with its insured."41 The court acknowledged that such an
insurance based cause of action was a distinct tort that had recently
emerged in California and had found favor in other jurisdictions. 11
The court held, however, that it was not necessary to decide whether
to recognize the new tort because the plaintiff in the case before it
could not prevail on such a cause of action; plaintiff's decedent
falsely answered his life insurance application. 1 2
In Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha,41 the Illinois Appellate Court
reviewed the trial court's dismissal of certain counts of a complaint
against a disability insurance company. The insured had brought an
action to recover punitive damages for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing and compensatory damages for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. In affirming the trial court's dismissal
of these counts, the appellate court rejected Illinois authority that
held that "a breach of contract itself may constitute an unusual case
where an independent willful tort will be found and that punitive
damages may be recovered." ' 4 The Debolt court found it important
406. 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972).
407. Id. at 3 (citing Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961)).
408. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). The court also observed "that insurance contracts are
subject to the same implied conditions of good faith and fair dealing as are other contracts."
Id. (footnote omitted).
409. 278 Or. 53, 562 P.2d 965 (1977).
410. Id. at 61, 562 P.2d at 969.
411. Id. (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 62-63, 562 P.2d at 970.
413. 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978).
414. Id. at 114, 371 N.E.2d at 376 (citing Ledingham v. Blue Cross, 29 I1. App. 3d
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that the state legislature provided a statutory remedy to insureds in
the event that an insurance company refused to pay or honor its con-
tract in an unreasonable or vexatious manner.415 Regarding judicial
creativity in expanding the ambit of tort law, the court stated:
We readily acknowledge that the courts throughout our na-
tion have been busy for several decades making new inroads in
the law of tort, however, we do not deem the making of law by
judicial decree to be a desirable practice per se but should be
limited to instances when humanitarian needs dictate the neces-
sity of judicial action or when legislative bodies for an unrea-
sonably long time refuse to enact statutory law for the purpose
of coping with an enduring and festering problem. In the instant
case there is statutory law of long duration which was enacted to
assist an insured as against an unreasonable and vexatious
insurer. 1
(k) Miscellaneous cases.-Various case opinions decided during
the 1970s responded to the innovative efforts of litigants and their
counsel to stake out radical new torts that courts had rarely, if ever,
considered. The majority of these cases resulted in the judiciary's
refusal to recognize unique theories. For example, courts rejected
such claims as (1) "extortion" and "coercion and duress;"417 (2)
"wilful refusal to make a good faith correction of a libelous news
story;" '18 (3) "intrusion into the attorney-client relationship" for
breach of an attorney disciplinary rule; ' (4) delay of the state in
appropriating property for public use under a statutory provision;420
and, (5) "computer malpractice." ''
339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975)).
415. Id. at 115-16, 371 N.E.2d at 377 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 767 (1975))
(permitting an insured to recover limited attorney's fees if it appears to the court that an
insurer's refusal to pay is vexatious and without reasonable cause).
416. Id. at 116-17, 371 N.E.2d at 378 (emphasis provided).
417. Leventhal v. Dockser, 361 Mass. 894, 282 N.E.2d 680 (1972).
418. Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
419. Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269,
271-72 (1973).
420. J.P. Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 51 Ohio App. 2d 83, 367 N.E.2d 54, 60 (1976)
(McCormack, J., concurring).
421. Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979). The district court stated:
The novel concept of a new tort called "computer malpractice" is premised
upon a theory of elevated responsibility on the part of those who render com-
puter sales and service. Plaintiff equates the sale and servicing of computer sys-
tems with established theories of professional malpractice. Simply because an
activity is technically complex and important to the business community does
not mean that greater potential liability must attach. In the absence of sound
precedential authority, the Court declines the invitation to create a new tort.
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In a few cases decided during this period, however, courts rec-
ognized a few miscellaneous new claims using "new torts" terminol-
ogy. For instance, the intermediate New Mexico appellate court in
Maxey v. Quintana4"2 held that "negligent misrepresentation is an
action upon which relief can be granted, that it is a tort determined
by the general principles of the law of negligence and that it is an
action separate from the action of fraud or deceit." '423 Similarly, the
California Court of Appeals in Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie
Co.,424 while admitting that intentional interference with prospective
business advantage was a vague "new tort," '425 held that a cause of
action was stated. In Lowell the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had informed prospective purchasers of the business that the delivery
contract with defendant would be terminated so as to discourage po-
tential buyers from purchasing the business and to depress its
purchase price below market value.
Moreover, in Tully v. Pate,42 6 which involved "a fight between
an estranged husband and his sister-in-law over the bodies of his
dead children,"42 7 the court recognized two new torts: "intentional
interference with the burial right" and "intentional interference with
the privilege to attend the funeral of a member of one's immediate
family."4 The district court based its recognition of these bizarre
new torts on proper allegation of all the elements of a prima facie
tort . 2
On occasion, some judges utilized "new tort" language in dis-
senting or concurring opinions while attempting to disparage the va-
lidity of majority holdings. In a wrongful death action on behalf of a
16-year-old who was killed when his motorcycle struck a steel cable
placed on land by the defendants, the court allowed the defendants
to seek contribution in the same action against the boy's parents for
negligent entrustment.4 30 The dissent contended that "no apportion-
ment may be had absent a breach of duty owing to the injured in-
fant. In this respect . . . the majority seems to be creating a new
tort cause of action which defendants may assert directly against
Id. at 740-41 n.j.
422. 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356 (1972).
423. Id. at 42, 499 P.2d at 360 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1965)).
424. 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1978).
425. Id. at 19, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
426. 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973).
427. Id. at 1065-66.
428. Id. at 1070-71.
429. Id. at 1071.
430. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
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[the father]. '
The dissent in Dubreuil v. Pinnick432 used a similar argument in
attacking the majority holding. The Dubreuil court held that suffi-
cient evidence existed to render liable for false imprisonment a per-
son who had filed an affidavit requesting plaintiff's arrest. The dis-
sent objected by asserting that "[t]o the extent that the majority
impose liability upon [defendant] because of her motive in executing
the affidavit, then it would appear that the majority have contra-
vened the foregoing authority and have created a new tort.
433
C. Judicial Creativity Consolidated, 1980-1988
During the eighties the number of cases using "new tort" par-
lance exploded. Courts frequently utilized "new tort" terminology
while they reviewed new causes of action, reconsidered legal barriers
to tort recovery, interpreted statutory rights, and examined novel
procedural issues. The raw number of "new tort" cases decided dur-
ing the eighties was approximately three times those written during
the seventies; the number of recurring problem areas also increased
substantially. The number of categories of novel questions with re-
curring patterns increased from ten 34 to seventeen tort typologies.
New tort categories that emerged during the 1980s included: nonin-
surance bad faith cases; intentional spoliation of evidence disputes;
emergency response compensation cases; breach of confidence ac-
tions; negligent misrepresentation matters; abuse of litigation claims;
and contractual/economic interference torts.
Courts construed a more diverse group of statutory tort causes
of action including new "constitutional tort" actions involving con-
struction of various constitutional provisions. In addition, the type
and number of "new tort" application problems also increased.
1. Statutory and Constitutional Construction Cases.-Two
federal court decisions considered the arguments for recognition of
novel constitutional tort claims. In both cases, the courts utilized the
unique federal constitutional "special factors analysis" to determine
431. Id. at 349, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting). "The
problem with this, of course, is that [the defendants] have not suffered any injury recognized
by tort law." Id.
432. 178 Ind. App. 526, 383 N.E.2d 420 (1978).
433. Id. at 536, 383 N.E.2d at 427 (Young, J., dissenting).
434. These categories of novel questions included: invasion of privacy cases, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful birth/wrong-
ful life, product liability, abolition of immunities, loss of consortium, wrongful discharge, mi-
nority shareholder, and insurance tort causes of action.
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whether implying a cause of action under Bivens4 35 is appropriate.436
In Reuber v. United States43 7 a research pathologist sued his
employers, two government contractors, and the National Cancer In-
stitute because his supervisors had written and disseminated a letter
of reprimand that accused him of mischaracterizing personal re-
search as being endorsed by the National Cancer Institute.438 Dr.
Reuber alleged that these actions violated his first amendment rights
of freedom of association, freedom of speech and privacy, as well as
his fifth amendment right to procedural due process, and led to his
"constructive discharge" and resulting mental distress.439
In a plurality opinion, the court held that no special factors
could bar a constitutional tort action against Reuber's employers.
4 °
Partially dissenting, Judge Starr claimed that three "special factors"
made a Bivens constitutional tort action undesirable: (1) the private
status of the defendants; (2) the relationship of Reuber's opinions to
his employer's government contract research business; and (3) the
availability of a state law defamation remedy.44' The dissent was vi-
tally concerned with "the systematic consequences" of creating a
particular constitutional tort action. 4 2 Judge Starr believed that the
availability of a remedy under common law was the key reason why
the courts should not recognize a constitutional tort. 4 3
435. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
436. The history of constitutionally based actions for money damages or "constitutional
tort cases," began with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Biv-
ens, the Supreme Court fashioned the hybrid tort/constitutional principle that citizens can
bring an action to recover damages for fourth amendment violations caused by federal officials
acting in their official capacity, notwithstanding the lack of a congressionally authorized cause
of action. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court extended this principle to citizens seeking to
fit their cause of action under the fifth amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979), and the eighth amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Other courts
have implied constitutional damage actions for violations of the first amendment. See, e.g.,
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
The scholarly literature on constitutional torts is extensive. See Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L REV. 1532 (1972); Hill, Constitutional
Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Love, Damages: A Remedy for Violation of Con-
stitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242 (1978); Whitman, Government Responsibility for
Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986); Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional
Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980).
437. 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
438. Id. at 1044-45. Reuber forwarded his research paper, using government letterhead,
to certain litigants in California. This led to the misconception that the National Cancer Insti-
tute had endorsed Reuber's study. Id.
439. Id. at 1053-54 (citation omitted).
440. Judge Bork filed his own concurring opinion as to the judgment regarding only the
plaintiff's constitutional tort claim. Id. at 1063-69. Judge Starr filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1069-76.
441. Id. at 1069-76 (Starr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
442. Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1072 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
443. Id. at 1073.
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In Stepanian v. Addis, 4" the court applied a "special factors"
analysis and decided not to imply a constitutional tort damages ac-
tion. 445 The plaintiff in Stepanian alleged that a Justice Department
attorney had defamed him during a news conference that addressed
plaintiff's grand jury indictment. A majority of the Stepanian court
endorsed the three "special factors" articulated by the district court
as grounds for not implying a new due process constitutional tort
cause of action. 46 The "special factors" that the court analyzed
were: (1) the public interest in keeping a free flow of information to
aid the federal prosecutor's law enforcement activities; (2) the diffi-
culty in defining what "process" is due a person before the govern-
ment can release information, and in determining the availability of
a remedy under the common law for libel and slander; and (3) the
fact that the criminal trial provided the plaintiff with a full opportu-
nity to clear his name, even if not with monetary compensation as
well.4
47
Two federal court cases decided during the eighties referred to
the phrase "new tort" while interpreting railroad workers' rights
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). 448 In Lancaster
v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,449 the Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that FELA did not create a cause of action for tortious
acts lacking physical contact and conceded that no court has decided
that any "new torts" give rise to FELA liability.4 5 By "new torts,"
the court meant wrongful discharge or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress causes of action. 45' The court of appeals held that the
plaintiff had asserted a claim cognizable under FELA for "violation
of one of the traditional 'physical' torts such as assault, battery, and
negligent infliction of personal injury. 45 2
In Gillman v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,453 the court
found that a railroad worker's claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress was cognizable under FELA.454 The Gillman court ex-
plained its recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress
under FELA on the basis that FELA jurisprudence has looked to
444. 782 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1986).
445. Id. at 904.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
449. 773 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1985).
450. Id. at 815.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. 673 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. III. 1987).
454. Id. at 916.
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common law development for guidance.455
During the 1980s, several state appellate courts employed "new
tort" language while construing private rights under various statutes.
In Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff,456 the Oregon Supreme
Court considered an action against two attorneys for "intentional vi-
olations of the statutory duties of an attorney.14 7  In analyzing
whether an attorney's violation of an ethical duty imposed by statute
or by the Code of Professional Responsibility gave rise to a new and
private cause of action independent of the common law,"' the God-
frey Pontiac court distinguished between cases involving an underly-
ing common law cause of action and cases not involving an underly-
ing common law cause of action when liability is based upon
violation of a statutory duty. 5 " Noting that a typical illustration of
the former type of case is a negligence per se action, the majority
pointed out that the standard for determining whether violation of
the statute gives rise to a finding of negligence is "(1) whether the
injured person is a member of the class intended by the legislature to
be protected and (2) whether the harm is of the kind which the stat-
ute was intended to prevent." '4 ° When no underlying common law
cause of action exists, the Godfrey Pontiac court said it must go be-
yond the protected class/prevented harm inquiry to determine
whether any explicit or implicit legislative intent suggests that a vio-
lation of a statute should give rise to a tort cause of action.46'
The Godfrey Pontiac court also surveyed the cases and com-
mentary of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of
whether an attorney's violation of statutory duties or the Code of*
455. Id. (quoting Atchison, Topeka &. Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562
(1987)),
456. 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981).
457. Id. at 321, 630 P.2d at 842.
458. Id. at 324-25, 630 P.2d at 844.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 326, 630 P.2d at 845 (citing Stachniewicz v. Mar-cam Corp., 259 Or. 583,
586, 488 P.2d 436, 438 (1971)). Stachniewicz has since been overruled by Davis v. Billy's
Con-Teena, Inc., 284 Or. 351, 587 P.2d 175 (1978).
461. Bob Godfrey Pontiac Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 326, 630 P.2d 840, 845 (1981)
(citing Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 271, 278, 604 P.2d 1261, 1965 (1980)). The major-
ity opinion defined this standard in instrumentalist terms:
If no intent either way is evident from the statute, then, . . . this court
must attempt to ascertain how the legislature would have dealt with the problem
had it been considered by the legislature. This is usually done . . . by looking at
the policy giving birth to the statute and determining whether a civil tort action
is needed to carry out that policy.
Id. (citing Miller, 288 Or. at 278, 604 P.2d at 1265 (emphasis in original)). Later in the
opinion the court noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A presents a similar
approach. Id. at 330, 630 P.2d at 847.
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Professional Responsibility gives rise to a private cause of action
and noted that most authorities were against implying a new tort
cause of action.462 Finally, 'the court observed that the existence
under the common law of the absolute privilege against defamation
for statements made in judicial proceedings, and the "special injury"
requirement in malicious prosecution actions, would not support the
recognition of the new statutory tort.46 3 In light of these policies and
the risk that recognizing a statutory cause of action would interfere
with the legislative scheme,4" 4 the court declined to create a new pri-
vate cause of action.
In a concurring opinion in Godfrey Pontiac, Justice Linde
agreed with the majority's decision not to imply a statutory tort, but
said that the appropriate inquiry in such cases is to decide "whether
defendant's act violated the law and caused an injury of the kind and
to the kind of person contemplated by the protective law, and
whether the legislature meant some other remedy or method of en-
forcement to be exclusive." '65 Justice Linde also said that the courts
should not assume that statutory silence means that the plaintiff
should not be entitled to recovery. 6
In Nearing v. Weaver,4"7 a mother and her children brought an
action against police officers for damages to their psychic and physi-
cal health as a result of the police officer's failure to enforce a re-
straining order against the father. Justice Linde, writing for the ma-
jority, applied his analysis in the Godfrey Pontiac concurrence 6"
and held that the mother and her children stated a cause of action
under Oregon's Abuse Prevention Act46 9 for the officer's failure to
take the father into custody.470 The statute requires the police to ar-
462. The court observed that:
(a) The statute or Code of Professional Responsibility was not intended to
create a private cause of action. On the contrary, the sole intended remedy for a
violation ...is the imposition of discipline by disbarment, suspension or repri-
mand of the offending attorney.
(b) Other remedies, such as malicious prosecution, adequately protect the
public from harassment or abuse of unprofessional lawyers.
(c) To expose attorneys to actions for damages for breach of ethical duties
imposed by such statutes and codes would be contrary to the "obvious public
interest" in affording every citizen "the utmost freedom of access to the courts."
Id. at 331, 630 P.2d at 848 (citations omitted).
463. Id. at 333, 630 P.2d at 850.
464. Id. at 335, 630 P.2d at 851.
465. Id. at 340, 630 P.2d at 854 (Linde, J., concurring).
466. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 340, 630 P.2d 840, 854 (1981).
467. 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983).
468. See supra notes 465-66 and accompanying text.
469. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1987).
470. 295 Or. at 704, 670 P.2d at 139.
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rest a person when there is probable cause that a domestic relations
court order has been violated.471  The Nearing court reasoned that
the statutory provisions were unique in that the legislature had cho-
sen mandatory arrest as the best way to reduce domestic violence.
4 72
Because the statute identified precisely "when, to whom, and under
what circumstances police protection must be afforded, ' 4 73 the court
was able to justify finding a cause of action against the police officers
under the statute. The concurring opinion in Nearing agreed that the
trial court should not have granted the police officer's summary
judgment motion because the plaintiffs stated a claim of negligence
per se.474
Two dissenting justices sharply criticized the majority for ignor-
ing Oregon precedent that had refused to recognize new statutory
torts.475 The dissent proffered four reasons why the court should not
recognize a common law new tort: (1) a rule of strict liability was at
odds with the tort law's customary concern with unreasonable con-
duct; (2) the new cause of action could severely disrupt law enforce-
ment practices and exacerbate municipal finances; (3) before creat-
ing "new law," interested parties such as cities and counties needed
to contribute input, and the legislature was the best forum for such
input; and, (4) courts should not create a new tort without reading
briefs and hearing arguments." 6
471. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1987).
472. Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 712, 670 P.2d 137, 143 (1983). The court further
stated that "[tihe legislative purpose in requiring the police to enforce individual restraining
orders clearly is to protect the named persons for whose protection the order is issued, not to
protect the community at large by general law enforcement activity." Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 714-17, 670 P.2d at 145-46 (Jones, J., concurring). According to the concur-
ring opinion:
When plaintiff's counsel first read the majority opinion in this case, they
will probably feel like the child at Christmas who asked Santa Claus for a
stuffed teddy bear, but instead received a real live cub. They received much
more than they requested and the gift may prove to be not only awkward, but
also dangerous.
The plaintiffs prayed for a claim of relief based solely on negligence; they
received a claim of relief called "statutory tort." The results of a "statutory
tort" are speculative and may be harsh. For instance, is "discretion" always
eliminated as a defense? Does comparative fault apply? Is a totally innocent act
actionable? To what precedent are we cited for direction?
Id. at 714-15, 670 P.2d at 145.
1 predict that future case law will probably develop, as it has in the prod-
ucts liability field where "strict liability" claims are gradually eliminating negli-
gence claims, to the point where we will have a new class of "statutory tort"
claims which will replace the traditional "statutory negligence per se" claims.
Id. at 717, 670 P.2d at 146.
475. Id. at 718-28, 670 P.2d at 146-53 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
476. Id. at 725-28, 670 P.2d at 151-52.
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In other cases decided during the 1980s, courts employed the
phrase "new tort" to decide whether particular statutory enactments
gave rise to independent rights. These statute-related cases can be
subdivided into four categories: (1) family dispute cases; (2) liquor
liability cases; (3) employment and civil rights cases; and (4) miscel-
laneous cases.
(a) Family dispute statutory cases.-Courts considered four
cases involving "new torts" interpretation of statutory family law
provisions. Williams v. Ali4 was the most provocative case. Wil-
liams involved an action against Muhammad Ali for alleged sexual
assault that resulted in the birth of a child. The plaintiff's theory was
that she had suffered continuing injury because Ali had failed to
support the child as required by a paternity statute. The court held
the claim to be barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the
.mother's attempt to allege a "new tort" in an effort to "breathe life
into her stale claim for sexual assault."47 The Williams court ac-
cused the plaintiff of "purposefully or inadvertently confus[ing] her
son's statutory remedy under the Paternity Act with her remedy in
tort for sexual assault," 7 '
Blucher v. Ekstroma8 0 involved an action against an automobile
driver and owner to recover compensation for injuries to the plain-
tiff's mother. The plaintiff alleged that because of the accident, her
mother could not care for herself and had been rendered financially
destitute. The plaintiff claimed that because she had a statutory duty
to care for her mother since her mother was financially incapable of
caring for herself, the driver who hit her mother should compensate
plaintiff."8 The Blucher court dismissed the claim and observed that
"[t]he statute carries no hidden meaning. It does exactly what it
purports to do, that is, require an adult child to support a destitute
parent if the child has the ability to do so. What the Act does not do
is create a new tort. 48 2
Two 1988 decisions by the California Court of Appeal, Hobbs v.
477. 145 I1. App. 3d 458, 495 N.E.2d 1052 (1986).
478. Id. at 461, 495 N.E.2d at 1054.
479. Id. at 462-63, 495 N.E.2d at 1055. In another portion of the opinion, the court
distinguished Illinois precedent that afforded long arm jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent
for recovery of child support based on the word "tortious" in the statute from a substantive
tort claim against a noncustodial parent for failure to provide child support. Id. at 462, 459
N.E.2d at 1054-55.
480. 68 Md. App. 459, 513 A.2d 923 (1986), vacated, 309 Md. 458, 524 A.2d 1235
(1989).
481. Id. at 462, 513 A.2d at 924.
482. Id. at 466, 513 A.2d at 926.
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Christenson"8 3 and Spellis v. Lawn,484 rejected arguments for judi-
cial creation of new torts. In both cases, the plaintiffs based their
new tort causes of action on statutory mandates that required par-
ents to support their minor children. In Hobbs, an illegitimate child
who had reached the age of majority sued her natural father for the
damages she incurred because of her father's failure to support her
during her minority; alternatively she sought retroactive child sup-
port.485 The Hobbs court refused to create a new tort that would
compensate the plaintiff for the years she was denied the lifestyle she
was entitled to had her father paid statutory child support obliga-
tions.486 Although concerned about the statutory obligation of a par-
ent to support his child, the Hobbs court was more concerned about
whether it should create a common law tort.4 8 7 The court was afraid
that if it recognized a new tort in the Hobbs scenario, it would "open
up a Pandora's box of litigation that springs from consensual sexual
acts of individuals.
488
Spellis v. Lawn involved an issue similar to the one in Hobbs. In
Spellis, however, the father had been subject to court ordered child
support.4 89 Although the Spellis court observed that the case
presented "fascinating questions of first impression, 4 a° the court
nonetheless dismissed the claim because the statute of limitations
barred it.
49 '
483. 198 Cal. App. 3d 189, 243 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1988) (case deleted from 198 Cal. App.
3d by order of the Supreme Court dated April 28, 1988).
484. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 246 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1988).
485. Hobbs, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
486. Id. at 635 (footnote omitted).
487. In this respect, the court engaged in common law reasoning through analogy to
statutory provisions. See generally, Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3
(1966); Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1936); Traynor,
Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. UL. REV. 401 (1968).
488. Hobbs v. Christenson, 198 Cal. App. 3d 189, 243 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1988) (case
deleted from 198 Cal. App. 3d by order of the Supreme Court dated April 28, 1988).
489. The child support order was incident to a 1963 divorce decree which required the
father to pay $40 a week in child support. After a subsequent remarriage to his wife and
second divorce from the same woman, the judicial support order increased to $50 per week.
The father went into hiding, changed his name, and evaded all support obligations for 16
years. Spellis, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1077, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
490. The "fascinating questions" that the case presented were:
Do allegations of a parent's clandestine name-change and deliberate con-
cealment of his or her whereabouts, in an effort to escape paying court-ordered
child support, state a cause of action for fraud? Is such conduct "outrageous"
enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress? Should the child
"victim" of such parental abandonment be limited to recovery of only back-due
support payments or should he or she be allowed compensatory damages for the
years of hardship?
Spellis v. Lawn, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 1078, 246 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1988).
491. "[T]he plaintiffs could have stated a cause of action. Violation of a statutory duty
is generally actionable in tort regardless of whether the statute provides a specific civil rem-
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(b) Liquor statutory cases.-During the 1980s, the courts con-
sidered "new torts" in seven cases arising under liquor liability stat-
utes. In Sanders v. Officers Club of Connecticut, Inc., '92 the Con-
necticut Supreme Court emphasized that Connecticut's Dram Shop
statute 493 created "new tort liability" that eased the traditional prox-
imate cause *requirement in tort and affirmed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff.49 4 The court said that the statute did not require a causal
relation between the sale of liquor and the plaintiff's injuries. 9 5 In a
1987 case, American Universal Insurance Co. v. DelGreco, 96 the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state's insurance statute
prohibited an insurer from reducing its liability for underinsured mo-
torist coverage by the amount the insured received from a liquor es-
tablishment pursuant to a Dram Shop statute.9 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Matthew v. Konieczny, 491
expanded the liability of liquor licensees beyond the express words of
the state liquor code.499 The Matthew majority found support for its
reading of the state liquor code in the public policy of protecting
minors and the public from the harmful effects of alcohol.5 00 The
majority conceded that to interpret the statute so that liquor licen-
sees would not be liable for any injuries arising from a sale of alco-
hol to minors would result in the anomalous situation in which licen-
sees would be less liable than social hosts."' The Matthew court
grafted the social policy argument that prevailed in the social host
liability case onto the liquor code's specific limitation of civil liability
for licensees.? °  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix disparaged the
edy." Id. at 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (Sonenshine, J., concurring).
492. 196 Conn. 341, 493 A.2d 184 (1985).
493. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990).
494. 196 Conn. at 349, 493 A.2d at 190 (citations omitted).
495. Id.
496. 205 Conn. 178, 530 A.2d 171 (1987).
497. Id. at 198, 530 A.2d at 182. The court construed the insurance regulation, which
stated that an insurance policy "may provide for the reduction of the insurer's liability to the
extent that damages have been ...paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the
injury," CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38-175a-6(d), as inapplicable to the case at bar. The ration-
ale for this holding was that since the dram shop statute "create[d] a new tort liability," it was
inappropriate to construe a victim-insured's receipt of a tort judgment against a liquor estab-
lishment under the statute as falling within the ambit of the insurance regulations collateral
source rule. American Universal, 205 Conn. at 199, 530 A.2d at 182.
498. 515 Pa. 106, 527 A.2d 508 (1987).
499. Id. Cf. Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (1985) (new civil
tort damage cause of action implied from penal statute proscribing sale of beer to an intoxi-
cated person).
500. Congini v. Portersville, 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983).
501. Matthew, 515 Pa. at 129-30, 470 A.2d at 520 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
502. The liquor statute imposed liability on a liquor licensee who sold liquor "to any
person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards,
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majority for creating a "new tort" based merely on a national
trend,5"3 and for intruding into the province of the legislature since
the Pennsylvania liquor industry is so carefully regulated by the
legislature.5"4
In three cases, courts either limited the applicability of liquor
liability statutes to certain claims or precluded actions that sought to
supplement the liability provisions of the respective statutes. In
Gardner v. Wood,5"5 the Michigan Supreme Court refused to imply
a new tort cause of action against a banquet facility that violated a
penal statute prohibiting consumption of alcohol on unlicensed prem-
ises. The court observed that "[w]hile it is part of the court's historic
common-law function to develop the law, a degree of caution must
be exercised in fashioning civil remedies where a balance struck by a
comprehensive regulatory scheme could be undermined." '
Taking a different approach to restricting liability under a li-
quor liability statute, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Pow-
ers, 50 7 held that a tavern whose employee served liquor to an intoxi-
cated person who later caused an injury, was not subject to a
contribution action brought by the tavern customer. 50 8 The majority
based its holding on an interpretation of the state contribution stat-
ute, which allowed contribution from a person "liable in tort,"509
juxtaposed with the state Dram Shop law.51 0 Interpreting the Dram
Shop statute to limit a liquor establishment's liability to nontort lia-
bility created by the legislature, the Hopkins majority denied the
customer's contribution action against the tavern.51' Disagreeing
with the majority's characterization, one dissenting opinion con-
or persons of known intemperate habits." Id. at 513 (quoting Pa. Liquor Code, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 40493(1) (Purdon Supp. 1989)).
503. Matthew v. Konieczny, 515 Pa. 106, 129, 527 A.2d 508, 520 (1987) (Nix, J.,
dissenting).
504. Id.
505. 429 Mich. 290, 414 N.W.2d 706 (1987).
506. Id. at 304, 414 N.W.2d at 712. In a footnote expounding upon its rationale, the
majority opinion stated that implying a tort cause of action "could also work against an
agency's objectives and result in over-enforcement of regulations. In certain regulatory
schemes, this could result in upsetting the delicate balance created by the Legislature." Id. at
304 n.7, 414 N.W.2d at 712 n.7 (citing O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of
Action, 52 CAL. L. REV. 231, 261-67 (1964); Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L.
REV, 553 (1981); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrack and Ash: Some Impli-
cations for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975)).
507. 113 I11. 2d 206, 497 N.E.2d 757 (1986).
508. Id. at 212, 497 N.E.2d at 760.
509. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
510. Hopkins, 113 Ill. 2d at 211-12, 497 N.E.2d at 758-59. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
para. 135 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
511. Hopkins, 113 Ill. 2d at 211, 497 N.E.2d at 759.
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tended that Dram Shop statutes were an example of "legislative pro-
visions creating new tort rights."5 '2
Echoing part of the Hopkins Court rationale, the Vermont Su-
preme Court in Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc.5"3 held that
Vermont's Dram Shop statute514 provided an injured party's exclu-
sive remedy against a liquor establishment for serving liquor to an
intoxicated customer who later caused personal or property
damages.515
(c) Employment and civil rights statutory cases.-During the
eighties, two United States District Court opinions used "new tort"
language in gauging the impact of state antidiscrimination statutes
and administrative remedies on the availability of a common law ac-
tion for wrongful discharge based on age discrimination. In Greene v.
Union Mutual Life Ins. Co.,5" the court expressed concern that
"creation of a new tort would duplicate the remedies already pro-
vided [to protect] the statutorily-created right to be free from age
discrimination and is, therefore, not necessary or proper. "517
Similarly, the district court in Lemon v. Tucker. 8 surveyed Illi-
nois case law and concluded that the relatively new tort of "retalia-
tory discharge" did not include a civil cause of action for age dis-
crimination. 519 The court's holding was significant because the
512. Hopkins v. Powers, 113 111. 2d 206, 215, 497 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1986) (Simon, J.,
dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A, comment b (1979)) ("exam-
ples of legislative provisions creating new tort rights are civil rights acts, dram shop statutes,
and dog-bite statutes").
513. 149 Vt. 213, 542 A.2d 269 (1988).
514. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1988).
515. The court said:
Vermont's Dram Shop Act . . . created a [new tort and] a remedy which
was unavailable under traditional common law principles, and it prescribed a
specific method of enforcement . . . . [lit follows that Vermont's Dram Shop
Act provides the exclusive remedy for cases falling within its scope, and
preempts a cause of action in common law negligence.
Id. at -, 512 A.2d 270.
516. 623 F. Supp. 295 (D. Me. 1985).
517. Id. at 299 (citations omitted). The court continued:
Moreover, creation of the common law action based on the public policy
against age discrimination would disrupt the delicate balance represented by the
remedial scheme set forth in the statute . . . . For example, the Human Rights
Act and ADEA have prescribed statutes of limitations, conciliation provisions
and damages provisions which would be undermined by allowance of a new tort
remedy.
Id. (citation omitted).
518. 625 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Il. 1985).
519. Id. at 1117 (citing Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 111. 2d I, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985)).
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Illinois Human Rights Act (I.HRA) 520 provided victims of discrimi-
nation with more legal rights than they had prior to the enactment
of that Act.52' Accordingly, the court concluded that IHRA did not
violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights, despite the plaintiffs'
contention that in filing a complaint under the Act they had not been
guaranteed a full hearing on their claims under either common law,
statutory, or administrative causes of action, unlike other plaintiffs
who had been guaranteed a hearing.522
(d) Miscellaneous statutory cases.-In a miscellany of other
statutory interpretation disputes, courts referred to the phrase "new
tort." Courts interpreted the "new tort" applications of unfair trade
practice statutes,523 wrongful death statutes, 24 anti-fee-splitting stat-
utes,525 comparative fault statutes,526 and no-fault motor vehicle
statutes."27
2. Novel Questions of Common Law Causes of Action.
(a) Invasion of privacy cases.-In five cases published during
the 1980s, courts referred to the phrase "new tort" in deciding issues
of tortious invasion of privacy interests. In three cases, the courts
utilized the phrase in a historical context, making reference to the
judiciary's eventual recognition of the "new tort" of privacy many
years after the right to privacy as a separate civil wrong was articu-
lated in the 1890 Warren and Brandeis article. 528 In the other two
cases, the courts employed the words "new tort" to characterize ana-
logues to the traditional privacy causes of action.
DeAngelo v. Fortney2 9 was one of the latter two cases. In De-
Angelo, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to recognize a sep-
arate tort of harassment in a case involving a homeowner who was
suing the defendant for having provided the homeowner's name to
home improvement companies that later solicited his business.5a0 The
520. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101 to 9-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
521. Lemon, 625 F. Supp. at 1117-18.
522. Id.
523. See, e.g., Doliner v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. 692, 489 N.E.2d 1036 (1986).
524. See, e.g., Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987).
525. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 573 F. Supp. 1443
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
526. See, e.g., Glidden v. German, 360 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Iowa 1984).
527. See, e.g., Jahn v. O'Neil, 327 Pa. Super. 357, 360-61, 475 A.2d 837, 839 (1984).
528. See Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968 (D.R.I. 1988); McSurely v.
McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
529. 357 Pa. Super. 127, 515 A.2d 594 (1986).
530. Id. at 132, 515 A.2d at 596.
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court noted that an action for invasion of privacy should ordinarily
provide an adequate remedy for conduct that unreasonably interferes
with a person's right to be left alone. 31
In another vein, the dissent in Kramer v. Downey532 objected to
the majority's exercise of judicial activism5"' in a married man's ac-
tion against a former lover who spied upon him and intruded on his
personal life at home and at work. While the majority of the court
concluded that the right to privacy included the right to be free of
such willful intrusions, 5 34 the dissent saw the holding as "classic
proof of the old aphorism: 'hard facts make bad law,' ""' because
the court was expanding the action of privacy to the extent of creat-
ing a new tort. 3
(b) Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.-Due
largely to citation of Prosser's 1939 article,537 numerous cases exam-
ining the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or out-
rage included the phrase "new tort. '5 38 Hall v. May Department
Stores Co.5 39 involved an action for defamation and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress that a store employee brought for hav-
ing been questioned by store security personnel about shortages in a
cash register. In an opinion by Justice Linde, the Oregon Supreme
Court held for the plaintiff and sustained the jury verdict. 4 Linde's
opinion is important, however, for the independent gloss he placed on
the cause of action and for the critique of semantical labels that
531. Id.
532. 680 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
533. Id. at 526 (Storey, J., dissenting).
534. Id. at 525.
535. Id. at 526.
536. Id. (Storey, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that creation of a new tort "should
be left to the court of last resort." Id. (citations omitted).
537. Prosser, supra note 5.
538. See Ingram v. Pirelli Cable Corp., 295 Ark. 154, 747 S.W.2d 103, 105 (1988);
Growth Properties Inc. v. Cannon, 282 Ark. 472, 669 S.W.2d 447, 448 n.3 (1984); Tandy
Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1984); Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 187 Ga. App. 222, 369 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1988); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77
(Okla. 1986); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 Or. App. 638, 707 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1985), revd
in part, 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d 854 (1986) (Gillette, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (citing Prosser, supra note 5); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776, 777 (S.C. 1981) (new
tort recognized in South Carolina); Save Charleston Foundation v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 333
S.E. 2d 60, 66 (S.C. App. 1985); Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652, 657 (S.D. 1984) (citing
Note, Minnesota's "New Tort": Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 10 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1984)); Tidelands Auto Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) ("new tort" of intentional infliction of emotional distress recognized in Texas);
Chamberlaine & Flowers v. Smith Contracting, 341 S.E.2d 414, 417 (W. Va. 1986).
539. 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1982).
540. Id. at 142, 637 P.2d at 133.
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Prosser and the Restatement of Torts had put on the "new tort.1541
Linde wrote that:
In attempting to articulate what separates actionable con-
duct from the ordinary run of crudely aggressive, overbearing,
or ill-tempered behavior, Prosser and the Restatement turned to
adjectives like "outrageous" and "extreme." These are not
words of art; other words or phrases could serve as well. All are
designed only to express the outer end of some gradation or
scale of impropriety and social disapproval. No more can be
conveyed by defining one epithet by another . . . . [F]or the
purpose of informing a trial court's exercise of its own responsi-
bility . . . the facts of the decided cases probably convey more
than any battery of verbal formulas.5
4 2
Decisions written during the eighties reflect judicial frustration
with defining the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and disagreement over the application of those ele-
ments to varying fact patterns. For example, the court in McGrath v.
Fahey,4' sketched the history of the tort of outrage and found that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action.544 During its analysis, the
McGrath court observed that "the main difficulties consist of deter-
mining what conduct constitutes 'extreme and outrageous' conduct
and what emotional distress may be characterized as 'severe."' 545
Judges also disagree about the application of the elements of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to the facts of a
case. In Haas v. Freeman,546 a construction subcontractor and his
wife sued the defendant for having issued a telephoned report that
said the sheriff was going to arrest the subcontractor for issuing a
bad check to an employee. Holding for the defendant, the Kansas
Supreme Court said that the erroneous telephone message did not go
beyond the bounds of decency. 547 A dissenting justice, however, be-
lieved that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that
the defendant had committed the tort of outrage.548 Since the jury
found the defendant's act to be outrageous, the dissent argued that
541. See id. at 136, 637 P.2d at 129-30 (citing Prosser, supra note 5;. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46).
542. Id. at 135-36, 637 P.2d at 129-30 (citation omitted).
543. 163 Ill. App. 3d 584, 520 N.E.2d 655 (1987).
544. Id. at 591, 520 N.E.2d at 658-59.
545. Id. at 588, 520 N.E.2d at 658 (citation omitted).
546. 236 Kan. 664, 693 P.2d 1194 (1985).
547. Id. at 669, 693 P.2d at 1198 (citing Roberts v. Saylor, 230 Kan. 289, 637 P.2d
1175 (1981)).
548. Id. (Lockett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part; dissenting as to this part).
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the reviewing court should not have reweighed the facts or engaged
in further judicial lawmaking regarding the elements of a cause of
action.549
In two cases decided during the 1980s, judges discussed the in-
tricate relationship between the tort of outrage and other parallel
tort causes of action. In Patton v. J.C. Penney Co.,5  Justice Linde
commented on an employee's suit against his supervisor for wrongful
discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. While
agreeing with the majority opinion that the employee's complaint did
not state sufficient facts to constitute the tort of wrongful discharge
or outrage, Linde believed that the facts sufficiently supported a
claim for tortious interference with plaintiff's employment
contract5 51
The California Court of Appeal opinion in Flynn v. Highan552
involved the question of whether plaintiffs who were constitutionally
barred under the first amendment from bringing a defamation action
against an author could, nevertheless, continue their action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The court concluded that al-
lowing the latter claim to proceed would be tantamount to the judi-
cial creation of a new tort action, and held that plaintiffs should not
be able "to do indirectly that which -they could not do directly" be-
cause of the constitutional first amendment privilege. 3
(c) Negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.-During the
1980s, opinions in thirteen cases used the phrase "new tort" while
adjudicating issues involving claims for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Courts used the phrase in cases involving the contin-
ued applicability of the physical impact rule;554 the need for physical
injury to recover for emotional distress;5. the ability of parents to
549. Id. at 670-71, 693 P.2d at 1199.
550. 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d 854 (1986).
551. Id. at 126, 719 P.2d at 859 (Linde, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
552. 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983).
553. Id. at 682, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (citation omitted).
554. See Elza v. Liberty Loan Corp., 426 N.E.2d 1302, 1308 (Ind. 1981) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Prosser, supra note 5).
555. See Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605, 611
(1981), overruled by James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting) (disputing majority's requirement of need for bodily harm); Strachan v. John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 300, 507 A.2d 718 (1986), rev'd in part, 109 N.J.
523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (physical injury required in action by parent against hospital for
negligence in hospital's failure to have in place a procedure for disconnecting, upon request,
life support systems for a brain dead patient); Payton v. Abbot Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437
N.E.2d 171, 177 (1982) (cause of action for emotional distress alleged to have resulted from
increased statistical likelihood of daughter of woman using DES would not be recognized ab-
sent physical harm) (citing Prosser, supra note 5); Air Florida Inc. v. Zondler, 683 S.W.2d
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recover as bystanders who witnessed the negligent medical treatment
of their child;"'6 and, a wife's ability to recover for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, although she was not present when her
husband was hurt in a fall from his hospital bed.557
Five of the decisions involving tort claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress deserve more extended discussion because of
the quality of their policy analyses. In the first three cases the plain-
tiffs' personal safety interests were directly at risk. Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co.558 involved an incident in which a sheet of glass
fell off a truck in front of the plaintiff's automobile and shattered his
windshield. Although glass fragments lodged in plaintiff's hair, he
did not suffer any contemporaneous physical injury.559 The Ohio Su-
preme Court broke new ground by holding that a contemporaneous
physical injury is unnecessary in an action to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 560 Citing Prosser's New Tort article,
the Schultz court found unpersuasive the argument that eliminating
the physical injury requirement would result in an unmanageable
"flood of litigation."'561 The court similarly rejected arguments that
people would bring fictitious claims and that courts would face insur-
mountable proof problems because damages would be based upon
conjecture or speculation. 562 The court marshalled numerous law re-
view articles in support of eliminating the contemporaneous physical
injury requirement and noted that "[e]motional injury can be as se-
vere and debilitating as physical harm and is deserving of
redress. '"563
A Missouri case, Bass v. Nooney Co.,6 ' also involved a direct
threat to the plaintiff's physical welfare. Ms. Bass became trapped
769, 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (Guillot, J., dissenting) (disputing the need for physical injury)
(citing Prosser, supra note 5).
556. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
Cf. Andalon v. Superior Court (Plowman), 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903
(1984).
557. Wiggins v. Royale Convalescent Corp., 158 Cal. App. 3d 914, 924 n.7, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 8 n.7 (1984) (Sonenshine, J., dissenting) (disputing the need for the "direct victim"
concept, citing Gallagher, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California's New Tort of
Negligent Infliction of Serious Emotional Distress, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 101 (1982)).
558. 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983).
559. Id. at 110.
560. Id. at 110-11.
561. Id. at I11.
562. Id.
563. Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ohio 1983). Compare the
dissenting opinion which, while agreeing that the contemporaneous physical injury rule needed
to be changed, urged that the safeguard of emotional disturbance "manifested as a definite
and objective physical injury" replaced the old standard. Id. at 115 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
564. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
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on a stalled elevator for about a half hour; as a result of the incident
she complained of dizziness, restlessness, a fainting spell and ex-
treme anxiety. Holding for the plaintiff, the Missouri Supreme Court
abolished the contemporaneous physical injury and impact rule.5" 5
The Bass court cited Prosser's New Tort article as well as a number
of other scholarly articles that criticized the plaintiff's need to estab-
lish physical impact in an action for emotional distress. 66 The court
found the impact rule unfair because courts tended to liberalize the
meaning of "physical impact. ' 5 7 The court also rejected the claim
that abandoning the impact rule would lead to a flood of fraudulent
claims and speculative proof on the ground that through psychiatric
tests and diagnostic techniques the existence and severity of psychic
harm could be established with reasonable medical certainty.56 8 Fur-
ther, the court believed that it had a duty to provide a forum for the
remedy of wrongs.5 9
Quill v. Trans World Airlines5 70 also involved a palpable threat
to the physical safety of the plaintiff. In Quill, a passenger brought
an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for mental
damages suffered when TWA's plane dove 34,000 feet in an uncon-
trolled tailspin. The Quill court held that the requirement of "severe
emotional distress," a predicate to the recently recognized Minnesota
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,571 was not required
to make out a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress .5 2 The Quill court justified the distinction between inten-
tional and negligent theories of emotional distress on three grounds:
(1) the supreme court's recognition that the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress did not displace all other torts involving
damages for emotional distress; (2) the evolution of precedent au-
565. Id. at 772-73.
566. Id. at 769.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Mo. 1983). Compare the dissenting
opinion which argued that "[n]othing in the facts of this case either compels or justifies our
changing of the law . ..in order to permit this plaintiff a possible recovery." Id. at 775
(Welliver, J., dissenting). The dissent went on to predict a "flood of cases .. .to the already
overcrowded docket ...; [exacerbation of the] already oppressively high liability insurance
premiums of [the.] state" and a further barrier for businesses to locate in the state. The dissent
protested "that the time has come for the judiciary to exercise the same fiscal and economic
responsibility that we would ask of the other branches of our government." Id. (citations
omitted).
570. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
571. Id. at 442.
572. Id. at 442-43 (citing Note, Minnesota's "New Tort": Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 349 (1984)).
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thorizing recovery of emotional distress damages when physical
symptoms of distress existed; and (3) the zone of danger rule's provi-
sion of indicia of genuineness. 5 "
In the second group of negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases, the plaintiffs seeking recovery for emotional distress exper-
ienced a threat to their physical safety. In Rickey v. Chicago Transit
Authority,5" an eight-year-old boy witnessed his five-year-old
brother being choked by his clothing which had become entangled in
an escalator. The accident caused the five-year-old victim to lapse
into a coma. The brother who saw the accident brought an action for
emotional distress against the operator and manufacturers of the es-
calator.5 75 The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff's action
to go forward and overruled longstanding precedent that required a
bystander to allege and prove contemporaneous physical injury or
impact.576 Citing Prosser's New Tort article, the Rickey court de-
cided to change existing law because: (1) the majority of jurisdic-
tions did not require contemporaneous physical impact or injury; (2)
a slight jolt or jar satisfied the "impact" requirement, making the
requirement a pure formality; and (3) a majority of jurisdictions rec-
ognized the "zone-of-physical-danger rule" as a suitable safeguard
against an onslaught of fraudulent claims.
577
Likewise, in Gates v. Richardson,5 78 a six-year-old boy's
mother, brother, and sister witnessed an automobile collide with the
boy, who was riding a bicycle. In addition to the boy's claim for
permanent disability, medical expenses, future lost wages, and pain
and suffering, the boy's mother, brother, and sister claimed damages
for emotional distress caused by observing the boy being injured.
5 79
The Gates court permitted the mother, brother, and sister's claim for
emotional distress to go forward even though they were never in the
zone of danger because: (1) compensation for emotional distress was
"not a new concept" since courts regularly allowed recovery for emo-
tional harm caused by false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
and work-related stress; 580 (2) the impact rule and the "zone of dan-
ger" rule were not necessary predicates to stating a claim for mental
573. Id. at 443.
574. 98 I11. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
575. Id. at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 2.
576. Id. at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
577. Id. at 553-55, 457 N.E.2d at 4-5 (citations omitted).
578. 719 P.2d 193 (Wy. 1986).
579. Id. at 194.
580. Id. at 194-95.
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trauma as held in Dillon v. Legg;5 81 and, (3) courts cannot apply a
precise formula to establish a defendant's duty regarding negligent
infliction of emotional distress; courts must weigh policy considera-
tions582  to decide whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to
protection.58 3
(d) Wrongful birth/wrongful life cases.-During the eighties,
five state supreme courts utilized "new tort" language while wres-
tling with policy considerations surrounding wrongful birth and
wrongful life causes of action.58' In Speck v. Finegold,5 85 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court heard a case involving the birth of a child
who suffered from the genetic disease neurofibronatosis. Two sepa-
rate instances of medical malpractice led to the birth of the child:
(1) a urologist failed to perform an adequate vasectomy on the hus-
band, and (2) another physician failed to abort the pregnancy.586
The court held that the parents could recover from the physicians
the expenses attributable to the birth and raising of the child and
damages for mental distress, but disallowed the child's claim for
wrongful life. 587
The Speck opinion has several noteworthy aspects. First, Justice
Flaherty's plurality opinion and Justice Nix's dissent differed juris-
prudentially in that Justice Flaherty contended that the parents' tort
action for injuries suffered as a result of the negligently performed
vasectomy and abortion procedures merely involved the extension of
existing principles of tort law, 588 whereas Justice Nix believed that
581. Id. at 195 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968)). The Wyoming Supreme Court summarized the holding in Dillon v. Legg: "The [Cali-
fornia] court held that a mother, who saw her infant child run down by a negligent motorist,
could recover from the motorist for her emotional harm." Id.
582. The Gates majority outlined eight key policy factors to be considered:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent
of the burdens upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and
the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.
Id. at 196 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976)).
583. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wy. 1986) (quoting W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54 at 357-58 (1984)).
584. See also Turpin v. Sortinis, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981),
rev'd, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984).
585. 497 Pa. 76, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
586. Id. at 81-82, 439 A.2d at 112.
587. Id. at 83, 439 A.2d at 113.
588. Id. at 93, 439 A.2d at 113 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
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the parents were asking the court to judicially legislate two new
causes of action.589 Second, like the opinions in other cases in which
courts recognized new torts, the Speck court emphasized the need to
provide redress for every substantial wrong and to hold wrongdoers
responsible for the consequences of their misconduct.59 ° Third, the
plurality opinion and dissent differed in their policy analysis. The
plurality justified the wife's wrongful birth action on the basis that
she had a constitutional right to seek a termination of pregnancy
under certain conditions9 1 and that the goals of tort law were to
compensate the victim, deter negligence, and encourage due care.59
The Nix dissent, however, asserted that had the court refused to rec-
ognize the wrongful birth action it would not have constituted gov-
ernmental interference with the constitutional right to abortion. 5"3
In Nelson v. Krusen,5"4 the Texas Supreme Court considered,
but ultimately did not recognize, claims for wrongful life and wrong-
ful birth against a physician who allegedly failed to warn parents
who had a child born with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy that the
mother was a carrier of the genetic disease.595 While the majority
opinion viewed Texas precedent as having approved a cause of action
for wrongful birth,596 the concurring opinion argued that wrongful
birth was not a new tort and involved no more than the traditional
elements of a negligence cause of action. 97 The concurrence shared
the majority's misgivings about recognizing the "new tort" of wrong-
ful life. 98 Whereas the majority emphasized the public policy of
placing a high value on the creation of human life and the difficulty
of calculating damages for a wrongful life claim,599 the concurring
opinion was concerned with deciding how to determine the element
of injury.600
589. Id. at 94, 439 A.2d at 119 (Nix, J., dissenting, original emphasis).
590. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 76, 83, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (1981) (Flaherty, J., concur-
ring) (citing Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973):
Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970)).
591. Id. at 85, 439 A.2d at 114 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
592. Id. (citations omitted).
593. Id. at 97, 439 A.2d at 120 (Nix, J., dissenting).
594. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
595. Id. at 925.
596. Id. at 923.
597. Id. at 925. The concurrence agreed with the majority that Texas's two-year statute
of limitations on the parents' claim, however named, violated the "open courts" provision of
the Texas Constitution.
598. Id. at 929 (citing Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort,
8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976)).
599. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984).
600. Id. at 929 (Robertson, J., concurring).
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Justice Kilgarlin, who wrote a partially dissenting and partially
concurring opinion, disputed themajority's decision not to recognize
a cause of action for wrongful life.60 1 He believed that tort law's
social policy of deterring wrongdoing supported the recognition of
the parents' action for wrongful life.6 2
In Smith v. Cote, °3 the of New Hampshire Supreme Court rec
ognized the parental claim for wrongful birth but rejected the child's
claim for wrongful life." 4 The Smith case involved a mother's claim
for.wrongful birth of a child born with Rubella and the child's claim
for wrongful life. The Smith court asserted that courts should never
decide whether a person's life is worthwhile °5 The court distin-
guished the case from cases involving the right to die doctrine noting
that "the judiciary has an important role to play in protecting the
privacy rights of the dying . . . [but] . . . has no business declaring
that among the living are people who never should have been
born." 1 The court also acknowledged the increasing public aware-
ness that the handicapped are valuable and productive members of
society. 0 7 Accordingly, the Smith court concluded that "[t]o char-
acterize the life of a disabled person as an injury would denegrate
both this new awareness and the handicapped themselves. 6 0 8
In two recent state supreme court cases employing the phrase
"new tort," the judiciary interpreted legislative "tort reform" stat-
utes that preclude wrongful life and wrongful birth actions. In Hick-
man v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,6"9 the Minnesota Supreme Court
deferred to the legislature in rejecting constitutional due process and
equal protection attacks on the statute610 and in rejecting an argu-
ment that the statute violated a state constitutional provision assur-
ing remedies for rights that vested at common law.61 In Justice
Simonett's concurring opinion, he echoed the traditional policy
grounds for not recognizing a new tort cause of action, stating that
601. Id. at 931-32 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
602. Id. at 932.
603. 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986).
604. Id. at 252-53, 513 A.2d at 355.
605. Id. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352.
606. Id. at 249, 513 A.2d at 353.
607. Id. (citing Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
447, 459-60 (1981)).
608. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 249, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (1986) (quoting Comment,
supra note 607, at 447, 459-60 (1981)). The court also observed that, in deciding whether to
recognize a new tort cause of action, it is appropriate to note that wrongful life claims present
problems that cannot be resolved in a fair and even-handed manner. Id.
609. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
610. MINN. STAT. § 145.424(2) (1984).
611. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 15.
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the legislature, not the judiciary, should create new tort causes of
action. '12
The Missouri Supreme Court in Wilson v. Kuenzi61 a held that
the state statute precluding wrongful life or wrongful birth actions
did not apply retroactively, even though the court precluded such
causes of action before the statute went into effect.614 The court
maintained that the legislature's expressed policy of limiting the
statute of limitations for malpractice actions and malpractice recov-
eries, as well as reforming legislative tort law, supported its decision
not to recognize the torts of wrongful life or wrongful birth before
the effective date of the Missouri legislation. 15
(e) Product liability cases.-Compared to the previous decade,
judicial use of "new tort" language in product liability cases de-
creased significantly during the 1980s to only two reported decisions.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.616 arose from
the construction of a nuclear power plant. The utility sued the sup-
plier of the nuclear reactor and the architectural/engineering firm,
contending that the plant's containment structure was defective in
that it could not contain the radioactive steam that emanated from
the reactor. The court concluded that the plaintiff's remedy for eco-
nomic loss was available under contract law, not tort law.6 17 In arriv-
ing at that decision, the Cincinnati court relied on Dean Prosser's
comments on the subject of pecuniary loss.6"8
In Hovanec v. Harnischfeger Corp.,61 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a third party product liabil-
ity verdict for a worker injured in an industrial accident. In criticiz-
ing the manufacturer's assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence arguments, the court noted that:
612. Id. at 15 (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (citing MINN. STAT. § 145.424
(1984)). Elsewhere in the concurrence, Justice Simonett observed that -[nlot every duty owed
not to injure people gives rise to a tort suit for money damages." Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
In a dissent joined by three members of the court, Justice Mamdahl urged invalidation of the
statute as "an unconstitutional restriction on a woman's right to an abortion prior to viability."
Id. at 20 (Mamdahl, C.J., dissenting).
613. 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988).
614. Id. at 742.
615. Id. at 746 (citations omitted). A dissenting opinion by Justice Higgins emphasized
that "[t]here is no necessity whatever that a tort must have a name." Id. at 748 (Higgins, J.,
dissenting) (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 3-4 3d ed. 1964)). In a separate dissent,
Chief Justice Billings expressed strong opinions on the unconstitutionality of the state legisla-
tion. Id. at 748-49 (Billings, C.J., dissenting).
616. 656 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
617. Id. at 55.
618. Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
619. 807 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Fancy new tort theories have been invented by brilliant aca-
demics and crafty lawyers and recognized by great jurists to af-
ford workers and consumers increased protection from the defec-
tive products of too often callous manufacturers. The doctrines
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence have changed
dramatically since Judge Cardozo wrote the landmark opinion
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 2'
(f) Abolition of immunity cases.-Like decisions in the
1970s,6 21 the eighties opinions cover a wide spectrum of cases using
"new tort" parlance in debating whether to abolish or erode old im-
munity doctrines.622 The clear focus during the 1980s, however, was
on judicial interpretation of immunity defenses by governmental
agencies, public officials, and quasi-governmental agencies.1
2
1
In Jet Industries, Inc. v. United States,24 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas vehemently de-
fended the federal government's immunity in official actions sur-
rounding the Federal Witness Protection Act.6 25 Jet Industries in-
volved a complaint that because the government had negligently
supervised a federal probationer and participant in the Federal Wit-
ness Protection Program, as well as negligently failed to warn the
plaintiff of a known risk of fraud from the probationer's past crimi-
nal record, the plaintiff corporation lost nearly $1.5 miliion. In hold-
ing the government immune, the court determined that the selection
and supervision of participants in the Federal Witness Protection
Program constituted a discretionary function, which was excepted
from waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act.626 The court re-
jected the argument that government officials had a duty of care to
supervise probationers because imposing such a duty would necessi-
tate writing "a new chapter in tort law," which was not within the
court's province. 7
Five state supreme court opinions written during the 1980s also
620. Id. at 452-53 (citation omitted).
621. See supra notes 363-77 and accompanying text.
622. For decisions of minor importance referring to legislative enactment of relatively
"new tort" claims statutes, see Phelps v. Anderson & Langford, 700 F.2d 147, 149 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1983); Green v. Commw., 13 Mass. App. 524, 435 N.E.2d 362, 365 (1982).
623. Only one case decided during the decade used "new tort" language to discuss the
implications of intrafamily immunity. See Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc., 340 N.W.2d 338, 340 n.I
(Minn. 1983) (court held that abolition of intrafamily immunity did not create a new cause of
action or a new tort).
624. 603 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
625. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (1988).
626. 603 F. Supp. at 644-45 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982)).
627. Id. at 646.
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addressed various governmental and quasi-governmental immunity
issues while utilizing "new tort" language. Initially, both the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court judi-
cially abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in their states. In
Pruett v. City of Rosedale,628 the court emphasized that it was act-
ing to abolish a "judicially created principle of sovereign immu-
nity."62 The Pruett court explained that the business climate
changes over the past 200 years, the inequity of blanket immunity to
government, the fact that most states had abolished the sovereign
immunity doctrine, the governmental immunity's tendency to en-
courage governmental irresponsibility, the historical anomaly of
adopting a doctrine based on the "divine right of kings," and the
law's rule of remedying wrongs even if new tort liability is created
were all reasons for abolishing sovereign immunity. s0
In McCall v. Batson,63 the South Carolina Supreme Court
echoed the Pruett court's reasons for abolishing the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine.632 The McCall court also noted its earlier elimination
of state immunity in contract cases, charitable immunity, and the
illogical and unfair "patchwork" of sovereign immunity exceptions
carved out by the legislature as reasons for judicially abrogating the
doctrine.
633
In the three other state supreme court cases, the dissenting
opinions used the phrase "new tort" pejoratively in order to undercut
the majority's holding. Justice Bakes of the Idaho Supreme Court
employed this tactic in his dissenting opinions in Sterling v. Bloom6 34
and Oppenheimer Industry v. Johnson Cattle Co.63 In Sterling, the
court held that under the Idaho Tort Claims Act the discretionary
function exception did not bar from evidence a state probation of-
ficer's alleged negligence in failing to prevent a probationer from
driving while intoxicated.6 36 Justice Bakes chastised the majority for
making "fundamental tort law changes" and for creating a "new
tort" to reach its holding.637 He raised similar objections in Oppen-
628. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
629. Id. at 1046.
630. Id. at 1046-51. In abolishing the doctrine, however, the court specifically retained
the immunity of "legislative, judicial and executive acts by individuals acting in their official
capacity." Id. at 1052. The court also made government liability prospective only. Id.
631. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
632. Id. at 245-46, 329 S.E.2d at 742. See supra notes 629-30 and accompanying text.
633. 285 S.C. at 245, 329 S.E.2d at 742.
634. 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986).
635. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986).
636. I11 Idaho at 232, 723 P.2d at 776. See also IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (1990).
637. I11 Idaho at 251, 723 P.2d at 795 (Bakes, J., dissenting). A concurring opinion
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heimer when the majority held the State Brand Board not immune
from tort liability under the "discretionary function exception" to
the state tort claims act. 38
In Weinberg v. Dinger,639 Justice Garibaldi of the New Jersey
Supreme Court criticized the majority for abrogating a private water
company's common law immunity from liability for negligently fail-
ing to provide sufficient water pressure to fire hydrants.140 Garibaldi
said that the "new tort liability" judicially foisted on private water
companies constituted a policy change that the legislature should
have made based on information and forecasts supplied by the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission. 4'
(g) Loss of consortium cases.-Three cases decided during the
1980s addressed loss of consortium claims while utilizing "new tort"
language. The most notable opinion was by Justice Linde in Norwest
v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital.642 In that case, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court denied a child's claim for loss of parental con-
sortium. 43 Justice Linde articulated a number of important tort
principles in the course of the Norwest opinion. First, Linde observed
that new tort problems "pose recurring questions of the sources and
methods of law." '44 Second, Linde said that because social policy
considerations are indeterminate, the court should ignore the prag-
matic arguments advanced for and against a child's damage action
for loss of consortium.645 Third, Linde's opinion reviewed claims sim-
ilar to the plaintiff's loss of consortium claim, including: (1) loss of
spousal consortium; (2) parents' recovery for negligent injuries to
minor children; (3) the child's noneconomic loss for his parents'
wrongful death; (4) alienation of affections, and (5) bystanders ac-
tions for emotional distress from witnessing the death or injury of a
close relative. 46 Finding none of these analogies persuasive under
Oregon law, the court concluded that they could not be "cumulated
attempted to answer the negative reference of the dissent by arguing that: "Clearly, the major-
ity has not created a new tort out of the Idaho Act, but merely made the state liable for the
same torts as are private persons and entities. The dissent's characterization of what the ma-
jority has said on this point is therefore erroneous." Id. at 241, 723 N.E.2d at 785 (Huntley,
J., concurring).
638. 112 Idaho at 428-29, 732 P.2d at 666-67.
639. 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987).
640. Id. at 498, 524 A.2d at 386 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
641. Id. at 499, 524 A.2d at 381.
642. 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982).
643. Id. at 688-89, 652 P.2d at 332-33.
644. Id. at 545, 652 P.2d at 319.
645. Id. at 553, 652 P.2d at 324.
646. Id. at 554, 652 P.2d at 324.
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to support a general liability toward dependent children for negligent
injury to their parents. 64
7
The Supreme Court of Colorado also denied an action for loss
of parental consortium in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health.64
The Lee court focused on the inherent difficulty the judiciary faces
in weighing competing social policy considerations outside the pre-
existing conceptual framework of tort law. 49 The court held that the
legislature should weigh these factors to decide whether a child had
a valid claim for the loss of companionship and support of an injured
parent. 5 '
(h) Wrongful discharge cases.-During the 1980s the judiciary
issued opinions employing the phrase "new tort" in twenty wrongful
discharge cases, but only five cases deserve elaboration.6 '
647. Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 569, 652 P.2d 318,
333 (1982). Justice Lent, in a dissenting opinion, concluded that he "would hold plaintiff has
pleaded a claim under the ordinary principles of liability for injury foreseeably resulting from
defendant's negligence." Id. at 574, 652 P.2d at 335 (Lent, J., dissenting).
648. 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
649. The court noted that:
The question of whether a child should be permitted to recover monetary
damages for the loss of parental companionship and support stemming from a
negligently inflicted injury to a parent involves a consideration of such factors as
the efficacy of monetary compensation as a substitute for the companionship and
guidance of a parent, the intangible character of the loss, the difficulty of mea-
suring damages to offset the loss, the individual and societal costs necessarily
resulting from recognition of this new tort, and the risk of overlapping and mul-
tiple awards for the different interests of children and spouse adversely affected
by the parent's injury.
Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
650. Id. at 234.
651. See also Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1983) (under
Illinois law, employee could not assert a claim for the new tort of retaliatory discharge when
employee was a party to a collective bargaining agreement which provided a "just cause"
guarantee and arbitration remedies); McCann v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 109 F.R.D. 363, 365-
66 (N.D. III. 1986) (recent case law did not provide sufficient excuse for 30-month delay in
former employee's request to amend pleading to include allegations for retaliatory discharge
and willful and wanton misconduct); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 285-86
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (trial court made findings of fact and law after a bench trial that employee
established violations of Indiana law concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful discharge); Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 244-45
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (discharge of at-will employee who had retained an attorney to represent him
in a dispute with his employer concerning payment of wages did not violate public policy of
Illinois according to the "contours of the new tort" fashioned under state law); Carrillo v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (court refused to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over state claim due to uncertainty as to whether Illinois courts would apply "rela-
tively new tort" of retaliatory discharge to allegedly discriminatory discharges); Fleming v.
Pima County, 141 Ariz. 167, 685 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (employee of county
highway department was not at-will employee, as county could only discharge him for cause or
by bona fide layoff; thus, after employee was laid off, employee had a contract claim, not a
new tort claim for wrongful discharge); Crenshaw v. DeVry, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 228, 526
N.E.2d 474, 476 (1988) ("relatively new tort" of retaliatory discharge not applicable to em-
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In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,652 the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that an employee who had been fired from a man-
agerial position for telling a local law enforcement agency that an
International Harvester employee might be violating the state crimi-
nal code and for agreeing to testify against the coworker in a future
criminal trial, had stated a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge. 5a The majority in Palmateer noted that with the rise of
large corporations and the consequent change in employer-employee
relations, the mutuality theory, which operates under the belief that
employees are on an equal footing with their employers, 5 ' was no
longer realistic. 55 The Palmateer court concluded that a clear public
policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses
made the tort of retaliatory discharge a viable action."'
In Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the discharge of an employee following her resis-
ployer who terminated employee several weeks after employee gave notice of intent to leave
employment); Morton v. Hartigan, 145 Il. App. 3d 417, 495 N.E.2d 1159, 1161-62 (1986)
(complaint failed to state cause of action for the "relatively new tort" of retaliatory discharge
for making "proposed legislative and judicial initiatives" to state attorney general); Powers v.
Delnor Hosp., 135 11. App. 3d 317, 481 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1985) (proposed cause of action for
wrongful discharge in cases where an employer states a reason for termination of an employee
known by employer to be false, whether grounded in contract or tort, would not be recog-
nized); Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc., 119 111. App. 3d 763, 457 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1983)
(evidence on issue of the "relatively new tort of retaliatory discharge" presented a jury ques-
tion); Cain v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n., 9 Kan. App. 2d 100, 673 P.2d 451, 454 (1983) (com-
plaint based on recently recognized "new tort" of retaliatory discharge, which alleged that
employee was terminated by state agency for his outspoken advocacy for consumers and inves-
tors, failed to state a claim for retaliatory discharge); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494
A.2d 212 (1985) (former employee's discharge for refusing to submit to polygraph examina-
tion violated clear mandate of statute and evidence was insufficient to establish that some of
the employees suffered extreme emotional distress necessary to support award for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Freidrichs v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 62
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (allegations of at-will employee that he was discharged based on his
refusal to violate engineering standards law stated cause of action under public policy excep-
tion to at-will doctrine); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984)
(when parties related widely divergent versions of employee's work performance and reasons
for her termination, genuine issues of material fact regarding employee's wrongful discharge
claim remained, and summary judgment was inappropriate); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank
Ass'n of Grand Forks, 407 N.W.2d 206, 210 n.1 (N.D. 1987) (it would be inappropriate to
provide a common law "new tort" wrongful discharge action for violation of the Farm Credit
Act); and Johnson v. Kolman, 412 N.W.2d 109 (S.D. 1987) (former employee's action for
wrongful termination and other causes of action not barred by failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies over objection of dissent that majority "has entered into' the creation of new
torts" despite contrary statutory directive).
652. 85 II1. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
653. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
654. Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
655. Id. (citing Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967)).
656. Palmateer, 85 111. 2d at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
657. 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984).
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tance to sexual harassment by her supervisor was an actionable tort
despite the defendant's contention that the legislature had abrogated
any common law remedy for wrongful discharge. 58 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Linde explained that the court had sharpened the
standard for alleging the tort of retaliatory discharge by recognizing
it only when an employee's discharge was the result of either fulfil-
ling a societal obligation or. pursuing a legal right directly related to
his status as an employee, unless the legislature intended another
remedy to be sufficient to protect the discharged employee.
'65 9
In Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc.,66° a Florida District Court
of Appeal held that an at-will employee who lost his job for allegedly
refusing to participate in his employer's violation of environmental
statutes and regulations failed to state a cause of action for wrongful
discharge. 6 ' Acknowledging that several jurisdictions had created a
tort cause of action for wrongful discharge on the basis of "public
policy,"6 2 the court noted that Florida courts have refused to adopt
this "new tort theory. '6 63 The Hartley court concluded that only the
legislature should create a new cause of action for retaliatory or
wrongful discharge because an action for retaliatory discharge: (I)
would abrogate the inherent right of contract between employer and
employee; (2) would overrule Florida precedent and create uncer-
tainty in the law governing employer-employee relations, and (3)
cannot justifiably be created by the judiciary given the vague con-
cepts underlying it.664 Also, the court observed that the legislature
should determine the public policy, not the courts. 6 5
658. Id. at 97, 689 P.2d at 1304.
659. Id. at 100, 689 P.2d at 1305-06 (Linde, J., concurring).
660. 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
661. Id. at 1328.
662. Id.
663. Id. at 1329 (citations omitted).
664. Id.
665. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (citations omitted). As further support for deferring to the legislature, the court noted:
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to
elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would be directly
affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate
the impact of imposition of such liability. Standards should doubtless be estab-
lished applicable to the multifarious types of employment and the various cir-
cumstances of discharge. If the rule of non-liability for termination of at-will
employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a principled
statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in
consequence of judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adver-
sarial litigants.
Id. at 1329-30.
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In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Karavan Enterprise, Inc.,66
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia examined "new tort" and contract theories of wrongful dis-
charge under California law in construing a general liability insur-
ance policy. 1 7 The court found that an intentional discharge was not
an unintended or unexpected happening under the policy so that the
insurer did not have to defend the insured in the insured's suit for
wrongful discharge. 8
In Palmer v. Brown,669 the Kansas Supreme Court expressly
recognized the "new tort" of retaliatory discharge for employees who
lost their jobs for having reported infractions of rules, regulations,
and the law pertaining to-public health, safety, and the general wel-
fare. 7 In Palmer, an experienced medical technician brought suit
after her employer, a professional corporation of physicians, fired her
for reporting instances of Medicaid fraud. Based on state and federal
statutory provisions making Medicaid fraud a felony, the court de-
termined that public policy supported a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge." 1
(i) Minority shareholder cases.-Only two judicial opinions
given during the 1980s referred to the phrase "new tort" in resolving
minority shareholder lawsuits against majority shareholders. In
Coleman v. Taub, 72 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit cited the Borden Old Tort/New Tort article6 71 while
interpreting Delaware law as following an "intermediate position" in
protecting minority shareholders' rights.6 74 The court found Dela-
ware's approach to be between the approach that gives minority
shareholders a vested right in corporate participation upon merger
and the approach that gives majority shareholders the right to freeze
out the minority leaving minority shareholders with appraisal as
their sole remedy.6
7 5
666. 659 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
667. The district court observed that "under California law a wrongful discharge can
give rise to damages in both contract and tort." The court also observed that there are "three
analytically distinct causes of action arising out of the act of discharge: 'breach of employment
contract,' 'tortious discharge, and 'bad faith discharge.' " Id. at 1079 (citing Koehrer v. Supe-
rior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986)).
668. Karavan, 659 F. Supp. at 1081.
669. 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685 (1988).
670. Id. at 900, 752 P.2d at 689.
671. Id. at 899-900, 752 P.2d at 689-90.
672. 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
673. Id. at 634. See Borden, supra note 400.
674. Id. at 635.
675. Id. at 634 (citing Borden, supra note 400).
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Interpreting a similar provision under Pennsylvania law, the
Third Circuit, in Dower v. Mosser Industries, Inc., 76 cited the Bor-
den Old Tort/New Tort article for the proposition that majority
shareholders owed minority shareholders certain fiduciary duties in
effecting mergers.6 77 Mergers intended solely to "freezeout" or "cash
out" minority equity holders from their positions may be enjoined as
an attempted breach of fiduciary duty.678
(j) Insurance tort cases.-During the eighties the number and
variety of judicial opinions utilizing "new tort" parlance to resolve
tort cases against insurance companies increased to twenty-three
cases. Of these cases, seven merit discussion. 9
676. 648 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981).
677. Id. at 188-89, 189 n.7.
678. Id. at 188-89 (citing Borden, supra note 400) (other citations omitted).
679. See also A.W. Huss Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 735 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1984)
(under Wisconsin law, insured had no cause of action for bad faith handling of a third-party
claim within insured's policy coverage despite claim that insurer's delays caused concern, anxi-
ety, business loss, and attorney's fees in monitoring insurer's activities); Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (reasoning by analogy to
Oregon precedent on new tort of bad faith denial of existence of a contract); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1987) (evidence that health insurer denied claim, disput-
ing reasonable necessity of insured's hospitalization, without benefit of critical sections of med-
ical file was sufficient to sustain finding of bad faith refusal to pay claim); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. v. Broadway Arms, 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984) (insurer bad faith may give
rise to new tort; partial dissent would characterize new tort as "outrage"); Multiplex Ins.
Agency v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987) (jury was
improperly allowed to determine that tort liability had been established in contract dispute
between insurance company and agency, by mere breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing without determining if any special relationship existed between parties or if insurance
company denied contractual liability in bad faith and without probable cause); Federal Kem-
per Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1986) (homeowner's fire insurer was not a
fiduciary as to sum owed insured under policy and breach of contract by insurer does not give
rise to a new tort bad faith action authorizing recovery for punitive damages); Pillsbury Co. v.
National Fire Ins., 425 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (bad faith denial of insurance
claim did not constitute new independent tort absent exceptional circumstances); Kubiak v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 486 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1984) (insurer of
personal injury protection benefits not liable for new tort action of punitive damages for breach
of obligation to pay benefits in light of system of sanctions under statute); Milcarek v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 358, 463 A.2d 950 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1983) (personal injury
protection insurer's statutory violation did not entitle injured automobile passenger to maintain
new theory of recovery for punitive damages in light of sanctions under statute); Reeves v.
National Hydraulics Co., 53 Or. App. 639, 632 P.2d 1306 (1981) (trial court was correct in
denying the insurer's motion to strike claim for breach of a "fiduciary duty"); Smith v. Har-
leysville Ins. Co., 495 Pa. 515, 431 A.2d 974, 975 (1981) (court refused to create "new tort"
cause of action for insurer bad faith conduct, quoting Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment
- A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 775, 786 (1976)); Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa. Super. 276,
513 A.2d 427 (1986) (a common law action for fraud and deceit is not barred by statutory
provisions forbidding any insurer in state from engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices);
Rodgers v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 311, 496 A.2d 811 (1985) (insureds
could not bring new tort action to obtain damages based upon allegations of insurer's bad faith
conduct in failing to defend insureds in light of adequate statutory scheme of sanctions); My-
ers v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 298 Pa. Super. 366, 444 A.2d 1217 (1982) (injured driver and
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In Chavers v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co.,6 0 the
Alabama Supreme Court first recognized the intentional tort, of bad
faith in first party insurance actions. 8 ' The court held that the tort
arises if an insurance company initially refuses to settle a direct
claim when the insurance company knows it has no lawful basis for
the refusal or has intentionally failed to determine whether it has a
lawful basis for such refusal.682 Accordingly, the Chavers court con-
cluded that insureds under a fire insurance policy had stated a cause
of action for the tort of bad faith in first party insurance actions even
though the insurer had some evidence that the insureds caused the
fire. 8 ' The court found that the evidence linking the insureds to the
fire was extremely remote and inadmissible.684 In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Almon criticized the majority for being too anxious to
create a new tort without the proper set of facts. 85
In D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty In-
surance Co.,686 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to create an
independent tort for an insurance company's bad faith conduct in
failing to settle a first party property claim for storm damage to a
motorboat. 87 Referring to pre-existing statutory law that established
fifteen "unfair claim settlement or compromise practices,' 6 88 the
court found that the system of sanctions established under the Un-
fair Insurance Practices Act 89 did not have to be supplemented by a
judicially created cause of action.6 90 Dissenting Justice Larsen ar-
gued that traditional contract remedies were inadequate and that a
tort action would assure a policyholder with limited resources the
chance for recovery on small contract claims, and deter the insur-
passengers could not maintain new tort punitive damages action for acting willfully, intention-
ally, wantonly and recklessly in handling their claims under No Fault Motor Vehicle Insur-
ance Act); Nazer v. Safeguard Mut. Assur. Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385, 439 A.2d 165 (1981)
(complaint did not state a cause of action under the Uniform Insurance Practices Act since
there is no private right of action under the Act); Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
290 S.C. 154, 348 S.E.2d 530 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (claim for bad-faith refusal to pay first
party benefits under insurance policy is a remedy for the violation of rights arising in contract,
not a new substantive right in tort, and may be pleaded and proved only as a contract action
and not a tort action).
680. 405 So. 2d I (Ala. 1981).
681. Id. at 6.
682. Id. at 7.
683. Id.
684. Id. at 8-9.
685. Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 14 (Ala. 1981).
686. 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981).
687. Id. at 510, 431 A.2d at 972.
688. Id. at 506, 431 A.2d at 969.
689. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1-.15 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
690. Id. at 507, 431 A.2d at 970 (quoting Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment - A
New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 755, 786 (1986)).
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ance company from acting in bad faith.6"' Justice Larsen also be-
lieved that a policyholder should be compensated for mental distress
suffered as a result of the insurance company's bad faith conduct
since people purchase insurance to provide peace of mind.69
In Long v. McAllister,69 3 the Iowa Supreme Court declined to
recognize a new tort permitting a third party to recover against a
tortfeasor's liability insurer for the insured's alleged bad faith to-
ward the third party in failing to settle a separate claim.6 9 The
unanimous court distinguished the case from third party excess judg-
ment cases and first party actions in which the duty of good faith
and fair dealing arises from the insurance contract and runs from
the insurer to the insured.6 95 Moreover, the Long court reasoned that
it could not recognize a duty of the insurer to the victim under gen-
eral tort concepts since the insurer's fiduciary duty runs to the in-
sured whereas an adversary relationship exists with the victim. 96
The Alabama Supreme Court faced another bad faith insurance
case in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie. 97 In Lavoie, the plaintiff
charged a health insurer with bad faith refusal to pay a medical ex-
pense claim. The plaintiff's group health insurer failed to review the
plaintiff's claim for hospitalization expenses as required by its own
rules and procedures, and failed to obtain hospital progress records
or progress notes in deciding whether to deny the claim. 98 The court
concluded that the insurer was guilty of fraud, bad faith, and unfair
dealing. 9 9 Dissenting Justice Torbert advocated expanding the dam-
age rules in contract rather than creating a new tort because: (1)
contract duties are consensual; (2) established rules govern the de-
termination of a breach of contract; (3) contract law upholds parties'
expectancy interests, which is vital in the insurance field since calcu-
lating premiums requires predictability; and (4) courts have greater
control over excessive jury awards in contract cases than in tort
cases.
70 0
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, in Rich Maid Kitchens v. Pennsylvania Lum-
691. D'Ambrosia v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Caualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 512, 431
A.2d 966, 972 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
692. Id. at 972-73.
693. 319 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1982).
694. Id. at 262.
695. Id. at 261.
696. Id. at 262.
697. 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984).
698. Id. at 1066.
699. Id. at 1070.
700. Id. at 1079 (Torbert, J., dissenting).
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bermens Mutual Insurance Co.,70 ' interpreted the decision in
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance
Co.7" 2 The plaintiff in Rich Maid Kitchens sought punitive damages
from its fire insurer under the traditional tort theories of misrepre-
sentation, fraud, and tortious interference with business relations.7 °a
The district court concluded that D'Ambrosio prevented a plaintiff
from recovering punitive damages for outrageous conduct arising
from the tort action.70 4
The Idaho Supreme Court, in White v. Unigard Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 70 5 held that since insurers have a duty to settle first party
insurance claims in good faith, an insured has a cause of action
against his insurer for bad faith settling of such claims.7"6 Concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Bakes believed the court
should not have created the new tort because Idaho provides a rem-
edy under contract law for egregious conduct on the part of an insur-
ance company."'
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
in DiSalvatore v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,7"' predicted that
the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action
for breach of an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing when
the insurer failed to pay benefits due under a homeowner's insurance
contract.709 The district court relied on New Jersey case law, which
recognized that insurance companies have greater bargaining power
than the insured, and considered insurance policies to be contracts of
adhesion.710 The DiSalvatore court believed that the tort of breach
of an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing would deter insur-
ance companies from wrongfully delaying or denying payment since
the tort permitted a plaintiff to recover an amount greater than the
contract price.
711
701. 641 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
702. 494 Pa. 501, 43 A.2d 966 (1981). See supra notes 686-92 and accompanying text.
703. Rich Maid Kitchens, 641 F. Supp. at 310.
704. Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
705. 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986).
706. Id. at 100, 730 P.2d at 1020.
707. Id. at 103, 730 P.2d at 1022 (Bakes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part;
dissenting as to this part). See also id. at 1023 ("the plaintiffs contract remedies are adequate
and there is no reason for this court to create another new tort").
708. 624 F. Supp. 541 (D.N.J. 1986).
709. Id. at 543.
710. Id. (citations omitted).
711. Id. (citing Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to
Honor First Party Insurance Claims - An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164
(1976)).
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(k) Noninsurance bad faith tort cases.-Courts in nine cases
decided during the 1980s employed "new tort" language in analyz-
ing claims for independent bad faith actions against business defend-
ants in contexts unrelated to the insurer-insured relationship. Courts
for the most part refused to extend the tort of bad faith breach of
contract beyond the special relationship involved in an insurance
agreement. For example, a federal court in Alabama held that plain-
tiffs could not recover in tort from a bank under a theory of bad
faith for the bank's alleged intentional and malicious refusal to close
a loan commitment.71 2 The Nevada Supreme Court held that a
cause of action for tortious breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing did not extend to the landlord-tenant relation-
ship in commercial leases since the parties were not bound by any
special element of reliance or fiduciary duties.713 The California
Court of Appeal found to be prejudicially erroneous jury instructions
which stated that a contracting party who failed to deal fairly and in
good faith was subject to liability for all damages proximately result-
ing from such conduct.7 1  The Pennsylvania Superior Court refused
to recognize a "new tort" arising from alleged breach of contract
with bad faith intent to drive another contracting party out of busi-
ness. 715 A federal court in California found that the new tort for bad
faith denial of the existence of a contract was different from denial
712. Brown-Marx Associates, Ltd. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ala.
1981) (interpreting Alabama law):
There is no indication that the Supreme Court of Alabama has given any
consideration to the implications of applying this tort to contracts in general.
Would it be applicable to someone who fails to pay his grocery bill or rent?
Would it be applicable to the maker of a note? Where would the line be drawn
if the tort is not restricted to insurance contracts?
Id. at 283.
713. Aluevich v. Harrah's, 99 Nev. 215, 660 P.2d 986 (1983) (citing Comment, The
New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13
TULSA L.J. 605, 613-16 (1977-78)). The dissent, however, argued that "[allthough many of
the cases which recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involve insurance
and franchise contracts, I see no reason to restrict actions arising therefrom to these kinds of
contracts." Aluevich, 99 Nev. at 220, 660 P.2d at 988 (Springer, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
714. Quigley v. Pet., Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984). ("Contract,
compensatory, and punitive damages were sought for wrongful conduct arising out of a written
contract providing for Quigley Bros. to haul raw walnuts on behalf of Pet."). Id. at 395.
715. Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & Teslovich, Inc., 344 Pa. Super. 367,
375, 496 A.2d 840, 843-44 (1985). The court observed:
The new tort theory proposed by Standard is easily differentiated from the
established cause of action for intentional interference with the performance of a
contract. The latter occurs when one intentionally interferes with the perform-
ance of a contract (other than a marriage contract) between another and a third
party by inducing or otherwise causing the third party not to perform the
contract.
Id. at 844 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766 (1977)).
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of liability under a contract and separate from the tort of breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 16 Finally, the California
Court of Appeal held that since an independent rental equipment
dealer did not have a special relationship with a national rental com-
pany, he could not recover from the latter for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
7 17
In two cases, however, courts utilized the phrase "new tort" to
facilitate extending the tort of bad faith breach of contract beyond
insurance transactions. In Forty Exchange Co. v. Cohen,7" 8 a New
York trial court held that the beneficiary of a lease contract may
maintain an action for bad faith breach of contract. 719 Likewise, in
Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,7 12 the South Dakota
Supreme Court analogized a limitation of liability clause in a con-
tract for a Yellow Pages listing to a "new tort" of "unconscionabil-
ity" and held the contract unenforceable as a contract of adhesion.7 21
(1) Intentional spoliation of evidence cases.-A unique category
of tort cases that emerged during the 1980s was intentional destruc-
tion or spoliation of evidence. A California intermediate appellate
court was the first to recognize the cause of action in the 1984 case,
Smith v. Superior Court.722 Smith involved a personal injury suit
arising from an automobile accident. After the accident, the plain-
tiff's vehicle was towed to the dealership from where it was originally
purchased. At plaintiff counsel's request, representatives of the deal-
ership agreed to maintain certain auto parts involved in the accident
pending further investigation and repair of the vehicle.723 The dealer,
however, destroyed the evidence of the auto parts. 2
In recognizing a cause of action for intentional spoliation of evi-
dence, the Smith court cited Prosser's tort treatise and recent Cali-
716. Elxsi v. Kukje America Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-99 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (in-
terpreting California law).
717. Martin v. U-Haul Co. of Fresno, 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 25-28
(1988).
718. 125 Misc. 2d 475, 479 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984).
719. Id. at 493, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 632, 639-40 (citing Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should it be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?,
64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981)). However, the trial court held that, in the case at bar, breach
of the covenant was privileged and liability for the "new tort" was not appropriate. Id. at 493,
479 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
720. 358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984).
721. Id. at 246-47 (citing King, The Tort of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New
Times, 23 ST. Louis UL.J. 97 (1979)). See also Wells, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A
Sword as Well as a Shield, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 309 (1977)).
722. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
723. Id. at 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
724. Id. at 496, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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fornia decisions creating actions for "wrongful birth" and "wrongful
life" to support its creation of new torts."v 5 Additional factors consid-
ered by the court included: (1) the state supreme court's recognition
of an analogous tort of negligent failure to preserve evidence for pro-
spective civil litigation;72 (2) the need. to deter acts involving de-
struction of evidence;727 (3) the law's desire to provide a remedy
when someone has suffered a wrong, even when damages cannot be
proved with certainty;72 and (4) the analogy between an action for
intentional spoliation of evidence and the "recognized tort" of inten-
tional interference with prospective business advantage.729
In Spano v. McAvoy,7 3° the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York confronted the claim that the de-
struction of tape recordings of radio communications between a sher-
iff's deputy and the control center intentionally deprived the plaintiff
of evidence needed in a wrongful death action. The decedent's death
resulted from a high-speed chase involving the deputy. The plaintiff
claimed that, since the destruction of the evidence gave rise to a col-
orable action, he had been deprived of his fourteenth amendment
due process liberty and property rights.7 ' The Spano court rejected
this argument, observing that the interest at stake was not constitu-
tionally protected." 2
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the 1986 decision LaRaia v.
Superior Court,7"3 held that an apartment tenant failed to state a
cause of action against her landlord for intentional spoliation of evi-
dence.7"4 The suit in LaRaia arose because the plaintiff was poisoned
by a pesticide used to spray her apartment. The LaRaia court re-
fused to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege a cause
of action based on the landlord's intentional destruction of a pesti-
725. Id. at 496, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (citing W. PROSSER. TORTS § I at 3-4 (4th ed.
1971); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (wrongful birth);
Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)).
726. Id. at 496-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (discussing Williams v. California, 64 Cal.
3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983)).
727. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 499, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-35
(1984).
728. Id. at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
729. Id. at 501-02, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (citations omitted).
730. 589 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
731. Id. at 425.
732. Id. at 427 (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1984)) (noting that the "court there recognized a new tort" and distinguished the cir-
cumstances of the California case from the instant facts because of lack of agreement to pre-
serve evidence) (other citations omitted).
733. 150 Ariz. 118, 722 P.2d 286 (1986).
734. Id. at 121, 722 P.2d at 289.
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cide can and a piece of information that the plaintiff had given to
her treating physician regarding the content of the pesticide used to
spray her apartment.735 The LaRaia court believed that it did not
have to recognize a new tort because under general negligence prin-
ciples the landlord had a duty to mitigate the plaintiff's poisoning
damages attributable to the spraying of her apartment with the
pesticide.
736
Unlike the LaRaia court, the Alaska Supreme Court, in the
1986 decision Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage,737 found the
Smith court's reasoning persuasive and held that the owner of a
massage parlor had a cause of action against local government offi-
cials for alteration of the tape recording of an arrest.7 3' The record-
ing would have provided crucial evidence that the officials had com-
mitted the torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution in arresting
the owner.73 9
The Kansas Supreme Court, in the 1987 case Koplin v. Rosel
Well Perforators, Inc.,740 declined to recognize an action for inten-
tional spoliation of evidence."' The Koplin case was a personal in-
jury suit that arose because a piece of equipment, manufactured by a
third party, failed due to an alleged defect and injured the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's employer destroyed the defective piece of equipment
so that it could not be used in the plaintiff's third party products
liability claim against the manufacturer.742 The court refused to rec-
ognize the action because of concerns about endless litigation, incon-
sistency with the intent of the worker's compensation laws, the plain-
tiff's ability to have ever recovered in the underlying action, the
nature of the damages, the limitless scope of the new duty which
would be created, and the intrusion into the property rights of a per-
son who lawfully disposes of his own property.
743
(m) Public police and emergency expenditures recovery
cases.-Spurred by the economic and policy analysis of the Ninth
'735. Id. at 123, 722 P.2d at 291. The court, however, remanded the case to permit other
amendments. Id.
736. Id. at 122, 722 P.2d at 290.
737. 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
738. Id. at 463.
739. Id. at 464. The court noted that: "Hazen's prospective false arrest and malicious
prosecution actions were available expectancies. If the arrest tape [proving these torts] was
intentionally altered, this was an unreasonable interference with these expectancies." Id.
740. 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177 (1987).
741. Id. at 215, 734 P.2d at 1177.
742. Id. at 207, 734 P.2d at 1178.
743. Id. at 215, 734 P.2d at 1183.
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Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe,744 courts during the 1980s considered, but did not recog-
nize, new tort liability for causing public police and emergency ex-
penditures recovery. 745 In Flagstaff, the city sued a railroad for costs
incurred in evacuating all people living near derailed tank cars car-
rying liquified petroleum gas. Writing for the court, Judge (now Jus-
tice) Kennedy concluded that Arizona law did not recogiiize the mu-
nicipality's action and held that the legislature, not the courts,
should authorize recovery for the city's action.7 6 The Flagstaff court
reasoned that the imposition of the new liability was not worth up-
setting either the expectations of individuals and businesses or the
already existing fair and sensible system for spreading the costs of
an accident.71 7 The Flagstaff court also said that for economic policy
reasons, the party who can avoid risks most economically should
bear the cost of paying for them.748
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit largely tracked the Flagstaff approach in District of Co-
lumbia v. Air Florida, Inc.74 That case involved the District's suit
against Air Florida to recover costs of emergency services and
cleanup required in the aftermath of a plane crash into the 14th
Street Memorial -Bridge. Acknowledging that "settled expectations
must sometimes be disregarded when new tort doctrines are needed
to remedy an inequitable allocation of risks and costs, ' 750 the court
still found that judicial adjustment of liabilities was inappropriate in
this case because a generally fair system for spreading the costs of
accidents was already in effect." 1 Furthermore, the Air Florida
court was reluctant to reallocate risks when the injured party is the
government because the government's decision to provide tax-sup-
ported services is a legislative policy determination and not a deci-
sion for the courts to make.752
San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance75 3 also followed
the lead and rationale of the Flagstaff and Air Florida cases in dis-
744. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
745. Id. at 323.
746. Id.
747. Id.
748. Id. (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974), citing G.
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 69-73 (1970); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
LAW & ECON. 1 (1960)).
749. 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cit. 1984).
750. Id. at 1080.
751. Id.
752. Id. (footnote omitted).
753. 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986).
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missing a county's cause of action against various environmental
groups seeking to recover police expenditures incurred in responding
to a civil disobedience disturbance at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant.754 The court was reluctant to create a new tort doctrine
in the face of "settled expectations."75 Citing Prosser's tort treatise,
the California Court of Appeal noted that the state cannot sue in
tort in its political or governmental capacity whereas a property
owner may sue in tort for injuries to his property in his capacity as
an individual proprietor.75
(n) Breach of confidence cases.-During the 1980s, the Oregon
appellate courts, utilizing "new tort" phraseology, explored the cause
of action called "breach of confidential relationship" in Humphers v.
First Interstate Bank.757 The case involved a patient's suit against a
physician's estate for revealing her name to her natural child, who
had been adopted more than twenty years ago.758 The court dis-
missed the plaintiffs counts for outrageous conduct, medical mal-
practice, and breach of contract, but upheld her claims for invasion
of privacy and breach of confidential relationship.7 59 The court noted
that the plaintiff's claim for breach of confidential relationship was a
case of first impression.76 ° Concluding that two statutory provisions,
one dealing with the physician-patient privilege, the other with phy-
sician licensing requirements, could not reasonably be interpreted to
justify a civil remedy for violation of the physician-patient relation-
ship, the court said that the issue was "whether a physician-patient
duty of confidentiality exists in Oregon in spite of the absence of
such a rule in common law and any statute creating such a right.1 761
Referring to past Oregon case law, the Humphers court found sup-
port for its authority to recognize new rights of recovery in tort
law7 2 and observed that Oregon courts have not been hesitant about
754. Id. at 858-59, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
755. Id. at 859, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (quoting District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
756. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 2 at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
757. 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 298 Or. 706,
696 P.2d 527 (1985).
758. Id. at 576, 684 P.2d at 583-84.
759. Id. at 585, 684 P.2d at 589.
760. Id. at 578, 684 P.2d at 585.
761. Id. at 579, 684 P.2d at 585.
762. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 68 Or. App. 573, 579, 684 P.2d 581, 585
(1984), affd in part, revd in part, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985) (citing Norwest v.
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or. App. 853, 855, 631 P.2d 1377, affd, 293 Or. 543,
652 P.2d 318 (1982)).
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creating new torts.763 In addition, the Humphers court found support
for a civil right of recovery from the violation of confidentiality be-
tween a physician and patient in other jurisdictions.7"4
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's
claim for breach of confidential relationship but not the claim for
invasion of privacy.765 The supreme court observed that the claims of
breach of privacy and wrongful disclosure of confidential information
seem similar but they depend on different premises.7 6 Writing for
the court, Justice Linde traced the physician's tort liability to the
"non-consensual duty of confidentiality" emanating from a patient's
statutory privilege to exclude a doctor's testimony in litigation cou-
pled with statutory legal duties imposed on doctors.767
Jurisprudentially noteworthy in Humphers was the disagree-
ment between the supreme court and intermediate appellate court
about whether Oregon courts have hesitated to create new torts.76 s
The supreme court observed "that at all times a court must decide a
new point of law that necessarily will establish either a right in the
plaintiff or a privilege or immunity in the defendant . . . [but] at
least we do hesitate long enough to examine the premises for or
against a 'new tort.' "5769
(o) Negligent misrepresentation cases.-Several courts during
the eighties employed "new tort" language to probe the conse-
quences of recognizing a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. A federal district court in Robertson v. White77° declined to
recognize the cause of action in a case brought by a class of co-op
members against accountants and lawyers for negligence and fraud
763. Id. at 579, 684 P.2d at 586 (citing Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682
(1969) (creating tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct);
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (creating tort of invasion of
privacy)).
764. Id. The dissent in Humphers believed that the court did not have to create a new
tort called breach of confidential relationship given the availability of the existing tort remedy
of invasion of privacy. Id. at 585, 684 P.2d at 589 (Warren, J., dissenting).
765. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 721-22, 696 P.2d 527, 536
(1985).
766. Id. at 711, 696 P.2d at 529. "Their common denominator is that both assert a right
to control information, but they differ in important respects. Not every secret concerns per-
sonal or private information; commercial secrets are not personal, and government secrets are
neither personal nor private. Secrecy involves intentional concealment." Id.
767. Id. at 718, 696 P.2d at 534 (footnote omitted).
768. Id. at 717 n.14, 696 P.2d at 533 n.14.
769. Id. (citation omitted). During the course of its "new tort" analysis, the supreme
court cited Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982).
770. 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
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in prolonging the co-op's existence after insolvency."' The court ob-
served that the timing was wrong for it to be creating new torts be-
cause the legislature was concerned about the availability and cost of
business insurance.
772
Similarly, the federal district court in, Haigh v. Matsushita
Electric Corp. of America773 declined to "create a new tort" for neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 74 The Haigh court was particularly op-
posed to trial judges making new law and furthermore stated that
"there is no excuse for a court arrogating to itself the authority to
move the law along some purportedly wise or socially desirable
path."775
In Weisman v. Connors776 a defendant argued that the lower
court had created a new tort of promissory negligence when it found
that the defendant had a duty of care in relation to statements he
honestly made during discussions with the plaintiff about an execu-
tive position with an automobile distributorship. 777 The Maryland
Court of Appeals implicitly accepted the defendant's argument in
holding that certain representations made by the defendant during
precontractual negotiations with the plaintiff were not admissible be-
cause the representations could not form the basis of the pre-existing
tort of negligent misrepresentation.778
(p) Unreasonable, improper, or abusive litigation
cases.-Judicial opinions in a few cases decided during the eighties
applied the words "new tort" to cases alleging damages for unrea-
sonable, improper, or abusive litigation. In Carden v. Getzoff,779 the
California Court of Appeal considered a husband's action against his
wife's financial expert in a marital dissolution proceeding. The hus-
band, an anesthesiologist, contended that the "Medical Practice Val-
uation" prepared by the defendant-accountant was false and was the
cause of his settlement dissolution action.780 In appealing the trial
court's dismissal of his complaint, the plaintiff argued that a trend
had developed in California in which the courts recognized a claim
for improperly conducted litigation analogous to the spoliation of evi-
771. Id. at 969.
772. Id. at 970.
773. 676 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Va. 1987).
774. Id. at 1350.
775. Id.
776. 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988).
777. Id. at 441, 540 A.2d at 789.
778. Id. at 456, 540 A.2d at 793-98.
779. 190 Cal. App. 3d 907, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1987).
780. Id. at 910, 235 Cal. Rptr. 699.
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dence tort.781 The Getzoff court concluded that the tort was not cog-
nizable, noting that as long as a good faith basis for the suit exists,
even malicious publications are protected as part of the policy of
granting litigants access to the courts.78 2
A number of Georgia decisions discussed the contours of the
Georgia Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Yost v. Torok,783 which
molded the torts of malicious use and malicious abuse of civil pro-
cess into the new tort of abusive litigation. The tort of abusive litiga-
tion arises when a party asserts a claim not supported by a justicia-
ble issue of law or fact.78 4 Courts noted that the Yost decision
recognized that malicious use of process and malicious abuse of pro-
.cess presented problems to litigants in that neither could proceed as
a counterclaim unless the party who allegedly committed either tort
won the underlying action.78 5
(q) Intentional interference with business or economic relations
cases.-Judicial opinions in two ca es reported during the eighties
referred to "new tort" language in reviewing tort theories alleging
intentional interference with business or economic relations. In a
partial dissenting opinion in Gross v. Lowden Realty Better Homes
& Gardens,78 1 the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court ob-
jected to the majority's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts "expansive new tort" for intentional interference with a con-
tract or business relation.78 7 The dissent noted that previously the
complaining party had to prove fraud or coercion 788 and argued that
the "new tort" is too vague because it makes the defendant prove
justification.
78 1
(r) Miscellaneous cases.-In addition to the generic categories
781. Id. at 911, 235 Cal. Rptr. 700.
782. Id. at 915, 235 Cal. Rptr. 703 (citation omitted). Cf Battig v. Forshey, 7 Ohio
App. 3d 72, 454 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1982) (intermediate appellate court was "without authority
to overrule controlling Ohio Supreme Court precedent to create the 'new tort' [of 'unreasona-
ble or improper litigation']").
783. 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986).
784. Augusta Tennis Club v. Leger, 186 Ga. App. 440, 442, 367 S.E.2d 263, 264
(1988). See also A.L. Williams Corp. v. Faircloth, 120 F.R.D. 135, 137 (N.D. Ga. 1987);
Wilson v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 183 Ga. App. 353, 356, 358 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1987).
785. Analytical Systems Inc. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1469, 1476-
77 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
786. 494 So. 2d 590 (Ala. 1986).
787. Id. at 598 (Torbert, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part; dissenting as to this
part) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-774A (1979)).
788. Id.
789. Id. at 599-600 (footnote omitted).
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of cases previously discussed,7"' jurists utilized "new tort" terminol-
ogy to debate an assortment of additional tort theories during the
1980s. For example, courts decided that suicide did not constitute an
actionable "new tort; ' 79' that public policy bars an action for "edu-
cational malpractice; ' 792 that a claim for negligent publication of an
advertisement in the classified section of a telephone directory is not
actionable;793 and that the first- amendment and state constitutional
provisions protected the Jehovah's Witnesses practice of "shunning,"
barring it from "new tort" status. 94 A claim for negligent failure to
investigate the safety of an advertised product was held not actiona-
ble.7 95 A private right of action for bribery of public officials under
state statutory or common law was denied. 791 One court would not
"legislate new tort law" to hold a social host liable for serving alco-
hol to an intoxicated person797 and another court would not "create a
new tort" of sexual extortion.79 8
IV. A Tentative Appraisal of "New Tort" Suppositions: Problems
and Prospects
Over the last one .hundred years, beginning with the framework
established in Warren and Brandeis's Right of Privacy article in
1890, courts and commentators have utilized "new tort" phraseology
to plumb the depths of judicial creativity in the realm of modern tort
law. This article has, thus far, traced the history of the use of the
"new tort" concept in American law and has provided a taxonomical
structure that has identified two broad categories of cases employing
the term: (1) statutory and constitutional construction cases and (2)
novel questions of common law causes of action. Analysis of these
790. See supra notes 434-789 and accompanying text.
791. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 424 A.2d 744 (1981).
792. See Hunter v. Bd. of Montgomery County, 47 Md. App. 709, 715, 425 A.2d 681,
684 (1981) ("It is conceivable that, if allowed, suits for educational malpractice might arise
every time a child failed a grade, subject, or test, with the result that teachers could possibly
spend more time in lawyers' offices and courtrooms than in the classroom.").
793. See Morgan Roofing, Inc. v. Ohio Bell Tel., 21 Ohio App. 3d 53, 486 N.E.2d 191
(1984).
794. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of New York, 819 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir.
1987).
795. Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987)
(tampons).
796. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Corp., 420 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
797. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 389, 755 P.2d 759, 763 (1988) (citing and
refusing to follow, inter alia, Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1983); Peck, The Role of the Court and Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1963)).
798. Bouchet v. National Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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categories has revealed the numerous distinct "new tort" causes of
action that have emerged and ripened during this century and the
proliferation of these discrete actions in recent years.
But other taxonomical observations are necessary. The various
factors that courts and commentators have used in attempting to link
the universe of possible tort means and ends while utilizing the term
"new tort" should be examined and synthesized. Moreover, the vari-
ous general meanings that courts and commentators have expressly
or implicitly attributed to the phrase "new tort" should be classified.
A. Factors Considered: A Multiplicity of Concerns
As demonstrated in prior discussion, judges and scholars have
articulated a wide assortment of decisional and interpretational fac-
tors in the process of writing about the desirability of recognizing,
expanding, or limiting a "new tort." Postponing for the time a dis-
cussion of what these jurists and writers may have meant by employ-
ing the phrase "new tort," at this juncture a list of the factors con-
sidered seems most useful. The factors considered by judges and
scholars include:
(1) Statutory construction or analogy: for example, whether
express statutory/constitutional language supports recognizing,
expanding, or limiting a "new tort"; whether a new tort can be
implied from a statute's/constitution's language and history;
whether a statutory/constitutional provision provides an analogy
for judicial creation of a "new tort;"
(2) Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions;
(3) Whether current statutory or common law provides an
existing remedy for a clear wrong;
(4) Reliance and expectancy interests of the parties at bar
or similarly situated parties;
(5) Consistency of existing principles of tort law with the
proposed "new tort;"
(6) The relative importance of the interest or interests at
stake;
(7) Whether the proposed "new tort" is suggested by anal-
ogy to traditional common law principles;
(8) The logic and reasonableness of recognizing the "new
tort;"
(9) Whether current tort law has yielded nonuniform, in-
consistent or unjust results;
(10) Concerns bearing on judicial restraint, such as: feder-
alism; whether the legislature is better equipped to decide a
matter of public policy; separation of powers; whether recogni-
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tion of a "new tort" would contravene longstanding law; whether
a higher court should make a judicial policy decision; stare deci-
sis; hesitancy to expand a "new tort" too quickly; the desirabil-
ity of deferring to a pre-existing, principled statutory scheme;
(11) The force of scholarly opinion;
(12) Concern about fostering multiple or frivolous
litigation;
(13) Freedom of contract considerations;
(14) Considerations of deterrence and punishment;
(15) Concern about allowing excessive damages or windfall
damages;
(16) Whether a wrongful injury will go uncompensated;
(17) Considerations regarding the nature of tort law: for
example, whether tort law is a dynamic and flexible system of
law or a pre-existing set of categories and rules;
(18) Matters of pragmatism and practicality;
(19) Matters of morality, social values, and custom;
(20) Labelling considerations: for example, whether a pro-
posed "new tort" can be reduced to a name;
(21) Technological impact: for example, the need to re-
spond legally to changing modern enterprise and inventions that
have created new, unforeseen avenues for personal injury;
(22) Macro-economic considerations: for example, the
likely impact of a "new tort" on industrial growth, efficiency,
and productivity; micro-economic considerations such as the
probable impact of a "new tort" rule on insurance markets;
(23) Historical matters: for example, whether the current
state of the law is archaic, outmoded, and in need of reform;
(24) The procedural context of the case: for example,
whether the ruling below is an order for a directed verdict, a
summary judgment, or an order notwithstanding a jury verdict;
(25) The nature of the facts of the case, and;
(26) The motive of the plaintiff or defendant in proposing a
"new tort" theory.
B. Factors Applied: An Absence of Consistency and Priorities
Of these twenty-six categories of decisional and interpretational
factors identified in the extant "new tort" cases, judges have typi-
cally focused on only a few of the considerations in a particular case.
Different courts stress different factors. Indeed, a particular judge in
different cases may utilize varying factors without explaining why a
change in analysis is in order.
Neither "new tort" case law nor scholarship to date has at-
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tempted to comprehensively assess the most important decisional and
interpretational factors of analysis, or how the factors should relate
to each other. Although many judges and scholars have asserted the
importance of various considerations, such as the desirability of de-
ferring to the legislature or the need to expand tort principles in light
of technological change, no jurist or scholar employing the term
"new tort" in the course of analysis has attempted to comprehen-
sively analyze the interrelationship of the numerous factors or to ex-
plain whether some factors deserve priority in certain kinds of tort
cases."9 This is a worthy project for future work.
Three recent books offer a foundation for further theory build-
ing in understanding what decisional and interpretational factors the
courts should use in entertaining "new tort" arguments, and how
they should use these factors. Oxford law professor John Bell, in his
book Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions,8"' analyzes the proper
role of the English judiciary in light of three role models that he
terms the consensus model (judges should make value judgments ac-
cording to social consensus), the rights model (judges should be lim-
ited to questions of rights and should not decide issues about collec-
tive welfare), and the interstitial legislator model (within proper
limits, judges should make decisions of a similar character as legisla-
tors). In the process of reviewing English case law in which judges
have openly discussed the policy bases of their decisions, Bell identi-
fies six generic judicial policy arguments based on: (I) social factors;
(2) administrative factors; (3) constitutional limitations; (4) fairness;
(5) economic analysis; and (6) "absent" factors (these may involve
"various elements which are not present in the rule-created decisions
in courts"). 8"'
799. Compare the robust literature on the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature in
creating new tort law (R. KEETON. VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE (1969); Cooperrider, A Com-
ment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1290 (1958); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the
Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962); Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69
IOWA L. REV. I (1983); Peck, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 21 TRIAL 19 (1985); Ursin,
Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 229 (1981); Sommer, Transforma-
tive Torts, 97 YALE LJ. 645 (1988)) with general jurisprudential writings on appellate judging
(Albertsworth, Imitative and Apocryphal Reasoning of Courts, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 229 (1923);
B. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Cardozo, Law and Literature,
14 YALE L.J. 705 (1925); Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and
Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Frankfurter, Judge
Learned Hand, 60 HARV. L. REV. 325 (1947); Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Func-
tion of the Hunch in Judicial Decision," 14 CORNELL L.Q (1929); Hopkins, Public Policy in
the Formulation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 323 (1971); K. LLEWELLYN. THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION - DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1923)).
800. J. BELL. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1983).
801. Id. at 77.
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In a more comprehensive generic study, Louisiana State Univer-
sity law professor Julio Cueto-Rua addresses the "dialectical process
of evaluating and understanding the law as evidenced by the judges'
grounding their decisions in similar .. .considerations."8 2 Accord-
ing to the analytical framework in Professor Cueto-Rua's book, Ju-
dicial Methods of Interpretation of the Law, judges should decide
hard cases by considering five groups of elements in the dialectic
process of. interaction between the facts of the case and conceivable
rules of law that may be applied to the case.80 3 The five elements
are: (1) logical elements; (2) historical elements; (3) pragmatic and
teleological elements; (4) doctrinal elements; and (5) value-laden ax-
iological elements.0 4
Finally, Harvard law professor Henry Steiner, in his 1987 book
Moral Argument and Social Vision in the Courts: A Study of Tort
Accident Law,"°5 explores an ideal decisional technique for appellate
courts to use in response to modern tort arguments. Drawing on
themes derived from legal realism, moral theory, as well as insights
of critical legal studies, Steiner sketches an interdependent frame-
work for understanding tort legal argument, which consists of three
vital elements: (1) existing doctrine (rules); (2) courts' moral argu-
ments or justifications supporting these rules; and (3) the social vi-
sion of courts in forming such justifications and, therefore, legal
doctrine. 806
C. The Elusive Meaning of "New Tort"
What is a "new tort"? Beyond an overriding classification of
new tort problems into matters of statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation and beyond review of novel questions of common law
causes of action, what have courts and commentators meant by the
term "new tort"? A few generalizations are in order.
First, most courts and commentators have used the phrase as a
term of art to express a recent or contemplated departure from pre-
existing law. Indeed, this reference is consistent with the dictionary
definition of "new:" "of recent origin; having existed only a short
time; lately made, produced, or grown . ..; [n]ot yet old; fresh; re-
802. J. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 3 (1981).
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TORT ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
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cent; [u]sed for the first time; not second hand."8 7 In this regard,
however, some courts have persisted in calling relatively well-estab-
lished tort actions, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress
or invasion of privacy, "new" torts. Although these causes of action
may have been "new" several decades ago, referring to them as
"new" after a significant passage of time or adoption of a theory by
several jurisdictions seems anomalous. Yet, courts and commentators
still tend to use the phrase "new tort" either out of habit or out of
reference to seminal law review articles or decisions characterizing
the tort as "new."
Second, most courts and commentators have used the phrase
"new tort" in a cautionary sense; they use it as an expression of
judicial concern that they are addressing a doctrinal issue of first
impression or one that will have far-reaching future policy conse-
quences. This cautious attitude has interfered, at times, with com-
prehensive and insightful resolution of a novel case.
Third, and related to the second generalization, a few judges
have used the words "new tort" in a pejorative sense. Judges use the
phrase perjoratively particularly when writing to justify an unwill-
ingness to change existing tort doctrine or to protest the majority's
extension of traditional tort law. These judges seem to suggest that
to alter existing tort rules would be bad or extremely unwise.
Fourth, a handful of judges and commentators have utilized
"new tort" phraseology to trumpet judicial power to change tradi-
tional tort doctrine and to express pride in undertaking that change.
For these few judges and scholars, a "new tort" is a concept of
beauty, of progress, and of enlightenment.
V. Conclusion
Judicial and scholarly use of the words "new tort" aptly fits Jus-
tice Holmes' observation that "word[s] [are] not .. .crystal[s],
transparent and unchanged; [they are] the skin[s] of . . . living
thought[s] and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which [they are] used.""08 At its
essence, however, the term "new tort," as used by American courts
and commentators over the past one hundred years, is an indication,
an item of circumstantial evidence, that a court is being requested to
or has decided to use judicial creativity to alter existing tort law.
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Such use of the phrase is an indication that legal change is at issue
and is worth learning more about.
